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Introduction 
Methodology, or a lack of principles (and no necessary connections). 
The yams of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within 
the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical [ ... ]and to him the meaning of an 
episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out 
only as glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of those misty haloes that 
sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine." Joseph Conrad, 
Heart of Darkness 
tract n. region or area of indefinite (usu. large) extent, (a tract of sand, pathless tracts) 
C.O.D. 
A university thesis, the concept of a thesis, implies a centre with regard to synchronic structure, 
and a trajectory in terms of its diachronic aspect (or a continuous development towards an 
endpoint). A track must be made across an open tract. However this dissertation finds itself in 
the theoretical contexts of a poststructuralism which propagates networks without centres or 
origin, and postmodernisms which discern a breakdown of narrative continuity, whether it be 
subjective and historical (Fredric Jameson) or with regard to philosophical legitimation (Jean-
Francais Lyotard)1. When I say "contexts" I refer to more than a disengaged awareness of 
these vectors of thought, as happening elsewhere, useful here and there - the concerns and 
interests of this thought directly shape some of the views, contents and objects of this work. 
This leads to a small ethico-methodological problem; how (at what loss of engagement) can one 
then view this 'content' (of the work) as something separate from its 'form' (its narrative 
structure, or methodological principles)? In other words how does one still (now) maintain a 
centred focus or locus without some foundational hocus pocus? This thesis has no centre, and 
no teleological progression. This is not an excuse for laziness, or the inability to pull 
fragmented concerns together, but an intentional gesture towards avoiding a totalising logic and 
its various implications. These are then the reasons and pseudo-principles justifying the often 
discontinuous narrative progression of this thesis: 
1 See Jameson's 'Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' and Lyotard's The 
Postmodern Condition. 
a) An overriding 'thesis', a recurring and persistent phrase, is insensitive to the fundamental 
and irreducible otherness of that which is represented. 
b) The analysis attempts to work at a new mode of academic or critical discourse which doesn't 
rest on the laurels of the "grand narrative" or myth of unity, to challenge the sense of authority 
or legitimation the university system as 'spirit' assigns to its various discourses and disciplines 
(Lyotard's thesis in The Postmodern Condition), the stabilised sense of academic place or 
orientation, the complacency with regard to intellectual role or functions. In other words to face 
the crisis of legitimation and function that the critical discourses in the Arts and Hwnanities are 
begitming to experience. 
c i)The forthcoming analysis strives to avoid the common dogmatism of treating 'theory' and 
'literature' as two modes of expression diametrically opposed in their relation and access to the 
real or their referents, and of treating them separately and consecutively as separate entities. To 
deconstruct their 'respective' uses of literal and metaphorical modes I want to avoid using 
literary or cultural theory on literary or cultural texts, in other words, avoid the bogus meta-
level positioning of the scientist above or outside the world he is examining or explaining 
(what could be called the empiricist illusion of objectivity). Literary criticism frequently 
'interprets' a cultural text or texts merely to evidence a particular theory under the guise of 
explaining it. Criticism thus often involves a predictable process of recognition, one which 
tacitly privileges fact over fiction. Fredric Jameson wants to perpetuate or bolster the difference 
that Altlmsser maintains between what Lyotard would call the descriptive and the expressive 
phrase, a difference which "remobilises an older and hencefortl1 classical Marxian distinction 
between science and ideology that is not without value for us even today" ('Postmodemism' 
53). However I wish to examine how these allegedly abstract and hence 'non-representational' 
discourses actually end up, or start off, by "representing" (subjectively) in addition to 
"knowing" (objectively). In a nutshell, instead of finding facts in fiction, this method 
fictionalises all discourse, not to deny their generic differences but to find tl1e figural in even 
factual language. 
c ii) If theory is often prioritised, the subtle point of origin, the fixed centre of the critical 
discourse, the reverse is also often true. The oeuvre of a particular author, a genre or style, 
maybe even a single literary text provides tl1e centre or stabilising focus of tl1e whole system 
and various methodologies or tools are brougl1t to bear on it. Tlus kind of reverse domination 
thus emerges in criticism - this discussion will rather attempt to think the relationship between 
the genres of writing dialectically, in the Hegelian sense of being within each other. This makes 
particular sense when considering what this thesis is 'about' (in the loosest sense of this. 
preposition); the relationship between science-fiction and scientific discourses in general, as the 
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hybrid name of the fictional genre suggests, is already incestuous. But the specific relationship 
between SF 'writing' and SF criticism appears to be almost unparalleled today, at least 
amongst literary genres, in the closeness and immediacy of the two domains. When one looks 
at the particular branch of SF literary criticism and theory that has grown through and out of 
the Science Fiction Studies journal, one detects what appears to be a quite unusual 
interpenetration and entanglement of discourses, where theories and criticism feed right back 
into the fictional streams. In the same edition (SFS #5, March 1975) one will find the arch-
critic Jameson, the esteemed novelist Brian W. Aldiss, and the writer-critic Stanislaw Lem, all 
conversing on Philip K. Dick.. On the other hand the influence of the critics was so 
omnipresent or intense that the paranoid Dick renounces critics such as Jameson, Fitting and 
Lem to the FBI as KGB agents (Csicer-Ronay, xvi). 
d) A related reason is to avoid the diagnostic power relation which come with the normative 
position offered by the medicalising discourses with regard to 'insanity'. One of the topics I 
pursue is that of paranoia and schizophrenia. Levelling the playing field means one can explore 
the paranoid core of some scientific or theoretical discourses, as well the more obvious 
('literal') popular manifestations of paranoia. Instead of essentialising paranoia and 
schizophrenia, and bolstering the line between 'us' and 'them', the interest in these is to 
investigate the creative power of paranoia latent in popular cultural forms and texts. 
Thematic concerns and structure 
The thesis is divided into three main sections; although there are four chapters, the first 
two constitute the first section, and the other two make up the second and third sections. These 
sections examine the theme of technology and the machine as Other to the human in 
progressively more immediate frames of reference, or what could be called contextual 
frameworks. In other words the structure follows a temporal or chronological logic, but not one 
which, with each leap, disposes of the last frame. The progression of foci involves an 
intensification of the lens power, each new frame within the last -like Deckard's remote-
controlled blow-up of his video frame in Blade Runner. Yet unlike the detective we don't end 
up with a kernel of truth or a revelation, but the irreducible nexus of Blade Runner (Ridley 
Scott, 1982 [and Philip K. Dick]), Johnny Mnemonic (Robert Longo, 1995 [and William 
Gibson]), and Fredric Jameson, a trinity of texts (the Father, Son and the Holy Ghost 
respectively), which open out on contexts and other texts, rather than release their hidden 
essences. Initially I discuss modernity as the outer shell or casing of my product (although 
there's no real product, it's all just layers of packaging). Here I examine the way in which SF 
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texts engage in the traditions, problems and debates that one associates with Enlightenment 
futurism and the discourse of modernity. One aspect of this which is of great interest to my 
work is the way in which SF mobilises and explores the traditional oppositions of 
Enlightenment and Romantic thought, the central anxiety being that Man, or his body, is 
becoming, or is already, a machine. This contradiction or conflict is manifested in various 
oppositions, man against technology, spirituality or subjective autonomy versus materialism, 
the body against the machine, production and reproduction, organic versus inorganic body 
parts, etc. The second section deals with what Jameson has identified as a discrete moment 
within the modernity of capitalism, postmodernism (late capitalism), a periodising of 
modernity which sees the transformation of our conventional notions of a semi-autonomous 
(Modernist) culture, and at the same time the massive reinvention of cultural and economic 
practices as marketing strategy. Within this 'last stage' of Capital, a further periodisation or 
categorisation takes place, in which the emerging discourses around computer and 
communicational technology crystallise and herald a new 'dawn' of society, Bush's New 
World Order, the end of history, a language we might provisionally call cyberhype. This 
space, the cultural or media space that has recently emerged as a hegemonic discourse, is 
postmodernism becoming quasi-conscious of itself, which, although making gestures towards 
some sense of a material reality and history, still serves classical (Althusserian) ideological 
functions. 
Modernity 
In the sociology of modernity and capitalism the perennial analogy or metaphor of the machine 
of modernity often surfaces; whether it be an 'iron cage' or an invisible 'economic' dimension 
co-ordinating superstructural activities, a representational figure of the machine or social 
"mechanism" underlies the materialist and historical sociologies of Marx and Weber. The 
denaturalising effect, for which Nietschze's genealogy is also responsible, involves the figuring 
of the social, of society, as something Other and vaguely threatening. However the major 
debate takes place between two writers before and after these great structural analyses. 
Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault's theories of modem subjectivity provide us with the 
grand debate of subjective autonomy, or to what extent the logic of materialism, the causal 
logic of science, should be used to understand 'Man' or the human and social subject. Kant 
goes to great pains to show that Man is not a machine. He introduces the separate and 
supersensible faculty of Reason centred around the principle of subjective moral freedom, a 
logical system working above that of the Understanding, which merely works upon and with the 
world of objects. This could be read as making or preserving a space for the human soul. 
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Foucault, in his notorious Discipline and Punish- The Birth of the Prison, attempts to 
demonstrate how, amongst other guilty humanists, Kant and the Enlightenment project of 
modernity had as their hidden motive, the very reconstruction of the human body as a working 
and specialised machine. The modem soul, in a famous phrase, is in inverted reality "the prison 
of the body". Here the discussion of schizophrenia under the sign of postmodernism is 
anticipated, and it is argued that 'paranoia' could be seen as an expressive and sublime 
metaphorical expression of what Foucault describes more literally: in other words, the co-
ordinated construction of a modem subjectivity through discourses and technologies of power 
that operate on the body. The genealogical method, and his themes, however, manifest 
themselves in an earlier critique of Kant, in Nietzsche's attack on slave morality or 
ressentiment 2 . SF, particularly the cyberpunk motif of the android or humanoid, partakes in 
this fracas over the ambiguity of the concept of the modem subject. The Replicants in Blade 
Runner extend and contribute to this long-standing philosophical problematic of the subject: 
autonomy, machinic obedience, slave morality. 
outline: 
The writing of the other of the human (which is also a defining of the human) is a semiotic 
project, which, in the Enlightenment, requires the figure of the machine, and sometimes that of 
the animal. Questions of subjectivity predominate and fuel this process; what is the essence of 
the human, and are we yet human? The journey towards enlightenment and emancipation is a 
key narrative which underlies the thinking of human history both then and now; the tale of 
freedom based on Kant's schema is shown to inform the world and trajectory of Blade Runner. 
The second chapter on modernity looks at how Marx and Foucault are recipients of this 
emancipation story and respond to the antithetical figures of autonomous subject and the 
machine in their different ways. 
Postmodernism 
Jameson's theory is particularly suited to the other texts that form the nexus of this discussion. 
fu the seminal essay 'Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' he actually 
anoints cyberpunk as the heir apparent to his vision of properly political postmodernism, as the 
2 Jameson sums up Nietzsche's mythology: "Nietzsche's whole historical vision, his historical 
master narrative, is organized around this proposition, which diagnoses ethics in general and 
the Judea-Christian tradition in particular as a revenge of the slaves upon the masters and an 
ideological ruse whereby the former infect the latter with slave mentality - the ethos of charity -
in order to rob them of their natural vitality and aggresive, properly aristocratic insolence" 
(Political Unconscious 201). For Foucault ethics is just one strategy of enslavement working 
to control the "natural vitality" of 'the body'. 
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nearest thing to a contemporary political artform which maps out ~e individual's non-
imaginary relation to the real conditions and the global. In this chapter we analyse in depth 
Jameson's theory ofpostmodernism, discerning: a) the distillation from popular (and 
intellectual) culture of an essence of"depthlessness" and the 'culture ofthe simulacrum', b) its 
diachronic correlation in the schizophrenic paradigm of both individual and collective 
obliteration of the past, a fragmented, hyperstimulated and charged perpetual present. This 
chapter also focuses on an evaluation of the schizophrenia paradigm, and discerns a undeclared 
opposition between catatonic schizophrenia and the paranoid type, the latter receiving 
Jameson's tacit approval. 
outline: 
The chapter starts with some speculation on the new effects of postmodernism- superficiality 
and a negation of ethics appear to herald a popular awareness of the materiality of culture--
cultural systems, such as the cinema, are seen as specific technologies with purely pleasure-
orientated function. This sensibility allows one to reflect back on the emancipation narrative 
already identified in Blade Runner, and we now see how it is undermined. The co-existence of 
different ideologemes of modernity, some ofwhich contradict each other, is analysed. The 
discussion then moves onto Jameson's theory ofpostmodernism, looking specifically at the 
culture of the simulacrum and the role technology plays in the deconstruction of the 
representation-reality dualism. The simulacrum theory is contextualised, and seen to be an 
amalgamation of ideas from Baudrillard, Debord and McLuhan. The section ends with an 
analysis of paranoid schizophrenia as a condition which involves a creative response to the new 
forms and dynamics of late capitalism. 
Cyberpunk\ Cyberhype 
This chapter gets down to an exploration of a new sensibility or aesthetic situated in the 
present phase of postmodernism, a cultural response to overtly cybernetic conditions and 
environments provisionally called cyberhype. The focus here is on interdiscursive production of 
a dominant cultural space, a contemporary sociality or sense of collective project explicitly 
celebrating and mobilising (post)modern technology, in particular the figure of the network. 
This trope is explored quite extensively and quasi-critically in Johnny Mnemonic's high 
tech/low tech thematic opposition. Cyberhype, the excitement generated around the emergence 
of a new, distinctively postmodern 'power technology', is the most immediate context of 
cyberpunk, a context which it paradoxically helped pioneer. It includes innovations in popular 
dance music, the internet, and multimedia and virtual reality developments. The flip-side of this 
embracement of the new machine age is the paranoia, withdrawal and resistance of the anti-
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State cult or alienated individual. This eschatological discourse resisting national hegemony 
and the techno-media is most visually manifested in the Branch Davidian cult, the Oklahoma 
bombing, Una bomber, or the Mid-West Militia who believe that American weather patterns 
are controlled by a CNN satellite-- apart from the usually right-wing politics these pockets of 
resistance are protocritical gestures. Here Jameson's distinction between "weak" postmodern 
films (which merely eulogise postmodern technology) and the few that manage to begin to 
represent the immense, unrepresentable structure of power and Capital behind the figure of the 
network, is of particular use in analysing the difference between the effects of most 




This final chapter attempts to interpret postmodernism as cybernetic age and involves a 
questioning of the innovation and political weight of the cyberpunk genre. The section follows 
on from the discussion of schizophrenia, and tackles the genealogy of the concept of the 
sublime. Moving from Kant's theorisation of the sublime, the analysis moves on to an in-depth 
investigation of Jameson's notion of a new (politicised) technological sublime, and the new 
figural role for technology. Anned with this criterion the section then meanders into a 
discussion of the definitions and claims of cyberpunk as literary movement. Cyberpunk is 
contextualised by tracing the influence of pop sociology, and other ideological and stylistic 
forces. In an attempt to theorise, or at least identify, a broader aesthetic, that of cybernetic 
fiction, the discussion returns to the theme of paranoia and its relation to the rise of 
performativity and efficiency as the new hegemonic legitimating principle that rules the 
cybernetic space of Late Capital. This involves trying to connect, Lyotard, Habermas, and the 
Frankfurt School around the common concept of instrumental reason and reification. 
3 It is thus argued that Johnny Mnemonic does begin to meet Jameson's requirements for a 
'deeper', more politically conscious text, that it offers a "glimpse into a postmodern or 
technological sublime" ('Postmodernism' 38). 
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CHAPTER ONE :AUTONOMY AND AUTOMATON 
If it were -- and thank God it is not -- expected of the anthropologist that he presage the future 
of humanity, no doubt he would conceive it, not as a prolongation or a transcendence of present 
forms, but rather on the model of an integration, progressively unifying the characteristics 
proper to cold societies [i.e., the type of order, approximated in archaic societies, which rests 
on the primacy of reversible, cyclical time] and hot societies [i.e., historically turbulent change 
and "progress", approximated in modem societies]. His reflection would take up the thread of 
the old Cartesian dream of placing machines, like automata, in the service of man. He would 
follow the traces of this dream in the social philosophy of the eighteenth century up until and 
Saint-Simon. For, in announcing the passage "from the government of men to the 
administration of things," the latter anticipated the distinction between [material] culture and 
society and the conversion, which information theory and electronics enable us at least to 
perceive as possible, from a type of civilization which historical becoming inaugurated in the 
past-- but at the price of a transformation of men into machines --to an ideal civilization which 
could succeed in transforming machines into men. Then, culture having received the 
burden of manufacturing progress, society would be liberated from the millennia! curse 
which forced it to enslave men in order to progress. Thenceforth, history could make 
itself 
Claude Levi-Strauss, 'Lecon inaugurale' 
(quoted in Dominick LaCapra, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher) 
1 
Introduction: The Spectral Metaphor of the Machine 
The epigraph to Philip K. Dick's 'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?' contains a strange 
fragment of information which appears to be a cutting from a newspaper article reporting from 
Auckland in 1966. Altl1ough iliere is no reasonable way of substantiating whether it is part ofilie 
fictional artifice of Dick's story, tl1e reader will probably feel tl1at tl1e date, close to iliat of its 
publication, weights ilie interpretation towards it being 'real'. But apart from introducing ilie meta-
ilieme or overarching textual strategy of undecidability, and pointing to ilie instability of oppositions 
that will ensue, iliis particular oscillation between 'fact' and 'fiction' is not what is of interest to us in 
ilie article. It tells of a turtle tl1at was given to the King of Tonga, preswnably an important leader, by 
Captain Cook in 1777, and which had just died nearly 200 years later. 
The animal, called Tu'Imalila, died at the royal palace ground in the Tongan capital of 
Nuku, Alofa. 
The people of Tonga regarded the animal as a chief and special keepers were appointed to 
look after it. It was blinded in a bush fire a few years ago. 
What immediately astonishes ilie Western reader is tl1e importance and value lent to or imposed on tl1e 
turtle. Not only is ilie turtle given human status through a name, in itself an extraordina1y act of 
empathy not usually present in human-animal relationships
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, but it is additionally invested wiili the 
power of a leader, who requires "special keepers". The article foregrounds the process by which culture 
projects and confers values on its domain or terrain. Culture recognises and ignores entities as subjects 
-here the turtle is recognised as a subject, or rather as a super-subject, a leader. We are used to or 
familiar with the concept of 'animals' constituting a semiotic Other by or against which we, as 
'humans', are partly defined in opposition. This process of differentiation allows us to eat them, make 
us work for them, etc., although the above example makes us conscious of the varying degrees of 
emphasis different cultures put on iliis difference. The creativity of culture when it so visibly invests, if 
not invents, subjectivity infects the reader's own sense of what it is to be a subject in society. Tlus turtle 
tale thus forces home the anthropological realisation iliat the rules, rights and principles regarding 
human subjectivity, or the status and powers attending ilie position of a conferred subjectivity wiiliin 
any culture are both arbitrmy and necessmy. 'Arbitrary' here means culturally and linguistically 
produced and contingent, as opposed to 'natural' and universal - pennutations of subjectivity are 
foregrounded as constructed fictions, via the privilged status of the turtle. 'Necessary', on the other 
hand, refers to a contradictory sense that this recognising of subjects, this treating of subjects 
differently from objects in tl1e world, is, although peculiar to a culture, nevertheless a fundamental, 
empirically recurring and inevitable distinction, recognised and produced by all cultures and languages. 
Subjectivity is tlms a necessary myth or fiction. We shall see tl1at the philosophical ilieme of the 
importance of ruumals as pets, even when tl1ey are mecl1ruucal, play a sigtuficant role for humans in 
1 Apart from the pet phenomenon, rutimals are generally used and considered dispensable by humans. 
2 
both 'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?' and Blade Runner, and at the same time contribute to the 
deconstructive confusion attending the main theme of the human-machine difference. 
This is of course Kant's central and persistent theme: the distinctively human or intersubjective 
world (the moral realm) must be considered as something apart from the objective world of things. In 
other words the scientific, deterministic logic put to work on the latter should not be applied to the 
realm of subjects. Humans are essentially- or at least should be- free beings, not things. This is more a 
prescription than an objective description, a principle without which proper social being would not be 
possible. Consequently, the subject-subject relationship is fundamentally different from the subject-
object relation. For Kant's writing tl1e distinction between the 'human' and the 'non-human' or 'Nature' 
(whether it be turtles or mountains) is a persistent textual opposition, a motif tl1at surfaces in the 
various distinctions between phenomena and noumena, the faculties of Reason and Understanding, and 
in the theory oftl1e sublime (which opposes the perceiving subject to the threatening other of Nature). 
Kant feels tl1at the human-moral realm of intersubjectivity is threatened by the natural-mechanistic 
realm, that it needs to be defended, shored up against tl1e growing power of scientific explanation. In 
Beck's introductionto his edition of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason this concern is analysed: 
The ultimate issue which Kant faced consists in the logical incompatibility between tl1e 
objective and subjective conditions of scientific knowledge. It is the dishannony between 
the object of science and the human ends it is made to serve. In tl1e Renaissance, after 
Galileo, Descartes and Newton had banished purpose from nature, nature came to be seen 
as a vast mechanism. With the replacement of Aristotelian ideas by mechanistic 
conceptions, science began to achieve unprecedented control over nature. A similar change 
of viewpoint in Hobbes, Spinoza and Harvey with regard to man's own body and mind 
opened the way for analogous advances in the control of man. 
But control for what? It is man who develops science and through it controls 
nature for his own purposes. There lies the paradox: man is understood as a machine, but 
the use of his knowledge of himself and of the external world is thoroughly purposive. (1) 
For Kant science had to serve tl1e higher human ideal and purpose of freedom to be worthwhile; hence 
the faculty of Understanding and its sensible world was subordinated to Reason and its supersensible 
dimension. The delimitation and mapping of the incommensurable 'realms' of ethics (reason) and 
science (understanding) constitute the essence of Kant's intellectual project. What I attempt to map in 
this section (the following two chapters) is an incomplete and discontinuous repetition oftl1e conceptual 
dualism ofthe 'human' and its otl1er, tl1e 'non-human', represented by the alternate, and at times 
synonymous, figures of the 'machine' and the 'animal'. This entails a genealogy of figuration that 
moves disjunctively from Enlightenment philosophy to the cybernetic or cyberpwlk sub-genre. The idea 
is to contextualise this central if not obsessional theme of the cybernetic aesthetic, to historicise its 
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philosophical problematic; hopefully it will be demonstrated that this 'new' fonn is doing old 
philosophical work, and that in tum philosophy partakes in a bit of science-fiction. 
Although there are many 'others' to the conceptualization of the 'human', such as the 
'animal', 'nature', the 'machine' or 'technology', they tend to converge tmder the sign of the 
'mechanism' or 'machine' in modernity, and especially in postmodem space. Since Descarte's 
treatment of animals as automata, as pure mechanical bodies without souls and thus inumme to pain, 
the figure of the animal has often been deployed as a substitute for the machinic other of human 
subjectivity. No Jess an authority on the human machine than Norbert Wiener, the idolized founder of 
cybernetics, confinns that "Descartes considers the lower animals as automata .. .to avoid questioning 
the orthodox Christian attitude that animals have no souls to be saved or damned" (Cybernetics 41). 
Even Kant's 'pure idea' of the whole of Nature which confronts the perceiving subject as a totality is 
understood as a giant mechanism, a natural machine that appears to be designed with a purpose and by 
a designer- this connotative prope1ty obviously becomes even more prominent with the development 
and geopolitical spread of colonialism and industrialisation and the increasing domination of lived space 
by capitalism. The process described above, essentially of conquering Nature, is what Jameson reworks 
as the postmodem sublime: where Kant's theory of the sublime involved the subject encotmtering the 
raw ferocity, omnipotence and magnitude of nature as a totality, Jameson maintains that this power is 
taken up by a technology and economic order which, in colonising what was previously seen as the 
untamed system of nature, takes on its menacing and antithetical properties for the perceiving subject. 
Teclmology and the world economic system eventually assume the role projected onto Nature in Kant's 
time, that which is other to the human. However the transition from Kantian to postmodem sublime, as 
the mapping of the man-maclline relation onto the macro-dimensions of humanity versus technology, or 
man against the totality or system, is a topic for the following chapter. Here I want to confine the focus 
to retracing the mutation of the simple textual relation between the autonomous subject and its figural 
nemesis, the machine or automaton, and its various substitutions in the writing of modernity. 
Apart from this genealogy or diachronic aspect of the man-machine dualism, which attempts to 
show the mutation of this binary opposition, a simply synchronic or ahistorical perspective provides the 
ground for another mode of interrogating the figure of technology. What I want to show in Hegelian 
fashion is the perpetual conceptual interdependence of the hwnan and its other, a semiotic symbiosis: 
even when Kant talks of the majority, agency or moral autonomy of the enlightened subject the figure of 
the machine haw1ts his discourse and emerges at certain junctures. In their respective accounts ofthe 
tragedy of modernity Marx and Foucault also attempt to uncover the repressed of history, a degraded 
and abused body which is located just beneath the surface veneer of humanist history and philosophy. 
For both these writers the progress of capitalism or modernity is the massive lie that our world is 
becoming more 'human'; their writing shares a common strategy of revelation, inversion, a turning of 
the tables- exposing how it in fact becomes Jess human or natural and more mechanistic. For early 
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Marx the repressed truth is a human essence, for Foucault the invested body. Although Foucault might 
deny any such moral outrage the position from which he speaks indicates a case of what Habermas 
discerns as 'cryptonormativism', or "the arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot account for its 
normative foundations" (Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, 276)
2
. 
So far I have been discussing the figure of the machine as a static conceptual entity - but 
'figure' has another shade of meaning, referring to a distinctly human personality or character. We talk 
of a 'major figure' in the art world, in history etc. In addition to the essentially synchronic (linguistic or 
symbolic) difference between man and machine, what needs to be addressed is the specific deployment 
or appearance of this dualism (that of man-machine, humanity-technology) in a proto-narrative, or what 
we could simply call a recurring myth. Hayden White points to a basic desire, a human essence in 
narrative, saying that "far from being a code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing 
experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which 
transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted" ('The Value of 
Narrativity in the Representation of Reality' 6). In other words the man-machine opposition could be 
reinterpreted as the effect of a more primitive and sub-conscious narrative of escape from a world of 
necessity or slavery. In this myth, a story which we might call after Lyotard the 'myth of emancipation' 
(but perhaps meaning more than just an historical forn1 oflegitimationi, the hero or central .figure 
undergoes a journey of enlightenment or self-discovery, in which he moves from a state of bondage or 
machine-like enslavement to one of freedom (whether it be moral, intellectual, or economic). This 
chapter explores the various slightly differing versions of this essentially unchanging mytl1, and 
maintains against the dominant currents ofpoststructuralism tl1at even where scientific discourse posits 
and seems to operate in a post-narrative systemic mode it is not so much a founding dualism which 
grounds, for instance, Kant's architectonic- it is often rather a hidden mytl1, with powerful allegorical 
dimensions. While poststructuralism's insistence of semiotic play on the surface of meaning denies the 
2
lt1 'Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again' Habermas points out Foucault's 
methodological or stylistic hypocrisy of a prejudiced or false positivism. On the one hand Foucault "scoffs at 
the 'gauchist dogma' which contends that power is what is evil, ugly, sterile and dead ... For him there is no 
'right side' " (282), but on the other hand his theorisation of power seems to imply some normative evaluation 
of it: "if one tries to glean the standards implicitly appealed to in his indictments of disciplinary action one 
encounters familiar determinations from the normativistic language games he has explicitly rejected" (284). If 
we accept Habennas' point we find the great anti-humanists are in fact ultra-humanists, whose intensity of 
response to reification, commodification or power is really a measure of their sense of the colonisation of a 
properly human-moral topography of freedom. In this sense neither Marx nor Foucault escape what Kant calls 
the regulatory or pure idea of freedom elusively hidden in the faculty of Reason. 
3 Lyotard sees two principle forms of narrative legitimation grounding knowledge and education in the 
Eoropean culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: "The mode of legitimation we are discussing, 
which introduces narrative as the validity of knowledge, can thus take two routes, depending on whether it 
represents the subject of the narrative as cognitive or practical, as a hero of knowledge or a hero of liberty" 
(The Postmodem Condition, 31). He puts an expiry date on this though, saying that "the grand narrative has 
lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative 
narrative or a narrative of emancipation" (37). For our purposes, however, the waxing and waning of the 
legitimating power of the freedom fable is not of much concern. Rather, with Jameson, the emphasis here is on 
the trans historical and transgeneric mythic power of this kind of narrative dynamic. 
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depth oftl1e deep-structures of structuralism, this analysis reactivates iliis discarded master-model of 
depth and argues t11e importance, perhaps even the determining priority, of narrative structure 
w1derlying human consciousness. This is ofparticular importance to our present cultural dominant 
which sees a historically unprecedented cultural spatiality hostile to temporal forms, more particularly 
science silencing the mythological constructions of narrative. The delegitimation of narrative blinds us 
to its centrality. 
Even if iliis proves to be too big a statement to maintain, what can at least be confidently 
asserted is t11at the historically delimited philosophical discourse ofmodemity is firmly rooted in 
narrative power or legitimation. Lyotard points out how modemity paradoxically reinvests in (grand) 
narrative as an autl1ority at tl1e same time as expanding the realm of scientific or empirical logic at tl1e 
expense of narrative. He discems a "renewed dignity for narrative (popular) cultures, already 
noticeable in Renaissance Hwnanism and variously present in the Enlightenment, t11e Sturm und Drang, 
Gennan idealist philosophy, and tl1e historical school in France. Narration is no longer an involuntaty 
lapse in legititllation. The explicit appeal to narrative in the problematic of knowledge is concomitant 
with the liberation of the bourgeois classes from the traditional authorities" (The Postmodern 
Condition 30). The two dominant mytl1s assert 'tl1e people' as the subject or hero of liberty, and 'the 
University' as the hero of knowledge (31-2). Later on he makes it clear that even Marxism makes use 
oftl1e two major fonns of narrative legitimation, involving the heroes of liberty and knowledge he has 
discussed: "The Party takes the place of the University, the proletariat that of the people or of 
humanity" (36-7). But if Lyotard confines tl1e emergence and fw1ctionality of iliis 'particular' mytl1 to a 
specific historical period, there is also support for the view of a transhistorical emancipation narrative. 
Jameson, in The Political Unconscious, suggests that the emancipation or struggle narrative is an 
allegorical dimension to all cultural texts, and a myth recurring across different modes of production 
(Political Unconscious 19-20). After quoting a famous sentence from Marx and Engels' "The 
Communist Manifesto", a passage which starts witl1 "the hist01y of all hitl1erto existing society is the 
history of class struggle: freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian .. ",Jameson explains how his 
project involves the revelation of a core, recurring story of struggle towards emancipation: "It is in 
detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to tl1e surface of the text tl1e repressed 
and buried reality ofiliis fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its 
function and its necessity" (20). Jameson here seems to be replacing the 'real' history of Marx's 
discourse witl1 st01y, where the repressed is a narrative of sorts -- tl1is will be examined in more detail. 
More immediately, in the discussion below of Kant's philosophy we see how he articulates autonomy as 
diachrony, as a narrative quest, and modulates the story to fit the context of the rationalisation 
processes of a modemising society. 
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REPLI-KANT (thinker, tinker ... ) 
The conferral of subjectivity in the turtle episode quoted above suggests the leitmotiv of Kant's 
work; within the broader project of a demarcation of philosophy into autonomous realms, he was 
particularly concerned to see the establishment of an independent sphere of human-orientated 
knowledge relating to morality and intersubjectivity, around the central principle of the recognition of 
subjectivity and subjective freedom. This was a difference already acknowledged in the separate fields 
of ethics and metaphysics or ontology, but Kant attempted to work at revealing the fundamental or 
transcendental principles of the moral world or the domain of 'practical Reason', the ground rules 
which enabled the very possibility of ethical thought and behaviour. In the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant puts forward four antinomies which illustrate the impasse between the rationalist and empiricist 
modes of reasoning. The Third Antimony contrasts a Thesis which maintains that "causality in 
accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world 
can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also 
another causality, that of freedom" and an Antithesis which asserts "there is no freedom; everything in 
the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature" (quoted in Owen, 10-11 ). These 
perspectives appear to contradict or undermine each other and provide an unresolvable aporia - either 
everything is determined, or some things are immune to determinism (and there are first causes or 
origins). Kant reconciles these competing views by positing two autonomous legislative realms of 
reason, the realm of theoretical reason and that of practical reason (everything, including humanity, is 
causally determined and yet we are also free). Kant argues that "The legislation of human reason 
(philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature, but 
also the moral law, presenting them at first in two distinct systems, but ultimately in one single 
philosophical system. The philosophy of nature deals with all that is, the philosophy of morals with that 
which ought to be" (quoted in Beck, 15). Theoretical reason operates within and upon a phenomenal 
world of appearances, and is grounded in the faculty of understanding; it provides knowledge of the 
empirical world of objects. Practical reason deals with noumena, things-in-themselves, which aren't 
knowable or representable, and it is established a priori in the faculty of reason. Kant argues that 
cause and effect (as well as time and space) are part of our perceptual apparatus, a way of seeing the 
world which projects itself onto it; as a facilitative or mediating mechanism the appearance-orientated 
explanatory system of cause and effect is thus entirely inadequate for dealing with the invisibility of the 
sensibly inaccessible 'noumenal' dimension. 
This split implies a duality in the subject, between a self which is able to perceive itself as an 
empirical object (i.e. as phenomenal, or as appearance) and a self which is able to know himself as a 
transcendental self(i.e. noumenon, or as a 'thing-in-itself'), where the fom1er is determined or 
conditioned (by the laws of nature), entangled in the net of cause-and-effect and the latter is a free, 
rational will (obliged and guided by moral laws), with the capacity to be the origin of actions and 
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events. This is quite a strange inversion of the linguistic order: the abstract property of 'autonomy' is 
rethought as a noun (thing-in-itself), while the now1 or 'th.ingi1ess' of the 'body' is rethought as an 
adjective (appearance). The concept of freedom arises out of the unconditioned causality realised by 
and peculiar to rational beings. "As a rational being and thus as belonging to the intelligible world, man 
cannot think of the causality of his own will except under the idea of freedom, for independence from 
the determining world of sense (an independence which reason must always ascribe itself to) is 
freedom" ('Foundations of a Metaphysics of Morals' 107). This transcendental subjectivity is a w1ique 
supplement to what hwnanity otherwise shares with the rest of the world of objects (indeed it is our 
human essence)- 'being' as being merely a part of the grand machine of nature. In this respect, in the 
opposition of a world ofF reedom to that of Necessity, Kant's tl1eory can be seen to be harbouring tl1at 
fugitive fable iliat Jameson alleges Marxism releases into the light of day. Marxism tells the ultimate 
story, the only one, which is the final yet repressed allegorical dimension of all narratives: "These 
matters can recover tl1eir original urgency for us only iftl1ey are retold within tl1e unity of a single great 
collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic a fonn, tl1ey are seen as sharing a single 
fundamental theme -for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of 
Necessity*; only iffuey are grasped as vital episodes in a single, vast unfinished plot" (Political 
Unconscious, 19-20). The origin of this opposition of the "realm of Freedom" to tl1e "realm of 
Necessity" is explained in a lengthy footnote quoting an extract from Marx's Capital. Following 
Kant's model Marx discusses the perennial battle between 'man' and fue "blind forces of Nature", 
between menial, material production and tl1at supersensible realm, still to come, which lies "beyond" it: 
"The realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is in fact detennined by necessity and 
mw1dane considerations ceases ... Beyond it begins tl1at development of human energy which is an end 
in itself, tl1e true realm of freedom, which however can blossom forth only wiili tlus realm of necessity 
as its basis" (Political Unconscious 19). As will become evident a bit further on, the human as "end in 
itself' criterion is what Kant claims paves the way for an eventual 'realm of ends' where humans are 
more than just the means to an end. 
But how does Kant make the leap from a free will which is able to itutiate spontaneous action 
to 'moral freedom'? He discerns a realm of necessity or causality wluch only applies to rational beings 
living within language, subjects who are subject to linguistic imperatives oftl1e order of "ought": "All 
imperatives are expressed by an "ougi1t" and tl1ereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason 
to a will wl1icl1 is not in its subjective constitution necessarily conditioned by tlus law" ('Foundations of 
a Metaphysics of Morals' 72). I11 tl1is domain there are rules wluch govern tl1e dimension of social 
behaviour and interaction, but which don't mecl1anically determine how one acts, functioning rather as 
"constraint". These rules or imperatives exist to regulate or control tl1e subject's behaviour when it is 
still motivated by specific empirical ends, when it acts subjectively. However when the finally perfectly 
rational being cuts itself off completely from the empirical world of material ends (as would a divine 
8 
will) and acts morally for the sake of the pure moral law of practical reason alone, i.e. acts objectively, 
for the sake of the 'good', then constraints are not necessary and the subject cannot bethought of as 
being constrained: "The "ought" is here out of place, for the volition of itself is necessarily in unison 
with the Jaw" (73). For humans, who are not perfect moral beings (although we should strive to be), the 
will is constrained by 'duty' to the moral law. Yet we should be grateful, for this is the only free zone, 
in which the subject is able to realise (both intellectually and practically) his freedom in the human will. 
Thus the human subject is free to a degree in his social world and conduct but determined in his natural 
environment - subjectivity is made free, or its freedom is only enabled in or recognised, by the moral 
law. The moral law is the only condition of freedom. Thus, as David Owen says, "to act freely is, for 
Kant, to act morally" (Maturity and Modernity 11 ). But for Kant morality or the moral law and duty is 
more than an arbitrary set of prescriptions. Behind the rules governing or shaping human interaction 
lies the supreme moral principle that one expects others to respect your freedom as you respect theirs. 
Tlus is expressed in Kant's famous categorical imperative: "Act always according to that maxim whose 
universality as a Jaw you can at the same time will" ('Foundations of a Metaphyics of Morals' 94). The 
free subject wills the eollective or universal will, so that the social world or public space she fmds 
herself inhabiting respects human freedom, thereby ensuring her own and others' freedom. 
In the 'Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals' Kant asserts the basic difference in value 
between the world of persons and that of objects. In a surprisingly direct and expressive passage Kant 
explains that 
beings whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, if they are not rational 
beings, have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called "tlungs"; on the other 
hand, rational beings are designated "persons", because tl1eir nature indicates tl1at they are 
ends in themselves, i.e. things which may not be used merely as means. Such a being is 
thus an object of respect and, so far, restricts all [arbitrary] choice. Such beings are ... 
beings whose existence in itself is an end (86-?t 
The recognition of humans as ends in themselves is a necessary step towards understanding Kant's 
thesis that the human subject is essentially (should be) a legislator in the "realm of ends" (95). This 
kingdom or realm of ends is a Utopian state in which each human subject legislates for lumself in 
accordance with the principle that it should hold for everyone, and respect their status as ends and 
fellow legislators. 
What is striking at tlus stage is the resolution of the third antimony in an uncompromisingly 
dualist plulosophy which insists on tl1e coexistence of contradictory causalities, one for Nature the 
mechatusm, and one for Humanity, tl1e rational will. We should note however that these logical systems 
are not seen as having equal status- Kant feels obliged to defend a 'higl1er' morality under threat from 
4 Marx echoes the sentiment, as we have seen: "Beyond it [material "realm of necessity"] begins that 
development of human energy which is an end in itself' 
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expanding science and technology. Although neither sphere manages to obliterate the other, Kant 
emphatically insists throughout his work that practical reason is the 'higher' dimension or world, the 
dimension which is the most appropriate for the human. As Owen points out it is a defensive act: "The 
mutually exclusive positions expressed in the antimony arise, for Kant, out of the tendency of 
theoretical reason to transgress its limits, to overstep the boundaries of experience within which it holds 
sway" (Maturity and Modernity 11). Simply put, theoretical reason needs to be kept in its place. The 
result of this, with regards to thinking about human nature or the human condition, is a spectral or 
phenomenal world underlying or overlaying (inconunensurable yet coexistent with) the moral law or 
practical reason, in and from which humans are seen to be partly conditioned by the same infinitely 
regressive chain of cause-and-effect that seems to work for the rest of nature (a bow1dless, chaotic 
world which Derrida's metonym differance begins to evoke). Kant often uses the metaphor or simile of 
the machine to describe this other totality of the mechanical world or 'realm of nature', in which the 
human can no longer be considered autonomous; he mentions "the natural whole is looked upon as a 
machine" ('Foundations of a Metaphysics of Morals' 95). Through this dialectical frame we are seen as 
absolutely free yet also infinitely conditioned, although Kant finds the former a more appropriate, 
authentically human way of viewing humanity: tlus subjective, 'humanist' intuition is ultimately tl1e 
only reason he can provide for privileging it. Unfortw1ately he cannot exorcise the equally insistent 
'fact' or proposition that humans are also part oftl1e mechanism of nature, and the spectre of 
detemunism hangs over a "higher" human autonomy. 
In tl1e properly animal world of sense the human noumenon is thus transfigured into a ghostly 
phenomenon, an automaton, or a being upon wluch and through whom causal energy flows like a 
current and whose every move is detemuned by everytl1ing (and infinity) but tl1e self. Norbert Wiener 
recow1ts the history of the automaton, Ius figure of preference for thinking 'the human maclune', a 
description which includes Leibniz's monads. 
Each of them lives in its own closed w1iverse, witl1 a perfect causal chain from the 
creation or from nunus infituty in time to the indefinitely remote future; but closed tl1ough 
tl1ey are, they correspond one to tl1e other through tl1e pre-established harmony of God. 
Leibtuz compares tl1em to clocks wluch have been wow1d up so as to keep time together 
from the creation of all eternity. Unlike hwnan clocks they do not dtift into asynchonism; 
but tlus is due to the miraculously perfect workmanship oftl1e Creator. 
Thus Leibniz considers a world of automata, which, as is natural in a disciple of 
Huygens, he constructs after tl1e model of clockwork. TI10ugh tl1e monads reflect one 
anotl1er, the reflection does not consist in a transfer of the causal chain from one to 
another. They are actually as self-contained as, or more self-contained than, the passively 
dancing figures on top of a music dance. They have no real influence on the outside world, 
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nor are they effectively influenced by it. As he says, they have no windows. (Cybernetics 
41) 
It becomes obvious why Kant is so keen to create a human causality of spontaneous action, chains of 
effects stemming from human origins, outside of the infinitely regressive causality of the natural world. 
Essentially he wants to exorcise the automaton and replace it with an autonomous subject. Additionally 
Kant indicates time and again that freedom of the will and the noumenal rational world is open not to 
just humans but to "rational beings" as free agents in general. These two features, the dual-world 
paradigm or dialectical mechanism of thinking the human, plus the accceptance of any vaguely 
humanoid subject, makes his theory particularly useful- if not indispensable- for understanding the 
pseudo-anthropological differentiation of 'Replicant' and 'human' worlds in Ridley Scott's Blade 
Runner (as well as anticipating more generally the sci-fi arch-theme of artificial intelligence and the 
recurring trope of the cyborg). 
In Blade Runner 'Replicants' are biologically manufactured worker-slaves devised to do dirty 
work for humans, and as manifestations of the science-fiction category of robots, hwnanoids or 
androids they constitute a repressed Other to the properly human. The cyborg-human difference 
inm1ediately and intuitively signals their inorganic-organic essences, which mobilise the slavery-
freedom dualism and other related oppositions. In other words, in Jameson's language, this is just 
another- perhaps more open or conscious manifestation of the old repressed story of the human 
· struggle for freedom, in which the hero is a slave, a slave class or even the whole of humanity in general 
(depending on the allegorical level) who tries to move from the "realm of Necessity" or w1freedom to 
one of Freedom, or perhaps even to transfonn the fanner into the latter. As Jameson suggests, Marxism 
is only able to articulate more clearly what is a time-old Utopian impulse, present in the 'anagogical' 
level of Medieval hermeneutics and media-age advertising alike: "the collective struggle to wrest a 
realm of Freedom out of a realm of Necessity" (?olitical Unconscious 9). Necessity is a sub-human 
world, the world of exploitation, privation and subaltemity, of menial, bodily labour (as described by 
Marx); it is also the world of mechanical bodies, predetemuned mechanical 'death' (the Replicants have 
an unalterably fixed lifespan), lack of purposiveness and recognition of purposiveness (dignity), and the 
wholesale reduction ofthe subject to a means (the spectre of Kant's humatuty). This master-code, 
Freedom out ofNecessity, then activates or enables an analogical connection with a whole set of 
subsidiary stories ofthesame order, the illegal alien hw1ted in the First World city (individual or 
commwuty against the totality), persecuted Jews in Nazi Gennany, people with HJV struggling against 
a hostile majority (death-sentences for nunorities). 
There are also correspondences between the Replicants' predicament and Kant's Utopia of a 
"realm of ends". In Blade Runner we find a bw1ch of renegade latest-model Nexus-6 Replicants from 
an off-world colony running amok in this world (planet earth). This description "running amok" is 
somewhat perversely sarcastic as one of the thematic irotues the film hammers home is what little social 
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effect these new anthropomotphic additions to the streets actually have. This tiny group of renegade 
workers hardly threatens humanity at large. They must be "retired" merely on principle, a principle 
applied mechanically in a cold, relentless and brutally 'human' causality- this is heightened to a 
supremely obvious moment in the scene where Deckard kills a Replicant (the Snake Dancer), where we 
see a naked, vulnerable and blood-spattered female body flailing - and ultimately, tragically jailing-
through sheets of glass, as she is shot from behind. The translucent, plastic garment she wears and the 
transparent panes of glass quite literally exacerbate the spillage of blood, and more figuratively 
contribute to the sense of representational clarity appealed to, the obviousness and decisiveness of an 
act of murder, of killing "in cold blood" (a signified additionally hammered home by the gender 
relation, the male-on-female violence). At this nodal point in the narrative, the title of the film itself 
becomes tmavoidably ironic; "blade runner" becomes a bald euphemism for "killer" or "executioner", 
a transparent lie which casts metonymic ethical doubt on the whole of the legal-political apparatus, 
which in tum brings into question the integrity oft11e whole system. 
logical associations: 
I textual inversion : 
Humanity\Earth \LA 
"kingdom of ends" 




mechanism of nature 
"part of a mechanism" 
means to an end 
Humans 
Deckard's act of murder plays quite an important role in pushing the story into Jameson's 
third 'anagogic' level of allegory developed in The Political Unconscious. The first level of meaning 
involves seeing the individual text as a 'socially symbolic act' attempting a fantasy or imaginary 
resolution of a real social contradiction. His second level of meaning is one in which the individual text 
partakes in class warfare, or at least as ideologeme exists as testimony to the larger, transpersonal 
discourses of class. These are the fairly obvious connotations the Replicant-Humanity opposition 
signals to begin with; Replicants are labour (the realm of Necessity), humanity is capital (tl1e realm of 
Freedom), or the ruling class; one is determined, the other is free. However Jameson posits a third level 
which involves an even longer wave-length of struggle, that of the whole of society; here the tension is 
on a larger scale, between modes of production, a society struggling with itself to become free. For 
Jameson this is really the final horizon of the cultural artifact, implicit and unconscious yet embedded 
in the text, waiting to be glossed by the analyst, yet already at work in its dynamics. The second level of 
class rhetoric doesn't negate the third dimension of Utopian longing, ratl1er it enables it: "all class 
consciousness- or in otl1er words, all ideology in the strongest sense, including the most exclusive 
forms of ruling-class consciousness just as much as that of oppositional or oppressed classes- is in its 
very nature Utopian" (Political Unconscious 289). This exorbitant proposition is explained a bit 
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further on, where Jameson insists "the achieved collectivity or organic group of whatever kind-
oppressors fully as much as oppressed- is Utopian not in itself, but only insofar as all such 
collectivities are themselves figures for the ultimate concrete collective life of an achieved or Utopian or 
classless society" (291). In Blade Runner this deepest of narratives kicks in when the Replicants begin 
to appear more human than human, offering itself as a fairly explicit reading of this usually heavily 
disguised human-historical struggle. The allegorical charge of the oppressed realms is swapped 
around: it is not the Replicants who need to be liberated finally but the human pseudo-world of 
reification and instrumental reason - the whole capitalist mode of production (now the realm of 
Necessity) needs to be emancipated by a fonn of socialism (the realm of Freedom). In this conflict 
between modes of production the fragile yet emergent socialist or Utopian mode of production is 
symbolised by the close-knit intersubjectvity of the Replicants, whicl1 is discussed in some detail further 
on. 
However one should be careful of a too obvious reading of the Replicants 'positive' value (as 
revolutionaries, or ethical 'moral beings'). While at the level of content (a semiotic reading) they 
present themselves as human, all too human, at the level offonn (or narrative development and closure) 
they remain irredeemably Other. TI1is can be interpreted as a deeply ambivalent response to the various 
meanings and affects attached to the figure of technology. A strange doubling takes place in which the 
other world, the machinic 'realm of nature', returns to haw1t Los Angeles, the city of angels and the 
kingdom of ends. The automaton enters the world of autonomy and shows himself to be more human 
than the truly human, to reveal the sham of the moral law which respects "rational beings" as ends in 
themselves. The redemption scene whicl1 sees the Replicant leader Roy Batty's final forgiveness of the 
helpless Deckard (he finds himself in a position where he has the shattered Deckard utterly at his 
mercy) stands in stark contrast to Deckard's lack of empathy, and his cold-blooded actions. As we shall 
see, Kant's definition of 'private reason', that provisionally necessary and part-time subject-position 
which allows the human to become "part of the mechanism" and obey commands from a superior in a 
hierarchical organisation, is exemplified by the avenging angel, Deckard, who just does his job, 
carrying out orders from above. Indeed the fairly explicit Christian imagery deployed in these scenes of 
narrative denouement (as well as Batty's own personal ending) in and about Sebastian's building 
heightens one's already acquired sense of Batty's messianic charisma and additionally fixes it as a 
specifically Christian resonance. In attempting to hold onto his life-force just a little longer he sticks a 
rather Roman-sized nail through his hand, quite unmistakably evoking the crucifixion, and the ensuing 
pain gives him another spurt of energy, another short lease on life
5
. But while Jesus, the originator of 
5 Of course the 'lease on life' metaphor is itself a theme central to the politics of the film, which stands in for 
all sorts of perculiarly postmodern anxieties and anger about the unscrupulous extension of reification and 
privitisation to hitherto unexpolited spheres - here we have an allegorical level refering to the penetration of 
the commodity-form into the the arena of the body (the commodification of medicalised life), the same story as 
the medical aid running out and them switching off the life-support system, a now downgraded state health 
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the moral law, died nailed to a cross for our sins, departing this world to join his father so that we could 
follow him, Batty has killed his father (Tyrell) and nails himself to nothing, for nothing or no-one 
(apart from perhaps teaching Deckard a lesson), only to remain in our world, this world. This 
refiguration of the crucifixion tells a vaguely existentialist tale of disappointment at the hollowness of 
the 'moral law' -the lie of a kingdom of ends here on earth under capitalism - and of religion more 
generally, the impotence ofthe Father to change or maintain what he has made. 
But as death and departure it also performs the less obvious function of sealing off the human 
world from that of the threatening Other, the alien- in this case the mechanical world of the pseudo-
human. lfthe figure of the Replicant destabilises the human-machine difference in its presence the 
diachronic aspect of the narrative structure enacts a kind of ritual cleansing in its closure- although 
they come to hatmt they are finally exorcised, chased awa/. We end up where we started, a fonnally 
pleasing symmetry in which we are left with a biologically pure or 'cleansed' population- and hence a 
semiotically sustainable definition of humanity. This brings us to the dark side of the figure of the 
robot, cyborg or humanoid in the science-fiction genre. The horrific othemess of the life conditions of 
the human machine or slave (or the proletariat) can lead to an empathetic stirring or awakening in the 
viewer, which can constitute the impulse to liberate the other from his misery. But on the other hand, if 
the Other (robot, cyborg, android) is sufficiently 'Othered', one can write off its condition as 
irredeemable, appropriate, and possibly even revel in its suffering and its irrecoverable othemess. This 
persecutory pleasure, in eradicating a minority, a weaker adversary, is tl1e flip-side of the Utopian 
aspirations discussed above. Persecution, whether it be the witch-hunt or genocide, can only be 
rewritten as symbolically or figuratively Utopian (as Jameson proposes above) by a large stretch of the 
imagination7 . In Blade Runnertl1ese contradictory responses to the Replicants would then seem to 
speak about an ambivalent or even paradoxical response to both a slave or working class, and the 
forces ofteclmoscience, reification or private reason signified by technology. On the one hand a 
xenophobia towards a now otl1er-worldly working class (Oriental labour in the Far East and South East 
Asia) and a Romantic technophobia, while on the other a reconciliation of classes, and a Utopian or 
Marxian redemption of humanity and tl1e human body tl1rough teclmology. 
This last fantasy is exemplified by Batty's final and ironic victory over Deckard. Even as his 
last life ebbs out of him, he proves his physical and moral superiority over his mediocre victim. He 
embodies the recurring fantasy of acquiring etemal or prolonged life through biological or medical 
knowledge, breeding and medical intervention being the modes of application orientated towards this 
care system trailing behind privatised health etc. I will discuss this more fully when looking at the medico-
pharmaceutical nexus in Johnny Mnemonic. 
6 Depending on the version, Rachel is either an exceptional Replicant (after all she has no expiry date) and 
allowed to stay, or in the more sinister Director's Cut she remains Deckard's plaything for a little while longer 
(and here she is reduced again to being the means to an end, and not a purpose 'in itself). 
7 Jameson points out how in the Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer read a Utopian thread in 
racism, how " ... antisemitism, is shown to be profoundly Utopian in character, as a fonn' of cultural envy which 
is at the same time a repressed recognition of the Utopian impulse" (Political Unconscious 288). 
14 
end. Batty's struggle for inm10rtality can be read as indicated above, as a masked Utopian end-of-
history impulse, a grasp at Kant's "realm of ends" or Marx's "realm of Freedom"- but his whole 
perfonnance also has a distinctly elitist flavour. That Batty comes so close to finding the key to his 
survival (he meets his maker, Tyrell) is an ironic perversity which hints at the fom1 of tragedy- the 
tragic hero usually has a minor but fatal flaw, and he is certainly 'fitter' to live than Deckard, in both 
respects. In fact his physiological prowess is amplified by the Aryan phenomenon Rutger Hauer 
running arow1d bare-chested displaying an athletic torso; this combined with the very concept of 
biological engineering (not to mention t11ejilm noir coding) are supposed to evoke the racial 
Utopianism oftl1e Third Reich, and possibly further even back, Nietzsche's "overman". But of course 
what tl1e association of Nazism and Nietzsche is largely premised on is tl1e fonner's literalisation of 
Nietzsche's metaphorical imperative to 'breed a higher type', eventually into the 'ovennan', often 
translated as 'supennan'. The purpose and ultimate justification of society was to produce genius, 
superior beings who stood out from mediocrity and the nonn. TI1is 'breeding' was not racial or 
biological in any way, but engineered tl1rough education
8
. TI1e tem1 'higher' did not refer to social class 
dependent on economic standing, or any belief in the inherent value of the aristocracy; as David 
Cooper observes "Nietzsche's 'aristocracy' is one of the spirit, not of land or industry" (Authenticity 
and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy 119). Neitl1er was 'type' meant to signify the 
wufom1ed automata that tl1e SS factory floor produced from some fantasy prototype, but an individual 
able to tlunk and make judgements for lumself outside the linuts of a restraining morality (in tlUs sense 
Nietzsche's vision is a radicalisation of Kant's individual's journey of enlightenment, who comes to 
consciousness in morality). In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche tells us what to look forward to: 
Towards new philosophers ... ;spirits strong and original enough to make a start on 
antithetical evaluations and to revalue and reverse 'etemal values'; towards heralds and 
forerunners, towards men of tl1e future who in tl1e present knot together tl1e constraint 
wluch compels tl1e will of nullemlia on to new patl1s. To teach man the future of man as 
his will, as dependent on a human will, and to prepare for great enterprises and collective 
experiments in discipline and breeding so as to make an end of that gruesome donunion of 
chance and nonsense that has been called 'lustory' -the nonsense oftl1e 'greatest number' 
is only its latest fonn: for that a new kind of plulosopher and commander will sometime be 
needed, in face of whom whatever has existed on earth of hidden, dreadful and benevolent 
spirits may well look pale and dwarfed (126). 
8 As David Cooper points out in a footnote on Nietzsche's vocabulary "it should be clear ... tl1at by 
'breeding' Nietzsche is not referring to a programme of eugetucs- tl1ough he did expect cultural advance 
to come from greater racial nuxing. There are no passages where the eugenic interpretation is required, 
and many where it would impossible, as when he writes 'TI1ere is need of a doctrine strong enough to 
have the effect of "breeding" '" (Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy 155) 
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A Nietzschian reading of this struggle of humans contra Replicants would then situate Roy Batty as one 
such superior being, "a new philosopher" tending towards "overman", whose will to power knows no 
internal limits. Batty and his ilk, in their exceptionality or superiority over the norm, present a 
fundamental threat to the dominant utilitarian (whether liberal or socialist) ideology, ideals such as 'the 
greatest number', 'equality', mediocrity etc., and to the perpetuation of these as 'eternal values'. These 
"overmen" have to be eradicated, individually and collectively, for the logic of 'the herd' to prevail, for 
radical difference of ability or aptitude to be erased and negated. This would obviously not be a sutface 
logic in the text, in other words an explicit reason for 'retirement' of Replicants, but rather a 
subterranean 'democratic' will at work in the ideological deep-structure of the narrative, working in the 
interests of the majority and justifying itself (it would need to legitimate itself) by marking the superior 
'other' with the irrefutable paint of 'Nazism'. Nietzsche is himself aware of the possibility of the 
annihilation of the minority who transcend the masses or the herd. He warns against the prevailing 
situation "today, conversely, when the herd animal alone obtains and bestows honours in Europe, when 
'equality of rights could all too easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I mean into a general war on 
everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher 
responsibility, creative fullness of power and mastery" (Beyond Good and Evi/144). 
The Iron Grip of Private Reason 
The alienation of reason, from all the other activities of man, changed reason from an activity to a 
mechanism, and society from a human process to a machine"- Raymond Williams', Modern Tragedy, p. 72 
Kant stands at the dawn of modem philosophy, writing at and as the culmination of the 
Enlightenment- and yet he also has a significant position in the emergence of the matrix of distinctly 
modem object-orientated language of control, the network of medical, psychological, juridical, and 
hwnan science discourses that Foucault collects under the umbrella tenn of "power-knowledge". If the 
Critiques are read as initiating the tangent of philosophical discourse known as phenomenology, the 
Philosophy of Law makes a significant contribution to modem and Enlightenment legal and political 
science. Although 'Kant', the author, is still the w1ifying mechanism by which these different genres 
and foci are held together, he is paradoxically one of the first modem thinkers to envisage and promote 
the specialization and fragmentation of the all-encompassing field of philosophy into separate and 
locally legislated realms. One of his philosophical axioms, and a principle which gets applied 
consistently at the levels of both content and form, is that of heterogeneity: different objects of 
philosophical knowledge involve different mental processes, which each operate on a different set of 
ground rules and principles; these in tum require different discursive spheres. 
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In fact his architectonic of reason, which involves the division ofthe subject's mind into the 
independently legislated faculties of willing, knowing, and aesthetic experience, contributes to the more 
general modernist project of constructing a framework for the distribution and authorisation of 
specialised knowledges, an economy of divided knowledge still at work in the modem university. But, 
coextensive with tllis emphasis on difference, is a belief in sameness. The different tangents and 
discourses of modernity are, for Kant, held together by tl1e goal of modemity rather ilian an onmiscient 
subject: the evolution of a new type of subjectivity which goes by the name of maturity, enlightenment, 
autonomy. Jurgen Habermas suggests this is the original vision behind the whole collective programme 
of Enlightenment, let alone just Kant's wufying principle. "The Enlightenment philosophers wanted to 
utilize tlus accumulation of specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday life- iliat is for the 
rational organisation of everyday social life" ('Modenuty- An Incomplete Project' 9). Specialisation 
was meant to yield progress or development of knowledge in accessible, practical ways for ordinary 
people. Ironically t11e reverse process was put into gear -- the fragmentation of cultural production into 
autonomous and conflicting spheres9. 
Tunung to Kant, I want to follow tlus pedagogical t11eme and look at his developmental or 
diachronic tl1eory of autonomy and maturity after having examined the more ahistorical or synchronic 
analyses of the phenomena-noumena dualism and moral freedom one finds in tl1e Critiques and The 
'Foundations oft11e Metaphysics of Morals'. In Ius essay on the nature of Enlightenment we find Kant 
writing on and witl1in t11e narrative theme/scheme wluch haw1ts his philosophical system. Rearranging 
Lyotard slightly, who sees Enlightenment scientific philosophy first constituting itself and t11en 
validating itself by grafting itself onto a powerful legitimating narrative of emancipation, I argue iliat 
Kant's system or synchr011ic tl1ought appears inextricably bound up wit11 the narrative. 
The goal of autonomy can be analyzed into tl1e two interconnected components of 'subject' and 
'predicate', the paradigm or 'subject' of the autonomous subject as a frozen perceptual and cognitive 
structure at any given point of time, or at least its life-time, and the 'predicate' of progress, teleological 
evolution, the temporal life-process of becoming. Kant is concemed wit11 both of these perspectives on 
subjectivity as autonomy, but tends to focus on one aspect at a time. One gets a sense of these central 
preoccupations or philosoplucal motifs from the essay 'An Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment?', although here he puts more emphasis on process (or history) than mental state (or 
psychology). The first line of his essay gives us t11e answer to the question posed in the title: 
"Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage [sometimes translated as immaturity]. 
9 But whether it was for the mythical subject of 'the people' or the literal individual subject Enlightenment also 
meant a new consciousness of time or temporality which saw a radical break with a static, ahistorical past. 
Philosophical or cultural modernity (as opposed to economic modernization) emanating from the 
Enlightenment period is the process of the subject evolving into or becoming something: for Kant the 
individual moves towards a free, moral subjectivity; for Marx the multicellular subject of the sleeping 
proletariat is awakened; for Nietzsche, the stronger 'overman' emerges out of nihilism, or the loss of the value 
of values. 
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Tutelage is man's inability to make use ofhis understanding without direction from another" ('What is 
Enlightenment?' 30). Although his essay confronts a sense of what has most recently been identified as 
'power-knowledge', in Foucault's later work (Discipline and Punish [1977]), it is nearer to (both 
historically and ideologically) and perhaps prototypical of what Marx discerned as 'ideology' and the 
'superstructural' dimension; essentially it attempts to constitute and address the same problematic, the 
nexus of politics, education, and governance. 'Independence', 'majority' and 'guardians' are words he 
initially uses to describe the diachronic aspect of Enlightenment, and suggest the metaphor of the 
individual's development towards maturity; however this is just one of tl1ree pejorative metaphors - and 
probably the most positive one - that he manages to pack into his short monograph of only a few 
pages. 
For Kant the most part of humanity living in the society of his time were trapped in a state of 
near imbecility. This was in part due to the power of the supervisory strata, the polity or political 
classes that order and guide the social body, and here Kant makes a precocious analysis of the power 
relations inl1erent in the relationship between civil and political society, but he also blames the mental 
inertia of the public itself. People are actually satisfied or content being told what to think and do. The 
philosopher doesn't mince his words, claiming "laziness and cowardice are tl1e reasons why so great a 
portion of mankind ... remain under lifelong tutelage" ('What is Enlightenment?' 30). He returns, a bit 
further into his essay, with an indictment of revolutionary faith in instant enlightenment, arguing that 
the general change in consciousness can only be achieved gradually. In warning against the merely 
cosmetic changes of a post-revolutionary govenunent which still operates for the people, Kant evokes a 
lack of reason and awareness that characterises the general populace: "new prejudices will serve as well 
as old ones to harness the great thoughtless masses" (p.31). The "great tl1oughtless masses" is a 
representation of the absence of consciousness which will shape continental philosophy for a while to 
come, transmitted to Hegel and Marx, for whom the slave or bondsman is still to come into 
consciousness of himself, to Nietzsche who sees willed blindness and sheep-mentality on the part of the 
public. One could well develop an argument that tlus sign or designation seems to provide the 
enunciative or discursive subject-position of 'the plulosopher of Modernity' with a sense of personal 
'identity', both diachronically (in the lineage of a plulosoplucal tradition) and in its synchronic or social 
relation to the public or the reading audience. 
Although Kant goes to great pains to point out tl1at tl1ere is no quick transition between pre-
enlightenment and post-enlightenmnent, that enlightenment is an evolutionary as opposed to 
revolutionary process, it doesn't follow, as it could, that there are therefore no distinctly unenlightened 
people. In fact this is a rather strange inconsistency in Kant's argument. The fact that the "the public 
can only slowly attain enlightenment" would seem to indicate tl1ere is no defuute borderline between 
enlighterunent and the consciousness that precedes it, but Kant's various analogies indicate a quite 
distinct and inferior mental space. The metaphors of "maturity" and "guardians" all point to an analogy 
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not directly mentioned or invoked :the implicit figure of the average person (the public) as juvenile, 
child, or perhaps even infant. This difference is one still marked out within the boundaries of the 
human, in which the adult or teacher is opposed to the child. However Kant continues with his 
figuration, developing this difference and taking it outside these anthropomorphisms and the realm of 
human differences. The second metaphor explicitly draws a comparison between the relation between 
man and his guardians and the relationship between man and domesticated animals, 'thoughtless' 
creatures of burden. "After the guardians have first made their domestic cattle dumb and have made 
sure these placid creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they 
are tethered, the guardians then show them the danger which threatens them if they try to go alone" 
('What is Enlightenment?' 30). Here the lack of where a linguistic faculty should be is doubly 
emphasised in a tautology: cattle, already without language, are deprived it (again) in the adjective 
"dumb". The image of the "harness" in the above analogy is repeated and developed in the assertion 
that "new prejudices will serve as old ones to harness the great thoughtless masses" (31), and connects 
with an accompaniment of related metaphors: "the yoke of tutelage" and "fetters of an everlasting 
tutelage" serve to signal com1otations of exploitation, entrapment, even enslavement. 
This rhetorical surplus offigurality appears to be a compensation for an aporia in the 
discourse; it is paradoxically symptomatic of the failure to represent what is not enligl1tenment, or what 
enlightenment is not; that is, its Other, the 'now', the 'present' of Kant's society. He is much more at 
ease describing the supersensible future state and State, or where it is that a developing history is 
heading, than the sensible present, or what it is coming from. As we see only near the end of his essay, 
"tutelage" as the other of "enlightenment" is actually a euphemistic metaphor for the darker and far 
more nebulous concept of "barbarism": he warns that "Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity 
if only intentional artifices are not made to hold them in it" (p.34), suggesting that this anthropological 
term might be appropriate for the eighteenth century European nation-state. What is it that Kant cannot 
describe, and why can't he present it? The complexity of the 'object' of his analysis, the difficulty it 
poses for his brand of philosophical discourse in relation to the more_ adapted or evolved vocabularies 
of Marx and Foucault, has already been mentioned, and it is only retrospectively via these 
developments that one can appreciate his stretching of a still unspecialised language to its limits. 
Perhaps another reason for this avoidance behaviour, or what we could specify as the repression of the 
present, is the negative affect of the real. The logic of this repression: a sublime horror at the incipient 
sense of an actual and institutional history of domination which cannot be adequately represented 
(neither quantitatively in its totality and complexity, nor qualitatively in its degradation and bestiality) 
is to be avoided if possible. What I am suggesting is that there is repression or obfuscation alongside 
presentation; the metaphors speak about an evil and horror, and yet-- in the figural mutation, a 
process fueled by a sense of their insufficiency-- at the same time testify to its unspeakablity. 
Embedded in this affirmation of a future Enlightened consciousness there is a negation of the present, 
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even though Kant feels obliged to applaud the gestures of his relatively liberal monarch, Frederick Of 
course the truth does out, but, like in all good stories, only in the last line (as we shall see shortly). 
Having discussed two of the metaphors that Kant deploys to represent and repress the other of 
an enlightened humanity, it remains to discern the last and most important one. The final analogy 
deployed to describe the "masses" or docile public is one that, like that of "cattle", takes us out of the 
boundary of the human, and poses the machine as the other to the human. Although this sign only 
emerges in its naked and shocking materiality in the denouement of the story, one can discern its 
manifestation in less obvious garb. In the course of the essay tlus metaphor of the human machine 1s 
reached in a rather roundabout way, its first faint apparition ocurring where Kant goes about discussing 
the various necessary obstacles and restraints on the vector of progress and enlightemnent. The 
complete and immediate withdrawal and absence of social and discursive regulation would lead to 
anarchy and the failure of freedom, and Kant suggests that "the public can only slowly attain 
enlightenment" ('What is Enlightenment?' 31). What is for Kant undeniably and non-negotiably 
necessary in most social and econonuc institutions is a "certain mechruusm" (31) of power distribution, 
a certain disrespect for the individual's subjective freedom and will, which enables the smooth 
functioning of that orga1usation or system. He makes a distinction between what he calls 'public' and 
'private' uses of reason to justify the continued use of social control and prescriptive authority as a 
handbrake on personal freedom. 'Private use of reason' is that use which a person is required to employ 
or obey in his or her specific position within a hierarchical or unegalitarian situation, what he describes 
as a 'passive' use of reason. According to Kant "private use I call that wluch one may make use of it in 
a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him" ('What is Enlightenment?' 31 ). As soldier, 
teacher, bureaucrat, preacher, or even taxpayer (these are Kant's examples) one cam1ot challenge one's 
obligation when duty calls; one has to deliver, act or obey. Although the citizen is still bound (in the 
nation-state of enlightenment) to obey the prescriptive phrases that come Ius way in Ius official ru1d 
specific capacity within an institution (embedded within a socio-econonlic order), he can nevertheless 
look to a public domain of free expression in order to voice his dissent or criticisms. Tlus open and 
totally free zone of ideological traffic, open to one outside of one's immediate econonlic function, is 
what Kant calls 'public reason', a11d here the use of reason is not "passive" but active. "By the public 
use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it before the reading public" (31). So 
one can write freely in leisure-time, outside of the work place, but one ca1111ot disobey a superior 
authority, deny, challenge or reject a duty or obligation or command in a 'run-time' situation. Hence the 
slogan "Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!" (31). 
But if we look a little closer at this stereoscopic image of the "mechanism" the figure of the 
android jumps out at us in a surprising and subtle modulation of tone, so subtle that one nught not 
detect it at a first glance. In justifying the private abuse of reason in institutional spaces he argues, as 
we have seen, for the necessity of a "mechanism": "many affairs which are conducted in the interest of 
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the community require a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must 
passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, through which the government may direct 
them to public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying those ends" ('What is Enlightenment?' 
31). At this point the word "mechanism" seems to refer to a power relation, in which the normally 
active subject temporarily submits to an "artificial" role or function imposed by a higher authority. 
David Owens gives us a literal interpretation of this definition, saying "within a civic post, it appears, 
the individual must be conceived simply as an instrument for the achievement of public goals" 
(Maturity &Modernity 9). However in the second-next sentence of Kant's text, the meaning of 
"mechanism" modulates into quite a new, ambiguous and sinister significance. 
But so far as a part of the mechanism regards himself at the same time as a member of 
the whole community or of a society of world citizens, and thus in the role of a scholar 
who addresses the public (in the proper sense of the word) through his writings, he 
certainly can argue without hurting the affairs of which he is in part responsible as a 
passive member. [my emphasis] ('What is Enlightenment?' 31) 
In a rather startling about face Kant refers to the whole of the social subject as a "part of the 
mechanism", of which a 'sub-part' manages to see itself as global citizen or "member of the whole 
community". We would expect it to be the other way arow1d, the whole human being who submits a 
part of.himselfto a certain mechanistic functionality (this is consistent with the explicit logic of 
capitalism: one sells one's labour as a commodity, so many hours per day, in which time one is obliged 
to go through the appropriate motions regulated by pre-specified codes - being part of a mechanism 
isn't normally seen to extend to recreational or home time). One could interpret the qualification "at the 
same time", as it is clear a certain part of Kant intended, as splitting the subject down the middle, 
symmetrically and simultaneously, into symbiotic and equal partners, a passive and an active subject. 
This would be quite a neat bisection; in which a part of the "part of the mechanism" cohabits 
peacefully with the "citizen of the world" in the same body. But what is striking and of course sinister 
is the way in which the grammatical structure of the sentence momentarily weights this apparent 
balance or happy marriage. The subject of the sentence is the cog in the machine, the "part of the 
mechanism", the subject already there, who manifests or conjures up another self out of itself, a 
surplus self, an emancipated serf- later and lesser, the predicate derived, just like Eve. The primary 
existence of the subject as mechanical part is unassailably asserted and presented by the sentence, yet in 
relative contrast a Cartesian cloud of doubt or w1certainty hangs over the presence of the identity 
dreamed into existence by that uncertain verb "regards", a word which suggests appearance as opposed 
to reality or essence : 'it regards himself as such, but we know otherwise'. 
What does this suggest about the way in which Kant perceives the modem subject? Obviously, 
as I have pointed out, the demands of his conscious philosophical architectonic require symmetry, 
equality, a give and take with regard to the sovereignty of the human will. However, another image 
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appears within a rupture or hiatus in the continuity of his exposition, a representation possibly not 
intended surfaces, a picture of a machinic subjectivity which only imagines or "regards" itself to be 
free, and to be driven by its own will, and respecting the respective wills of a community of other free 
subjects. Kant, the author, might well deny this as his intention, and this would still be consistent with 
the above interpretation: it rests precisely on the principle that there the author does not have full and 
consistent control of the meaning which he appears to produce, and that it is quite possible that 
meanings and images antithetical to his intended logico-philosophical enterprise manifest themselves. 
As David Simpson points out in his introduction to the essay: 
Much of what Kant says here marks him out as a man of the Enlightenment rather than as 
a Romantic, though any extreme version of this historian's dichotomy must inhibit our 
understanding of the period. Here, the emphasis on the possibility of clear and rational 
thinking and its salutary effects on society at large is presented with only hints of the 
darker forces working to complicate the establishment or dissemination of truth. Or 
perhaps we should say[ ... ] that the negative effects are recognized in the argument at the 
same time as a faith in the possibility of their disappearance is preserved (German 
Aesthetic and Literary Criticism 29). 
It is precisely these "hints of the darker forces" that I have been trying to finesse from the text . Where-
ever there is assertion there must - even if simply from a linguistic point of view- also be negation, and 
there can be moments within a logical vector or trajectory when this suppression presents itself. As we 
shall see, the whole system of Kant's philosophy is embedded in and concretises the grounds for human 
freedom; it simultaneously asserts and constructs or develops the principles which govern or enable -
and there lies the ambiguity- the thinking of an autonomous human subject. The image or representation 
denied or repressed by such a conception is what has rather rhetorically been called the spectral 
metaphor of the machine, in this case a human machine which in its enslavement is the inverse of the 
free subject, and which is just a "part ofthe mechanism", a cog in a larger conspiring and dominating 
machine as opposed to a community of free wills or a "kingdom of ends". 
It is only in the last sentence of Kant's monograph on enlightenment that tlus ghostly image of 
the human-machine appears in its full horror. The apparition appears in order to do the work of scaring 
us out of the darkness of myth and into the light, to enable "tl1e escape of men from their self-incurred 
tutelage" ('What is Enlightenment?', 34), and in !us final paragraph Kant suggests that the enlightened 
ruler "is not afraid of shadows" (35). Kant has been hard at work trying to convince the reader oftl1e 
rather conservative notion that the freedom of the mind increases in inverse proportion to the civil 
liberties respected by tl1e state, i.e. tl1at all a country needs is, in David Owens' words, "a few 
enlightened individuals and freedom of public debate" (!vfaturity and Modernity 8 ). A disciplined and 
firmly governed society fosters enlightenment, and a more libertarian dispensation (and here he would 
appear to be gesturing towards the French revolutionary state) actually impedes the enlightenment of 
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individuals. His final sentence is thus a declaration of faith in the climate of intellectual tolerance 
established by Frederick ll in Prussia, and a slow steady movement towards an enlightened age. What 
is here fmally revealed is the true essence of the contemporary public, who have already been 
pejoratively compared to domesticated animals: 
As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the seed for which she most tenderly 
cares -the propensity and vocation to free thinking- this gradually works back upon the 
character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom; 
finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its advantage to treat men, 
who are now more than machines, in accordance with their dignity (my emphasis). (34) 
What is strikingly evident is that Kant is in no hurry to speed up the process of enlightenment. It is 
only when a dialectical movement of enligl1tenment - the interplay between the free intellectual thought 
of an elite and the incremental development of the masses - has reached a stage of maturity in which the 
public is ready that the powers that be can really begin to consider conferring a properly human status 
on all. Men can only be treated according to their "dignity", that is their moral freedom, when they have 
it. The "hard shell" of animal-like immaturity is not cracked, but slowly weathered away, and the inner 
seed of freedom "uncovered". Although there is perhaps a degree of irony or equivocation about his 
description, Kant implies that if the public of a future utopian state are "now more than machines (my 
emphasis)" then people that constitute the masses in his time, a time he has already hinted at as 
"barbarity", are now, at present, no "more than machines", without and undeserving of dignity and 
human rights. This is a fairly negative interpretation or rather one which denies that Kant says 
exclusively what he wants to say. Alongside the explicit appeal for the extension of the domain of 
freedom is a more reticent retentiveness which wants to keep freedom as an end, an esoteric goal 
attained by few. 
One could, on the other hand, argue that his characterisation of the general public or masses as 
"machines" is dripping with verbal irony, and that his rhetoric is intended to highlight the absolute 
depravity, inhumanity and absurdity of the instrumental reason employed by the state. Obviously Kant 
does not really intend it in any kind of absolute literal sense; there is a sense of a degree of irony or 
humorous play in his deployment of this obviously extreme opposition to the human; but in irony there 
is also always a sense of resigned acceptance. This is the sense of a lack of empathy, an inability or 
unwillingness to identify with what is seen as not yet properly human, an intellectual snobbery. And 
when considering the general rhetorical context of the metaphor, what has already been interpreted as a 
defense of the authoritarian Prussian state of 1790 (whose attitudes and strategies were presumably 
being questioned or least compared to the radical events in France) it becomes clear that Kant is 
questioning the maturity and readiness of the public to assume full powers of citizenship. The escape 
from tutelage is then a process which takes time and has to be worked at; the masses shouldn't expect 
to be treated like humans until they can think for themselves, as humans do. Enlightenment then is 
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essentially a process of becoming human, discovering one's own and others' humanity- until then one 
is an animal or a machine. The table below illustrates the oppositions that underlie the elaboration of 
Kant's views on the development of consciousness and Reason. 
present utopian future 
child adult, teacher, 
rrunor majority, guardians 
animals\ cattle guardians 
mechanism (private reason) scholar (public reason) 
barbarity enlightened age 
machine \masses men\ humanity 
If this is the way in which Kant sees the evolution and spread of the individual consciousness towards 
humanity and maturity, what does it indicate about his conception of modemity and history more 
generally? Modemity is the historical stage which makes the goal of maturity possible, and as such is a 
time of transition which holds the promise of a future humanity within it, in which the human recreates 
itself anew in a more human image. Although he admits that he does not live in an enlightened age, he 
nevertheless maintains that the contemporary age was "an age of enlightenment"(33), in which there is 
limited yet gradually increasing freedom. Machines will become men, private reason will shrink to 
minimum as public reason grows in strength, the power relation between an infantile populace and its 
guardians will disappear as all reach the age or stage of majority. In modemity civil society emerges 
out of political society, which in tum becomes less significant. This historico-teleogical theory and its 
motifs proves to be extremely influential, providing the conceptual and thematic framework with which 
a number of later historical critiques (from Hegel and Marx to Foucault) orientate themselves, or at 
least against which they position themselves. As I have mentioned, Kant's inability to represent- or his 
avoidance of- the present indicates a repression; it is achieved through a metonymic shorthand, in 
which various metaphors are substituted to avoid the difficult work of addressing the sublime totality of 
power, instrumental reason, and domination operating in modem society. He admits it is there, but 
omits digging any deeper, expressing faith that it will soon disappear anyway. The totality and power 
structure of the historical present is addressed more directly by the philosophers that follow in his 
footsteps. Marx takes Hegel's treatment of the master-slave relationship and its dialectical narrative of 
emancipation10 and tums it on its head, telling a story of a slave-class becoming conscious of itself and 
1o-rn his magnum opus, The Phenomology of Mind, Hegel offers the strange, metaphorical analysis of a mental 
conflict beween different modes of consciousness which constitutes the principle of all servitudes: 
''The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent , and its 
essence is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsmen. The master 
is the consciouseness that exists for it<;elf, but no longer merely the general notion of existence for self. 
Rather, it is a consciousness existing on its own account which is mediated with itself through an other 
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freeing itself from its enslavement as "part of the mechanism". This is all still within the narrative 
paradigm of 'maturity', the process of becoming more than just a machine. 
Returning to the figure of the Replicants in Blade Runner, it doesn't take much to realise that 
they, in a strange inversion of Kant's dualism of phenomenon versus noumenon, are the community 
that best represent the 'kingdom of ends' - and that humanity, metonymically represented by the killing 
machine, Deckard (but also the teeming, anonymous, sublime amalgamation of populations of Los 
Angeles) represent the phenomenal world of mechanical cause and effect. Indeed the multiple 
ethnicities, the various animal species that make cameo appearances, the sex shows, all that we see of 
human life, provide a sleazy but distinctly biological flavour, a world of genetic determinisms. The 
Replicants are humanoid in fonn yet are biologically constructed robot-workers constructed for specific 
purposes, Pris as a pleasure worker, Batty as a soldier, etc. However they refuse these ends or 
purposes, and embark on an archetypal quest for the transcendental human purpose of freedom, of 
being as an end in itself. They commence the journey of enlightenment, a process of emancipation from 
what Kant calls "self-incurred tutelage" towards autonomy of the will, although as machines the 
"tutelage" comes already programmed
11
. In rejecting their respective specialised fw1ctions they reject 
the reifying force that is described above as 'private reason' and they assert Kant's conviction that 
"every rational being exists as end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that will" 
('Foundations of a Metaphysics of Morals' 86). They seek Kant's redemption in the search for his 
human essence of being (and being recognized as) a pure 'purpose' or an 'end in itself' and of having 
(which amounts to being recognised as having) inherent, immeasurable value- they seek nothing more 
than an extension of their limited lifespans; human life itself, albeit their own (and it is nevertheless a 
recognition of value), exists as their purpose. 
On a more simplistic level it is the Replicants who are the only social or conununal creatures in 
the human world, exhibiting empathy and feeling for each other and living far closer to the moral law of 
enlightened humanity than the isolated and alienated hwnan individuals. I disagree with Philip Strick 
who in 'Philip K. Dick and the Movies' argues that "contrary to Asimov's well-ordered universe, the 
chaotic opportunism of the 21st century has provided for no moralistic implant in android 
programming; these [Replicants] are all creatures without conscience, guilt or fear. And as they begin 
consciousness, i.e. through an other whose very nature implies that it is bound up with an independent being or 
with thinghood in general [ ... ] In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which 
embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its 
notion; for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come 
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent , but rather a dependent 
consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth 
is rather the unessential consciousness[ ... ] The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the 
consciousness of the bondsman" (Hegel, pp. 234- 237). 
11 Here it is appopriate to speculate on some of the resonancs of the name ''Replicant". While the reptile or 
snake is a figure with its own density of meaning in the story, what is relevant at this juncture is the othe half 
of the compound, namely 'applicant': importantly our first introduction to the Replicants involves a situation 
which looks like a job interview, but then it becomes obvious that the Replicant is, via the test, applying for the 
status of 'human', and that more generally speaking the replicants are simply applicants. 
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to wear out, they sometimes go berserk and have to be destroyed" (16). On the contrary, they have a 
rational purpose, and seem to share a deep empathetic w1derstanding of each other. Tyrell, Sebastian, 
and Deckard are all single males, lonely and wmappy, in the leisure time merely alienated parts of 
different social mechanisms. To alleviate his loneliness Sebastian surrounds himself with a collection of 
synthetic 'friends', dwarf-sized humanoid toys (who eventually do fW1 amok, creating a bit of social 
disturbance by throwing garbage arow1d!). While the only emotions that the hard-boiled Deckard (or 
perhaps Harrison Ford) can dredge up are a watery melancholic nostalgia at the piano, and a bit of 
petty cruelty towards Rachel, when he enjoys watching her identity crumble as he reveals to her that she 
is in fact a Replicant. Replicants touch each other with mammalian warmth, while Sebastian and Tyrell 
play a long-distance game of chess. TI1e Replicants operate as equals, whereas the humans are 
enmeshed in power relations and hierarchical systems whether it be Sebastian's domestic politics, 
Deckard's police force or Tyrell's corporation
12
. This latter triumvirate is not partially situated (as 
Kant would have it) but wholly embroiled in Kant's mechanism of "private reason". In tem1s of this 
last social vector, the three bachelors represent- in their spheres of influence, science (Sebastian), 
commerce (Tyrell) and political society (Deckard)- the final victory of reification or cognitive-
instrumental reason over the value spheres of aesthetics and ethics. Habermas has pointed to this 
perception, showing how the various cultural spheres emerge as independent and autonomous domains 
of reason with the beginning of cultural modernity and social modernization, replacing the Wlified 
metaphysical and Christian world-view. According to Habermas the history of Reason in modernity has 
seen one dimension come to the fore, cognitive-instrumental reason, which has been cultivated througll 
the manipulations of capitalism and rationalisation: ironically the 
commooicative potential of reason first had to be released into the patterns of modem 
lifeworlds before the wlfettered imperatives of the economic and administrative sub-
systems could react back on the vulnerable practice of everyday life and could thereby 
promote the cognitive-instrumental dimension to domination over the suppressed moments 
of practical reason. The commwucative potential of reason has been both developed and 
distorted in the course of modernization (Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 315). 
"Cognitive-instrumental reason", a structure of rationality based on knowledge and mastery via subject-
object relations, thus comes to colonise and strangle the other rationalities: "moral-practical" reason, 
as discerned by Kant, and predicated on intersubjective relations (normative evaluations and 
expectations, prescriptions, laws) as well as "aesthetic -expressive" reason, which involves the 
subject's expression and relation to itmer experience. 
12 In this Romantic difference, they are nostalgic phantoms ofthe imaginary loss of more primitive bonds of a 
primal, egalitarian community, 'lost' in the move to a rationalised and alienating Gesellschaft. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MODERNITY CONTINUED - 'THE PRISON OF THE BODY' 
Marx (subject subjected) 
For Marx and mainstream Marxist theory the Kantian faith in the developmental processes of 
cultural enlightenment and an improving humanity corresponding to modernization and capitalist 
growth was another beguiling and mystifying myth. The roles of the emancipation drama have to be 
given to the real subjects of history, the antagonistic classes that emerge in every mode of production. 
The emerging logic of modernity as a time of change is not Kant's "public reason" but a warped, 
instrumental reason which reduces men to things and elevates things to subjects. While offering 
unprecedented potential for the final liberation of humanity, modernity is simultaneously a time of 
degradation and privation, of the loss of the most basic human essences. Rather than moving away from 
a life as animals or machines, modernity means, for the majority of people, a regression back to a form 
of existence even lower than that of animals. "A dwelling in the light, which Prometheus describes in 
Aeschylus as one of the great gifts through which he transformed savages into men, ceases to exist for 
the worker. Light , air, etc. - the simplest animal cleanliness - ceases to be a need for man. Dirt - tlus 
pollution and putrefecation of man, the sewage (t11is word is to be understood in its literal sense).of 
civilization- becomes an element of life for him" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 359). The 
central 'contradiction' within a capitalist trajectory is both moral outrage and absurdity, as well as an 
unreformable econon1ic and structural paradox: the more the capitalists accumulate capital, the more 
impoverished becomes the working class. This central contradiction of capitalism or modernity can only 
be resolved by revolution. 
Marx confronts the tradition of Enlightenment and its preoccupation with consciousness, 
intellectual thought and emancipation and turns it on its head. Exploding the unity oftl1e concept of 
consciousness he redirects attention to the conveniently forgotten mental state of real human experience 
as he saw it, an experience for the most part of humanity embedded in the most atrocious conditions. 
Under the shattered rubric of consciousness Marx establishes the counter-consciousness of the 
proletariat - a different if not antithetical mode of consciousness, a space of alienation and suffering, to 
counteract what he saw as a totalising bourgeois illusion of the whole of humanity in the idea of the 
'essence' of man. In Marx and Engels' The German Ideology t11is is discerned in the criticism of the 
philosophy ofFeuerbach: 
Like our opponents, Feuerbach still accepts and at the same n1isunderstands existing 
reality. We recall the passage in the Philosophy of the Future, where he develops the 
view that the existence of a thing or a man is at the same time its or his essence, that the 
conditions of existence, the mode of life and particular activity of an animal or human 
individual are those, in which its "essence" feels itself satisfied. Here every exception is 
expressly conceived as unhappy chance, as an abnormality which cannot be altered. Thus 
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if millions of proletarians feel themselves by no means contented in their conditions of life, 
if their existence is in contradiction with their "essence", then it is certainly an 
abnormality, but not an unhappy chance (German Ideology 34) 
The incongruency of a concept of a generally fulfilled human essence with the facts of the living 
conditions of a large sector of the industrialised population is pointed out. The main point asserted here 
is that this kind of thinking denies the very real differences of class realities and experiences, and is not 
able to see that social reality needs to be transformed if it does not satisfy a large sector of the 
population. But, even if as a side-effect, the logic employed by Marx and Engels also brings into 
question (or at least into focus) the rhetorical nature of the ontological category of "essence", a 
foregrounding achieved by the isolation of the word in quotation marks.
13 This destabilisation of the 
meaning and value of the concept "essence" is one which proves problematic for the materialist 
approach. On the one hand "human essence" demands to be negated by a historical logic of material 
production, yet on the other hand it is also the ethical principle to which the discourse appeals. There is 
an unarticulated conflict here over what to do with the category of "essence". To reject it would be 
commensurate with some of the positions taken in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 
where he produces a supplement of contradictory negative experience, which ca.tmot be contained by the 
initial clause: "It [capital] produces intelligence, but it produces idiocy and cretinism for the worker" 
(327). Here the emphasis is on the constructedness of human consciousness, a stratification of 
experience built by history. The other of consciousness or experience is not so much an "essence" 
which needs to be fotmd or rediscovered as the repressed other of bourgeois consciousness: proletariru1 
pre-consciousness. On the other hand he also wants to retain a sense of essence, a trace of communality 
and freedom that is still there, struggling in the day-to-day "abnonnality" of industrial capitalism. 
Marx offers an analysis that, in rejecting an existing essential and common humanity, proposes 
a modernity in which two conflicting essences are at work against (ru1d for) each other. The working 
class has an essence or soul fundamentally opposed to that of the middle-class. One can see the 
Hegelian dialectic, a linguistic or semiotic technique, at work in the representation of this other, as is 
revealed in The Holy Family: "Proletariat and Wealth are opposites. As such they form a whole[ ... ] 
Private property as private property, as wealth, is forced to maintain its own existence and thereby the 
existence of its opposite, the proletariat. It is the positive side of the opposition, private property 
satisfied in itself." (quoted in Introduction to German Ideology xiii) and the Proletariat equals the 
"negative side". The Proletariat has as its essence a ghostly essence, a lack or negativity of essence, 
alienation. All the differences (of sub-classes, of pain, pleasure and others) within a "whole" of society, 
as well as those without, are silenced or subsumed by the deployment of the totalising category of the 
13 He continues this metaphysical witchhunt of Feuerbach a little futher on, again foregrounding the archaic 
language of "essences: "To push these aside he must take refuge in a double perception, a profane one which 
only perceives the "flatly obvious" a.tld a higher more philosophical one which perceives the "true essence" of 
things" (German Ideology 35). 
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Proletariat, which has its supposed essence or core, some metaphysical or external principle of 
negativity. This mythologisation reappears in a discussion of political economy: "the whole of human 
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production" (Economic & Philosophical 
Manuscripts 333), which allows for "wuversal human emancipation" through the liberation of the 
proletariae4. At this point Marx's logic sow1ds very much like the multi-dimensional textuality 
analysed in Blade Runner, as either Enlightenment or a deeper emancipation myth. The class struggle 
signifies a greater struggle, that of all servitudes in history (as the 'Communist Manifesto' recounts 
"freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman - in a word 
oppressor and oppressed"). As we shall see a bit further on, Jameson accounts for this redemption 
theme of a 'tragic' Marxism in his analysis ofthe final interpretative frame, 'the ideology of form'. If 
we add to this the contradiction mentioned above between bourgeois "intelligence" and proletarian 
"idiocy and cretinism" a schema both similar and different to that of Kant's begins to emerge. Add 
Marx's appropriation of Hegel's subject's struggle to consciousness and we have the sen1iotic system 
tabled below: 
Proletariat \ Labour Bourgeoisie\ Capital 
Unconsciousness, pain, suffering Consciousness 
Work and animal pastimes Pleasure 
Cretinism Intelligence 
Body\Animal\Machine Mind\Human 
Kant's Enlightenment Marx's capitalism 
"masses" "guardians" working class bourgeoisie 
age of n1inority age of majority nwnerical majority numerical nunority 
animal, machine human dehumanised worker animalistic capitalise
5 
14 Some contemporary theorists would have problems with what could be seen as the latent essentialism of 
Marx's knowing unequivocally their real "conditions of life", because to know 'the other' (in this case, the 
'Proleteriat', or perhaps even 'suffering', as a different order of experience from 'signification') is to be able to 
speak for the other, on behalf of it, and ultimately to force it to comply with its representation. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard' s work within the realm of postmodern ethics poses these kind of problems, displaying a sensitivity to 
the kind of oppositions and differences manufactured, or at least prioritised or embellished, by the order of 
rational signification at the expense of other realms of experience. Lyotard has a problem with the overiding 
generalisation and reductionism that takes place in social theory. In Sadie Plant's words, a post-Marxist 
Lyotard "argued that revolutionary politics inevitably portrays the working class as helpless victims who can't 
help themselves [ ... ] People were not dragged screaming to the factory, at some level they must have wanted 
to go; in some sense they had enjoyed the privations and labours of capitalist life" (The Most Radical Gesture 
142). The argument is that 'they' don't want to be liberated by means of a revolution; perhaps they don't see 
themselves in this representation at all. 
15 ''The existence of a suffering humanity which is oppressed must of necessity be disagreeable and 
unacceptable for the animal world of philistines who neither act nor think but merely enjoy" (Marx quoted in 
McLellan, 19) 
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condition remedy condition remedy 
"part of the "realm of ends", "realm of Necessity" "realm of Freedom" 
mechanism" enlightened age 
private reason public reason class struggle revolution 
If the Other to the human in Kant is the spectral phenomenon of the automaton, Marx 
substitutes it with the more concrete metaphor of the animal, and the more literal and material referent 
of the worker. The conditions of the impoverished or dehumanised subject-worker, the conditions that 
constitute his or her consciousness or subjectivity, are extensively explored by the early 'humanist' 
Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Here the worker has to struggle against the 
forces and processes of reification and alienation in order to become human, in the same way Kant's 
"masses" eke their way out of ideological barbarism, but here the battle takes place in economic terrain. 
We see as well that the figures Marx's discourse mobilises to represent this prehumanity are the 
familiar Others of the animal, and the machine. The consciousness of the proletarian animal arises out 
of a number of alienations which are the subjective effects of an expanding process of commodity 
reification; a process in which relations between people take on the aspect of relations between things 
("It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, 
the fantastic fom1 of a relation between things" [Capita/165]). These conditions also constitute an 
assault on the integrity of the human body and labours - the body is reconstructed as a commodity-
making machine: "labour not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and the workers as a 
commodity, and it does so in the same proportion in which it produces commodities in general" 
(Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts 324). This is a perception that doesn't change; in his 
introduction to Capital Ernest Mandel reminds the reader that "Marx himself added to the German 
edition of Volume 1 the note, that under capitalism, labour-power not only becomes a commodity for 
the capitalist but also receives this formjor the worker himself, implying that this degradation of work 
is both objectively and subjectively the fate of the industrial proletariat." ('Introduction' to Capital 65). 
Firstly, or most obviously, there is the worker's alienation from the product; this is divided into two 
slightly different unpleasant experiences, "objectification" and "estrangement". The worker produces 
an 'objectification of labour' in the production of a product - the finished product which reminds him 
of its power over him, his bondage to things: "it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to 
him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; ... the life which he has bestowed on the 
object confronts him as hostile and alien" (Economic &Philosophical Manuscripts 324). This is quite 
a radical claim: the worker is not even objectified and dominated by another subject (as in the 
traditional master-slave arrangement), but by an object. As we see in Capital it is human subjectivity 
that is sacrificed for a world of objects or commodities, who silence humanity and speak to each 
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other16. Additionally the 'estrangemet~t' of the object is the sense of separation from the product, the 
loss felt when the capitalist fmally appropriates the commodity. Estrangement is also extended beyond 
the worker's attitude towards the single product or object, to the diminishing world of objects, which is 
felt to threaten his survival. 
Second on Marx's list of alienations is the aliet1ation inherent in the actual activity of 
industrialised labour, which leads to the reduction of the human to the animal or a state of purely 
biological survival. Importantly Marx sees this estrangement as "self-estrangement, as compared with 
the estrangement of the object above" (Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts 329). The labour of the 
worker-machine is 'forced labour', labour which is not his own, which is necessary purely for survival, 
and which has all manner of negative effects and harbours numerous perversions and inversions of the 
natural human lifestyle -"the worker only feels himself only when he is not working; when he is 
working he does not feel himself. He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is 
working"(326). These two spaces are analysed as rigidly differentiated ru1der the rule of capitalism, the 
free home and the un-free work-place, but in another semantic twist the worker is 'not even at home 
when he is at home'. Marx sees the home as the degraded place of the basically 'animal fw1ctions' of 
"eating, drinking and procreation", a desocialized space of additional alienation (that which is 
supposed to define properly human-social activity is communal work)
17
. The only possible pleasures 
the worker might be left with are hunted down and exorcised from the worker's consciousness, in order 
to represent a life of pure suffering which "mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind". (p. 328). Here the 
logic of capitalism is seen to force the worker into the ever-expanding zone of Kant's "private reason", 
now quite literally as "part of a mechanism", the mechanism of the factory or whatever other type of 
commodity-producing machine. This economic space increasingly saturates the worker's entire body 
and being, and maintains its hold for longer periods of time. 
Marx moves into a third and quite tangential alienation, that of the worker's alienation from 
his 'species-being' or 'species-life'. Here the Kantian influence is evidet1t, where Marx tries to 
concretise and demystify what was earlier discussed as the supersensible realm of moral freedom, the 
social world or surplus value that constitutes human 'superiority' or rationality ('practical reason'). He 
wants to retain this important difference while working within a materialist perspective. Within this 
almost zoological framework he initiates a process of definition oftlus 'new' concept ofthe human that 
seems to mutate as he proceeds. "Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man from animal life 
activity. Only because of that is he a species-being"- but Marx argues that in tlus upside down world 
of capitalism the fact of estranged labour distorts the relationship, making 'species-being' serve the 
16 "In order therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the 
products of the human brain [including the commodity-form] appear as autonomous figures endowed with a 
life oftheir own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race" (Capita/165) 
17 One could imagine this taken even further along the Hegelian hall of mirrors-- the worker produces, 
through the work of reproduction, a mini object-worker who confronts him as an alien, potentially threatening 
competitor. And Marx hints at it: "procreation as emasculation". 
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biological, individual being, the animal being of 'survival'. This difference as a fundamental distinction 
is grounded in the very motor of human history and production, the space of "conscious life activity"; 
but the ground begins slipping underneath him, and Marx has to concede what evidently strikes him as 
he asserts the contrary, that animals "also produce". However they don't produce art, and after a flurry 
of abortive, feeble qualifications, such as "man produces universally" (Early Writings 329), which 
don't satisfy him, Marx has to resort to precisely that idealism which he had hoped to demystify, that 
unaccountable supplement of superstructural (ideological) 'spirituality' that materialism was supposed 
to do away with, the nebulous realm of beauty: "man also produces in accordance with the laws of 
beauty" ( 329)18. In tum 'species life' becomes a consciousness of the built environment, and then 
fmally Marx settles on a vague 'use' of the concept: "In general, the proposition that man is estranged 
from his species being means that each man is estranged from the others, and that all are estranged 
from man's essence" (p. 330). Why does Marx feel so obliged to defend the concept of the hun1an 
against the animal, one might ask? His equation seems to be 'human animal' + 'species being' = 
'human being', where 'being' signifies both verb (tl1e conscious will) and noun (the body). One could 
argue that this is essentially a rehashed version of Kantian humanism, which seeks to propose a 
conditioned animal-being, an object subject to deterministic causal laws, overlaid with an unconditioned 
human freedom, a subject overcoming alienation through constructing his social environment, and 
through recognising other subjects and being recognised. Man's species-being is the recognition of his 
sociality, his essentially social nature; this is remarkably similar to the sense of 'moral freedom' that 
Kant is so eager to see taking root in European culture
19
. From this point of view Marx is a direct heir 
to the Germanic phenomenological apparatus (the phenomenon-noumenon opposition) and the 
emancipation narrative. 
Foucault (goal or gaol?) 
In the philosophy of modernity Michel Foucault stands as the arch-critic of Enlightenment 
thought and of the Kantian project. Although undoubtedly just one of many anti-modernists that Jurgen 
Habennas discerns following in the wake of Nietzsche's original and absolute negation of Reason, 
Foucault seems to have personally taken on tl1e figure of Kant as some sort of nemesis and yet 
simultaneously as some kind of mentor. Some of tl1e more superficial indicators of his interest in Kant 
include his reading of the famous 'What is Enlightenment?' essay where he sees in Kant's sense of 
temporality or history a prototypical example of the spirit or ethos of modernity, the 'heroization of the 
18 Here again the spectre of Kant emerges, in that Kant proposes a metaphysical 'purposiveness without 
purpose'- similar to the 'end in itself- about the object of beauty; i.e. the mere form of the object must 
stimulate the perceiver of beauty, he must have no interest in it as an object. 
19 But although both see supersensible social or moral realms outside of the ordinary lived reality, Marx finds a 
historical reason as opposed to an eternal perceptual limitation: the reason for its obscurity lies in the 
development of increasingly complex modes of production, which in their naturalisation of the division of 
labour, alienate the truly human Utopian impulse. 
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present', and self-critique and self-reconstruction. For Foucault the continuity that connects us to this 
instance of the thinking of Enlightenment "is not faithfulness to its doctrinal elements, but rather the 
permanent reactivation of an attitude- that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a 
permanent critique of our historical era" (quoted in Owen, 142-143). But it is in the late work 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977) that we find the most sustained yet indirect 
critique of Kant, Enlightenment and modernity, and it is tllis text that I want to gloss with regards to its 
mutation of the figure of the machine. This book seems to be addressed to Kant, inverting the latter's 
teleological movement from machines to humans, to the more dystopian movement of humans to 
machines. Taking a methodological form from Nietzsche, Foucault writes a genealogy of the 
disciplinary and regulatory discursive matrix that emerges in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
control and order burgeoning European populations. This coming-to-grips and taking hold of the 
problems of health, education, low productivity and govemance are what he sees as a modemity of 
increasing power over the human, or at least the human body; of the extension of the social fields of 
power and the intensification of existing power relations in the construction of a human-machine. If 
Kant sees modernity as the historical moment in which humanity could elevate and emancipate itself 
from stagnant myth, power and domination, Foucault is diametrically opposed to this perspective; he 
almost perversely insists on seeing it as the direct opposite, as a new time of the total subjugation and 
occupation of the body by institutional and specialised discourses and other techniques of control. 
We should see Foucault's intervention in the writing of modernity as more than just a 
symmetrical textual or ideological antithesis of Kant, a philosophical dispute of content; it is also a 
dispute of 'form', where Kant's sense ofhistory is comic and Foucault's is tragic. Raymond Williams 
talks ofthe "contemporary reflex [oftragedy], that the taking of rational control over our social destiny 
is defeated or at best deeply stained by our inevitable irrationality" (Modern Tragedy 74). But 
additionally Foucault's genealogy is a self-reflexive activity which meditates on, amongst other vectors, 
the role of critical thought in the creation of what it purports to uncover, infer or 'deduce'. It is an 
activity which apart from questioning Kant's passive reflections on Enlightemnent, questions the 
Enlightenment's active constitution or manufacturing of modernity. Habermas argues that one can 
contest all speech acts against three different validity claims; the assertion's normative value, its truth 
value, and its sincerity or authenticity. These are brought to bear respectively on the utterance's 
relations to the addressee (it assumes a shared standard offaimess ), to the referent (it establishes 
truth), and itself, the addresser (it claims authenticity or expressivity). Justice, truth and sincerity are 
different linguistic validity claims independent of each other, written into the structure of speech 
situations and which can be independently challenged. Foucault doesn't just contest Kant on the issue 
of the normative value ofEnligl1temnent norms and goals, or on the trutl1 value or history of modernity, 
but additionally, perhaps even primarily, on his sincerity, on his relation to his discursive platform. 
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According to Foucault the refom1 calls of the Ideologues, the emergence of human rights 
discourse, the emancipatory rhetoric of Enlightenment, all of this was more deeply motivated by an 
emerging social power's desire for increased control, regulation and subjugation of an imaginary social 
body and the masses of individual bodies. Although control becomes an end in itself, the legal reforms 
of the eighteenth century were aimed at curtailing the inefficient and insufficient power of the monarch 
and stemming the tide of popular illegalities or crime; criticisms of public execution and the new wave 
ofhumanism were essentially the window-dressing ofthis political strategy. "The conjecture that saw 
the birth of reform is not, therefore, that of a new sensibility, but that of another policy with regard to 
popular illegalities" (Discipline &Punish 82). Where individuals located themselves in the pseudo-
spectrum of 'positions' within this overarching discursive vector constructing modem subjectivity does 
not concem him- neither does Kant's consciousness of his contribution to this interdisciplinary strategy 
matter much. 
Foucault insists on the relation between knowledge and power, insisting that they are 
intimately connected, and ends up with a new term, 'power-knowledge relations'. "We should admit 
power produces knowledge ... that knowledge and power directly imply one another" (Discipline & 
Punish 27). Knowledge does not provide power with any kind of human agency worth mentioning; the 
actual subject of knowledge or the individual that takes up a subject-position within a power-knowledge 
space plays a minimal role in the development of knowledge. "In short it is not the activity of the 
subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge ... but power-knowledge, the processes and 
struggles that traverse it, and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge"(28). Foucault doesn't just take on Kant's philosophy as content or form but the 
philosophical Kant and the discourse in which he is situated. Habermas quotes Foucault on the 
significance of Kant's mistake: "Modemity begins with the incredible and w1workable idea of a being 
who is sovereign precisely by virtue of being enslaved, a being whose very finitude allows him to take 
the place of God" (Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 261). Foucault accuses 'him', or at least the 
discursive function we call 'Kant', of complicity, of being an instrumental or arch-architect of modem 
subjectivity, and hence the modernity of power-knowledge, or rather an instrument of instrumental 
reason. Foucault's logic renders a strange, perverse scene. Kant's call for an autonomous subject was 
in reality the guardians' desire for a subjected and organised body, for the automaton (and many 
W1iform automata). 
For Foucault there is an underside to the history of the last two or three hundred years that is 
normally displaced or repressed by the positive representation of the Enlightenment and the liberating 
humanism ofthe ideologues and reformers. This is the history of the penetration of individuals and 
establishment of institutions by discipline, and the construction of a modem subjectivity or soul. Here 
the paradigm for controlling individual bodies as well as orchestrating and organising multiple bodies is 
the machine: 
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Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers 
and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its 
fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously 
subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent 
coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive fonns of training, 
not to the general will but to automatic docility (Discipline and Punish: 169). 
What is significant here is the way Foucault frames his revelation-" but there was also a military 
dream" (my emphasis). He seems to give it a secretive flavour, a dream not normally acknowledged, a 
nightmare repressed from the conscious film of history. This unpresentable, disinherited force is imbued 
with a sense of invisibility, a quality which surface again in his elaboration of "power", and conspiracy 
-the military dream conspires and silently works towards the goal of a well-oiled mechanism ("a 
perfect society") through expanding its domain. What Foucault unmasks as the 'real' is a dystopian 
teleology which symmetrically tums the utopian movement of Kant's modernity or age of enlightenment 
inside out. This 'otl1er' dream- what Kant thinks will be constrained under or somehow magically 
limited to the label "private reason"- cannot be contained within a separate sealed-off sector of society, 
a designated zone allowed and intended to be militarised and mechanical in its organisation; the 
"military dream" or "private reason" is rather a hidden, silent strategy of power that seeps or "creeps", 
to some degree, into all soci.al institutions and sets up new ones. The goals of docility and efficiency are 
not confined to the soldier, but extended to include any useful body in the various modem spaces of 
production, service and training, as well uncooperative and dangerous ones in prisons and asylun1s. 
Power 
Before we examine Foucault's metaphor of the machine it is necessary to explain the contexts 
out of which it emerges, namely the emergence of new, distinctly modem systems of power. In fact, in 
an ideological inversion which removes tl1e primacy of the economic as a determining category, power 
produces the effects of the modem. Foucault sees a break in the late eighteenth century, the 
disappearance oftorture and the decline of the spectacle ofpunislunent (Discipline &Punish 8), and 
the emergence of the hiding of punislunent: even the term changes to 'improvement'. The letting-go of 
the body as the primary target of justice and the "elimination of pain" (16) are indicative of a shift of 
focus of juridical discourse and practice, from the body to the soul. In Foucault's tenninology the soul 
is seen as a kind of new prostl1etic device or appendage sinisterly attached to or implanted in the 
innocent body. In disceming and describing the function of the modem 'soul' he drops the occasional 
lyrical phrase which appears to reveal tl1e essence of his meaning: "the soul is tl1e effect and instrument 
of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (30). He explains his study as one which 
attempts to demonstrate how the emerging sciences of man and a 'humanising' penal system cohere to 
produce the modem soul, the effect of a new way "in which the body is invested by power relations" 
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(24). The implication here is that the real break in modem history is not so much the mode of 
production (the Marxist view), but the emergence of a public power as multi-dimensional social 
strategy. The primary utilisation of the body as a force of production "is only enabled if it is [already] 
caught up in a system of subjection" (26). 
A 'political technology' is proposed which is diffuse, multi-discursive but nevertheless 
produces coherent results. Foucault resorts to both a metaphysical, magical description of power as 
well as a 'scientific' analogy in an effort to express its form as strategy: "what the apparatuses and 
institutions operate is, in a sense, a micro-physics of power, whose field of validity is situated in a sense 
between these great functionings and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces" 
(Discipline & Punish 26). That he is aware that he is on figurative or non-literal ground is indicated by 
the repetition of the qualifying insertion "in a sense", but he still very much wants to locate power 
spatially and literally, suggesting that power is invisible, magical, inhabiting space as a kind of force-
field "between" subject and object. The "field" metaphor provides a hazy notion of the physical 
indeterminacy of power, of it being present yet absent, invisible yet everywhere. This half-analogical, 
half-literal attempt to represent the extremely difficult conspiracy of power is an indication of how 
difficult this terrain is to put into discourse or representation. It would appear we don't really have the 
vocabulary to deal with the power networks of modernity, almost as if our built environment has out-
complicated our capacity to describe it directly, and often Foucault resorts to metaphorical language. 
Tlus undecidable oscillation between metaphor or metonym and literal sign is a phenomenon wluch also 
takes place with the deployment of the term 'machine' to represent the subjected modem body. 
Although it appears at times to be more metaphorical than literal, sometimes it becomes clear that 
Foucault has collapsed the distance between the 'human' and the 'machine', and the latter is the word 
most appropriate for the literal description of certain activities. 
Foucault claims that beneath all the apparently critical appeals of the Enlightenment era the 
new strategy of power is emerging, driving towards a new 'political teclmology'. One of the misleading 
impressions we have about modernity is that of the role played by penal reform in the break with the 
past age. According to Foucault tl1e refonn movement tl1at emerged from the Enlightenment had as its 
objective "not to pwush less, but to pw'lish better" (Discipline & Punish 82), particularly as a means to 
curb the growing illegalities. It aimed to improve the efficiency, regularity and exactitude of the power 
to pw'lish far more than it aimed to bring about the humanist ideals often primarily associated with it. 
He then retraces the refonnists theorisation of a "semio-technique" (94) of pw1ishn1ent that sought to 
dissuade repetition of the crime, by creating a natural, spontaneous link in people's minds between the 
crime and its now specified pwushment. Although the refonnists were against imprisonment, prisons 
suddenly became the basic form ofpw'lishment in the early nineteenth century (115). Whereas the 
reformists envisaged the manifestation of a soul tlnough the circulation of representations (what we 
might call publicity) (127-8), the prisons focused on the body behind walls, creating an obedient and 
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malleable subject. This discrepancy Foucault puts down to the fact that in the late eighteenth century 
one is in fact "confronted with three ways of organising the power to ptmish" (130), the old 
monarchical law, the juridical reformers, and the prison to which correspond three separate 
technologies of power: the inefficient spectacle, the semio-tecbnique, and bodily discipline (131 ). 
Discipline: Installing the Machine 
Foucault's conception of the significant impact of 'the disciplines' on human life in modernity is of 
particular relevance to my analysis of the representation of the machine in the writing of modernity. It is 
discipline as a technique ofthe half-hidden strategy of 'political anatomy' (Discipline &Punish 138), 
as a mode of constructing the body as a machine- or as part of a machine- for specific uses, that is the 
hidden secret of what Foucault still presents generally in enigmatic-metaphorical form ('power') and 
more particularly in elusive shorthand as a threatening conspiracy ('power-knowledge'); discipline as a 
technology- the secret other of the human. Both Kant and Foucault's writing of the other seem to 
depend on an 'organic-natural' versus 'inorganic-mechanical' opposition. But where Kant saw the other 
of the human as the machine, Foucault rewrites the human, the 'natural' dwelling or at-bomeness of 
humanity, in the relatively unconstrained body; what threatens the human body is the rhetorically 
'human', the new, essentially legal, subjectivity deployed by the guardians of the soul. In introducing 
the concept of discipline Foucault asserts that in the classical age "the great book of Man-the-Machine 
was written simultaneously on two registers" (Discipline & Punish 136), the anatomico-metaphysical 
register, as initiated by Descartes, and the technico-political register. The first was an analysis and 
writing of the static body-machine, whereas the second treated the body-machine in motion, taking 
responsibility for, training, and correcting its movements, its operations in time . Foucault claims "there 
was a useful body and an intelligible body" (136), separate entities supervised by different kinds of 
technicians, although they were both required for instilling the common aim of 'docility' in the body. 
The disciplines had undoubtedly existed previously but what was new was the scale of control. Firstly, 
the individual body, its mechanism, was now the target of discipline as opposed to a body of people; 
secondly the object of discipline was the careful coordination of the body in motion; fmality, the 
modality of discipline, "constant coercion", repetitive supervision (137). Discipline, as a specific 
power, produced a direct relation between obedience or docility and utility in the body, which were 
mutually reinforcing. The expansion of this new method was not sudden, and did not emanate from a 
particular institution developing by circulating tl1rough- and cross-fertilising between- educational 
institutions, military institutions, hospitals and industrial workshops (138). 
Foucault's analysis of the new way discipline moulds the human being into a functional 
mechanism results in four types of simultaneous individuality: cellular, organic, genetic and 
combinatory. The cellular individual arises out of his spatial distribution, his own analysed space, 
within tl1e barracks, the classroom, the factory, and according to rank, or some kind of hierarchical grid 
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(Discipline &Punish 141-2). The organic individual emerges from training and the meticulous control 
of his activity and bodily operations in relation to specific tasks. Control of the individual's time in 
relation to the new concept of linear development creates the genetic individual, and 'the composition 
of forces' or the co-ordination of the individuals actions in relation to the group or collective body (the 
soldier to the unit) produces the combinatory individual (164). In his discussion of these different 
methods and processes Foucault repeatedly refers to the machine, to what one can only assume to be 
the common blueprint of 'the machine', for both bodies and the disciplinary mechanisms themselves. 
"The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges. A 
'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was being born; it defmed how one may 
have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wants, but so that they may 
operate as one wishes" (Discipline & Punish 138). Tlus sentence demonstrates both kinds of reference 
to the machine, the "machinery of power" as well as the body that no longer "does", that comforting, 
simple description of voluntary activity, but "operates", as- and possibly with- a maclune. In 
discussing the control of activities Foucault describes the relation of synthesis that the body must have 
with the machine, a relation wrought by discipline in the kind of exercise called the 'manoeuvre' : "it 
constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex" (153). In the composition of forces he 
sees the major task and thrust of the discipline. Its job is "to construct a machine whose effect will be 
maximised by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed. Discipline is 
no longer singly an art of distributing bodies ... but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient 
machine" (164). If "forces" too strongly implies just the acceptable 'fighting machine' of the military 
structure, Foucault finds it in the school of the classical era as well. "The school became a machine for 
learning, in which each pupil, each level and each moment, if correctly combined, were permanently 
utilized in the general process of teaching" (165). In his discussion of the move from spectacle to 
surveillance and Panopticism Foucault again chooses the term 'machine', this time not to describe the 
modem body or a disciplinary mechanism, but rather to define the nature of contemporary Western 
society. "We are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the 
stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves 
because we are part of its mechanism"(Discipline & Punish 217). If the tone here is somewhat stagey, 
bordering on the revelatory, it is because Foucault is concluding Ius section on discipline and feels it is 
time for the narrative denouement, the revelation of a general condition, and this he offers as the 
machine 
The question of how to interpret Foucault's vision of modernity- and it is here made clear that 
"we" are still in the age of discipline- forces itself on 'us'. Does Foucault judge tlus age of control in 
any way, does the recurring image of the maclune indicate something that should be alien to the human 
world? Within the field of science-fiction criticism the man-maclune figure has been discussed quite 
extensively as a binary opposition loaded with connotation, an abundance of meaning. In a discussion 
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of cyborgs in science-fiction film Forest Pyle argues that man-machine and humanity-technology 
dualisms have supposed organic and mechanical essences. At the same time as (usually quite 
obviously) representing a threat to humanity, technology enables and is crucial to the dialectical 
definition of that humanity, to its 'organicness' ('Making Cyborgs, Making Humans: Of Terminators 
and Blade Runners' 228), and, as one could extrapolate, its 'naturalness'. In their essay 
'Technophobia' Kellner and Ryan detect a conservative politics in 1970's science fiction films in which 
"technology was frequently a metaphor for everything that threatened 'natural' social arrangements, 
and conservative values associated with nature were generally mobilized as antidotes to the tl1reat" 
(58). However in Foucault's schema there is no such affirmation of a corresponding force of 
'humanity'; altl1ough words such 'technology', 'mechanism', 'technique' and 'machine' abound, the 
word which describes the 'human' is usually just 'bodies'. The machine or the mechanical has no 
binary opposite in the field of power- even the individual body is sometimes described as a machine. 
This is because for Foucault the machine is not a clear-cut metaphor, for which a literal meaning can 
always be substituted; the machine is often inseparable from the human or the body in the power-gaze 
of modernity, the body and subject becomes a machine. This vision of modernity then yields up a fmal 
reading of the vastly expressive figure of the Replicant, and of the generic 'cyborg' trope: a world of 
complex social control in which power saturates public space and invests the body, transforming it into 
a useful and productive 'dung', regulating its physical and mental health mechruustically, is 
incommensurable with a view of the supplement of human autonomy, and the soul. The Replicant is 
thus the symbolic manifestation oftlus disguised yet 11iggling contradiction- tl1e cyborg represents in 
accessible or representational form, what Foucault himself resorts to describing in metaphor: the 
colmusation in modernity of the human body by the new 'political technologies' of the body-- "the soul 
is the prison of the body". 
Conclusion : tragedy as a response to autonomy 
At tl1is point I would like to preempt my discussion of the sublime in tl1e following chapter, an 
analysis of the postmodem sublime which looks at the difficulties of presenting both contemporary 
technological complexities ru1d its macrocosmic reflection, the world econon1ic system, in other words 
the 'here' and 'there' of capitalism. For now I want to look at a slightly different take on a diachronic 
as opposed to geograplucal sublime, what one could provisionally call the "lustorical sublime". This 
involves the failure of representation to account for the vastness of the temporal depth of history, a 
history of humanity which seems, at certain sublime moments or glimpses, to come from nowhere and 
be heading nowhere, disordered and cruel, perhaps not the history of a 'humanity' at all. This is 
perhaps what D. H. Lawrence expresses as lying belund good tragedy, "tl1is setting belund the small 
action of (the) protagonists the terrific action of unfathomed nature; setting a smaller system of 
morality, the one grasped and formulated by the human consciousness witl1in the vast, uncomprehended 
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and incomprehensible morality of nature or oflife itself, surpassing human consciousness" (quoted in 
Williams' Modern Tragedy 123). For Kant the human subject lives mostly in the sensible world of 
appearances and cause and effect, and its perceptual apparatus and understanding is not adequate to 
deal with inftnite spatial and temporal regressions. We could add that when the cultural constructs of 
temporality, teleology, narrrative are momentarily transcended or fall away, history glimpsed as 
directionless mutation - being rather unsettling - receives a kind of overcompensation from the anxious 
mind; eager to put human history back on track, it invests history with a kind of secret genetic 
structure, a hidden or internal utopian essence, or narrative logic, what Lawrence discerns as a 
'morality' (although we have just seen in Foucault how this can be transfigured into a dystopian telos). 
One can discern this in Kant's early essay, 'Idea of a Cosmopolitical History', where "the history of 
the human race, viewed as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to 
bring about a political constitution .. as the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in 
mankind can be fully developed" (Translator's Preface to Critique of Practical Reason ix). Marx also 
injects a conspiratorial fluid into the beast of history, a figuration in which history is narrativised: "It 
[communism] is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. The entire 
movement of history is therefore both the actual act of creation of communism - the birth of its 
empirical existence - and, for its thinking consciousness, the comprehended and known movement of its 
becoming". The "riddle of history" indicates the aporia that opens up before the historiographer's gaze, 
the immense perplexity and complexity of "the entire movement" which Marx claims to have solved. 
What is ironic about Marx's revelation is that at the moment at which it lays claim to the transparency 
and clarity of its discourse and historical vision, a historical referent outside of language or narrative, 
it has to resort back to hallucinatory metaphor -and the dimension of language - to express it ("riddle", 
"solution"). Metaphor points to the creation and projection of meaning. Additionally the analogical or 
comparative function of metaphor ironically depends on foregrounding that very space between 
narrative or textuality (words) and reality (things) that was supposed to be collapsed in knowledge; 
metaphor suggests that language isn't sufficient or adequate. With regard to the content of the views 
expressed above, it should be made clear that these secret machinations of history are of course not the 
sublime themselves, but rather the traces of a conquered (or at least restrained) sublime feeling - they 
are haunted, with varying degrees of 'presence', by that desperate sense of terror that the larger social 
or natural story or picture eludes one's representational faculties, that it can't be told or seen. Tragedy 
testifies to the unpresentable in history; althougl1 a henneneutic structure or way of seeing predating the 
discourse of emancipation, it is possibly the generic fonn informing the dystopian or anti-emancipation 
narrative underlying the Foucauldian 'nigl1tmare' of history. As Lawrence points out, tragedy involves 
the revelation of the fragility and fictionality of human purpose and improvement; it strips its characters 
of autonomy and development and shows the overwhelming migl1t of external or enviromental forces 
(whether these be Nature or 'political technology'). 
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The figure of the machine in sociology is not a sign patented by Foucault. The significance of 
the machine as a metaphor and underlying or implicit model for the reorganisation of productive forces 
is something that both Foucault and an earlier Max Weber draw our attention to. With regard to the 
metaphor Jameson draws our attention to the fantasy impulse in the work of this school of the 'hard' 
"vision of the total system": "the first group projects a fantasy future of a "totalitarian" type in which 
the mechanisms of domination ... are grasped as irrevocable and all pervasive" (Political Unconscious 
92). There is the suggestion here of a sado-masochistic view of history, in which pleasure is derived 
through suffering, humanity 'tied down' and subjugated. Of course the machine isn't just an attractive 
image or symbol, sheer fonn, it is also a 'content'- they both discern the machine as a fw1damental 
blueprint for modem subjectivity. According to Dandeker, Weber "argues that, in the field of 
administration, bureaucracy is analogous to the machine in the extent to which subjective or irrational 
elements of will and mood are eliminated" (9). Dandeker reckons that Foucault goes further, looking at 
the body-machine, the individual body and subjectivity not just as "a regulated cog in the administrative 
machine" (Surveillance, Power &Modernity 13), but as reconstructed by a whole range of public and 
private discourses and disciplines as a machine in its own right. Both share a vision of the growing 
power of the bureaucratic or institutional machine, in which subjects find their place, as in Kant's "part 
of a mechanism". For Weber they are presumably left to exude some animal warmth outside of the 
economic domain, although even this is doubtful when confronted with the Blakean imagery in his 
well-known 'iron cage' metaphor: 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was 
carried out of the monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly 
morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modem economic order. 
This order is bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which 
today detennine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only 
those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will 
so detennine them until the last ton of fossilized fuel is burnt. 1n Baxter's view the care for 
external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the saint 'like a light cloak, which can 
be thrown aside at any moment.' But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron 
cage. (The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, quoted in Jameson's The 
Political Unconscious 90) 
Apart from the very obvious dramatic finality of that magnificent metaphor placed at the very end of 
the sentence20, the destination of the modernisation process, what strikes us is the distinctly tragic sense 
of inevitability or necessity, the mechanical logic of "fate". 1l1e ironic and "irresistible force" of "fate" 
is a narrative causality most often associated with the genre of tragedy, and several cultural theorists 
20 Jameson notes Weber's 'theatricality' in "Weber's dramatic notion of the "iron cage"" (The Political 
Unconscious 90) 
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have commented on the persistence of the tragic form and other generic codes in historiography and 
other apparently realist or empirical discourses. Hayden White reflects on the tropological 
determination of the style of a history, and suggest there are at least three ways in which a 
historiographical reading is shaped: "interpretation thus enters into historiography in at least three 
ways: aesthetically (in the choice of a narrative strategy), epistemologically (in the choice of an 
explanatory paradigm), and ethically" (quoted in Leitch 126). Thus in terms of the first variable 
(narrative strategy or emplotment) we find a historical mode adopting one of four genre options as: 
romance, tragedy, comedy or satire (Deconstructive Criticism 126). White argues that Marx, following 
Hegel, developed a Comic view of history, in insisting on the "right oflife over death" and a Utopia to 
come21 . Once again Jameson has something to say on the matter. In The Political Unconscious he 
defends Marxism against a claim (probably White's) that reads it as comic in its Utopian leanings, and 
he argues that it too can in fact be just as easily seen as an essentially tragic vision, without actually 
resorting to this term: "we must observe that the most powerful realizations of a Marxist 
historiography ... remain visions of historical Necessity ... Necessity is here represented in the form of the 
inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure of all the revolutions that have taken place in human 
history ... History is therefore the experience ofNecessity ... History is what hurts, it is what refuses 
desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its "ruses" tum into 
grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention" (101-2). Here in the last sentence, with the mention 
of "ironic reversals", history seems to be taking on the narrative form of tragedy. 
Strangely Jameson doesn't discuss tragedy here as a generic form, although it is clear that there 
must be some relation to (possibly a defense of) Raymond Williams' thesis of the connection between 
tragedy and a properly socialist sensibility. Both seem to share a belief, contrary to White's emphasis 
on revolution, that Marxism or socialism is tragic in its retention of a past of recurring suffering and 
failure which it won't surrender. Jameson's view of Necessity as "the determinate failure of all the 
revolutions" certainly sounds a lot like Williams' tormented appeal to a tragically perpetual struggle-
"the final truth in tlus matter seems to be tl1at revolution- the long revolution against human alienation, 
produces, in real historical circumstances, its own new kinds of alienation, which it must struggle to 
understand and wluch it must overcome, if it is to remain revolutionary" (Modern Tragedy 82). 
According to Williams' point of view tl1e tragedy here is the fact that these mistakes continue to be 
made, tl1at true human emancipation is constantly thwarted, deferred, and in the paralysis of this 
insight, all one can do is hope and remember. Williams suggests that possibly socialism, as a properly 
human way of viewing society and remembering history, hasn't yet fully developed. "Socialism, I 
believe, is the true and active inheritor of the impulse to human liberation which has previously taken so 
21 Jameson quotes White quite extensively on this point, in a footnote in his 'Magical Narratives' chapter of 
The Political Unconscious, including this sentence: "Marx carried this Comic conception even further; he 
envisioned nothing less than the dissolution of that 'society' in which the contradiction between consciousness 
and being had to be entertained as a fatality for all men in all times" (103). 
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) 
many forms. But in practice, I also believe, it is an idea still forming, and much that passes under its 
name is only a residue of old positions" (Modern Tragedy 74-5). He goes on to suggest that present 
Marxist societies have not yet succeeded in 'revolution' in the fullest sense, which he appears to 
connect with a final and "total redemption of humanity", an idea which he quotes from Marx: "I see 
revolution as the inevitable working through of a deep and tragic disorder, to which we can respond in 
various ways but which will in any case, in one way or another, work its way through our world as a 
consequence of any of our actions. I see revolution .. .in a tragic perspective" (75). Both tragedy and its 
newer incarnation in socialism are simultaneously driven by the hope of ultimate emancipation and 
pessimistically aware of the elusiveness and distance of this goal. 
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CHAPTER THREE : POSTMODERNISM - FROM THE BODY -MACBJNE TO 
THE CULTURE INDUSTRY 
Artists will confuse sending with creation. They will camp around screeching 'a new medium' 
until their rating drops o:ff .... Philosophers will bark around the ends and means hassle not 
knowing that sending can never be a means to anything but more sending, like Junk. 
William Burroughs, The Naked Lunch 
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Introduction: Popular culture = cultural materialism: the waning of affect in postmodernism 
Kant said that there was a secret mechanism in the soul which prepared direct intuitions in such a 
way that they could be fitted into the system of pure reason. But today that secret has been 
deciphered. 
Adorno & Horkheimer , 'The Culture Industry'. 
One of the dominant moods ofpostmodemism -by which I mean less the objects of elitist 
postmodemist theory, such as Hutcheon's 'historiographical meta~fiction', but following Jameson, the 
cultural dominant or Zeitgeist - is one of moral or ethical amnesia. The humanist insistence on a 
programme of universal morality, and its conferral of a sacrosanct value on human life, no longer have 
hegemonic status in the contemporary milieu of popular or media culture - whole genres, such as the 
action-thriller, and texts have learned to forget human empathy and omitt respect for the estranged other 
(this being an observation and not a moral accusation). The impressionistic sense of an increase in the 
intensity and quantity of violence in both film and television in the last few decades seems to point to 
the demise of the state's ideological monopoly on justice, as Clint Eastwood's Dirty Harry executes 
'rough justice', Bruce Lee administers 'Chinese justice' and Arnold Schwarzenegger supplies a 
cybernetic solution. Biological aggression and competitiveness are now no longer inferior to the now 
suspect 'ideological' principles of community and respect. Obviously the popularisation of the 'new' 
evolutionism or gene-theory is partly responsible: the self-proclaimed 'scientific' key to previously 
philosophical questions about human life, popular genetics, such as Richard Dawkins' 'selfish gene' 
theory, dismisses all that archaic philosophy about human nature and culture as so much hog-wash--
all this contributes to the redundancy or a popular det1w1ciation of ethics. 
This erosion of the Enlightenment humanism of a universal ethics and a superior moral realm 
fits well under Jameson's rubric of the 'waning of affect' in postmodemism. The postmodem 
mechanism of pleasure offered to the viewer no longer involves the emotional charge of representation 
and the affirmation of the social contract, but consists of something more like pure presentation, the 
mind-altering drug's open commitment to mood enhancement, the biochemical rush or 'intensities' 
Jameson evokes as part of the "aesthetic model" of schizophrenia, and constitutes an affirmation of the 
individual's right to pleasure22. What replaces psychic affect, 'deep' and lasting emotional resonance, is 
a 'surface' excitement, effect as ephemeral and disposable mechanical-physiological stimulation, in 
tenns of strategy, a move from ideology to biology. The exemplary postmodem film then, according to 
this schema, is one which is orientated around a calculated chemistry of the body -the unformulated 
question that seems to dominate the space of film production is 'how much can we stimulate those 
22 See Daniel Bell's condemnation of the "axial'' pleasure principle underlying consumer culture in The 
Coming of Post-Industrial Society, pp 477-78. 
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adrenaline glands?' (or rather 'how to squeeze some more adrenaline out of that already overworked 
endocrinal system?'). 
To what degree, one might ask, does this shift in the technology of film change the way the 
social institution of the cinema is perceived, in what way does it reflect and relate to a broader culture 
or mechanism of the cultivation and satisfaction of the body? The advent and institutionalisation of the 
video recorder and video industry have definitely contributed to the erosion of the sense of social 
occasion of film watching, of viewing the act of viewing as a social action in terms of both medium and 
message - to articulate this sense of occasion and duty would result in something like "we are here, 
now, and in this space, gathered together to be entertained but also educated". The cinema, in this 
respect, is not the space it used to be; whereas once it propagated, maintained, or contributed to local, 
national and possibly international 'community' (or the lived 'illusion' thereof), and the collective goal 
of moral improvement (in the Kantian sense of "the highest good" achievable through 'practical 
reason'), it is now perceived primarily as a material phenomenon, a teclmology of physical pleasure 
operating on the individual bodl3 . This is a change of function in the worlds of production as well as 
consumption. It is now consciously geared towards and utilised as either a guaranteed pleasure-
inducing commodity, like a Coke or Big Mac, or a nostalgic flight back to the 'romance of the movies'. 
The question asks itself, to what extent is part of the pleasure here (in the cinema) the pseudo-
realisation or sense that, like the more obvious junk-food rush, any cinema movie is a guaranteed 
winner because it is part of a global distribution network? One feels safe because the global 'market' 
has ensured the survival of the fittest commodity, one feels excited, awed, to the point of the (Kantian) 
sublime because incomprehensibly massive and absurd amow1ts of capital and human labour have gone 
into its realisation and perfection. Debord's revelatory one-liner, "the spectacle is capital to such a 
degree of accumulation that it becomes an image" (Society of the Spectacle paragraph 34), captures 
this idea of the movie-commodity as pure 'surplus' production being 'nationalised' or made public, re-
routed to the masses. Film, as a consumable commodity offered to the citizen, becomes a poor 
substitute or compensation for the collective ownership of surplus production. One feels a perverted 
sense of 'connectedness' with other purchasers and consumers all over the world (one which feebly 
compensates for the absence of those already enfeebled earlier pseudo-communities of race, class and 
nation). 
23 This might seem somewhat hyperbolic to some: surely the fifties and sixties cinema was also a space of fun, 
as the nostalgia films of adolescent turbulence represent? Undoubtedly so, but the point I am trying to make is 
that this emergent lack of empathy (for characters) and ironic detachment from the moral domain (or situation) 
appears to be of the same order as the symptom of 'the waning of affect' that Jameson identifies as a facet of 
the new aesthetic dominant. This is consistent with the atomism, alienation or physiological individualism, 
which are part and parcel of a new cultural mechanism whose means and end are the isolated individual, as 
body and subject. As Debord says , " It is the same project everywhere: a restructuring without community" 
(Society of the Spectacle paragraph 192). In the fifties the cinema (in the dual sense of meaning and social 
space) tolerated or encouraged the co-existence of aesthetics and ethics; now ethics is subsumed by, and 
consumed as, the aesthetic (experience in pure commodity form). 
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This would all appear to be heading towards an affim1ation of Jameson's notion, central to his 
analysis of postmodemism, that postmodernity is the time of our (in the largest sense, pertaining to the 
'masses') becoming aware of the materiality of culture. According to him cinema or film is not the 
social apparatus or aesthetic medium that is most definitive of this spirit of the age, being tied to a 
Modernist trajectory towards the end (in both senses) of the high modem auteur of the fifties . For 
Jameson, democratised and disposable (digital) video tape is emblematic of postmodernism. More than 
anything else the rise of what is commonly and appropriately called the mass media has forced this 
realisation, this sense of a secular and material (and materialistic) culture, the original philosophical 
sense of 'modernity', into the minds of Western consumers at some level. 
Capitalism, and the modem age, is a period in which, with the extinction of the sacred and 
the "spiritual", the deep, underlying materiality of all things has finally risen dripping and 
convulsive into the light of day; and it is clear that culture is one of those things whose 
fundamental materiality is now for us not merely evident but quite inescapable. This has, 
however been a historical lesson for us: it is because culture has become material that we 
are now in a position to understand that it always was material, in its structures and 
functions. We postcontemporary people have a word for that discovery- a word that has 
tended to displace the older genres and forms - and tllis is of course tl1e word medium, and 
in particular its plural, media, a word which conjoins three relatively distinct signals: that 
of an artistic mode or specific form of aesthetic production, that of a specific technology, 
generally organised around a central apparatus or machine; and finally that of a social 
institution ('Surrealism without the Unconscious' 67). 
Jameson goes on to prescribe the three respective aspects of 'mass' media that need to be investigated 
in analysing or providing defitlition of any specific medium, the "multiple dimensions of the material, 
social and aesthetic" (67). Hopefully my discussion of the cinema has touched on these various 
dimensions. What I would like to remark on firstly is what appears on first impression to be a strange 
inconsistency or contradiction in the observation above. How can Jameson maintain in the same breath 
that the materiality of culture "finally" emerges (as if it always was material), but then say tl1at it is 
only because it "becomes" material through postmodem mass media that we can retrospectively see its 
materiality. One tends to think either culture was or was not material; upon reflection two answers 
present tl1emselves - either culture has always been 'material' in its effects and functions (as Jameson 
maintains), or pre-modem or technological culture wasn't material, but our contemporary 'reality' 
including mechanically-nlinded discourse orientated towards hegemonic material concerns of 'function' 
and 'mechanism' enable and produce tl1e materiality of past ages. Jameson, as I have remarked, seems 
to mention both, although he settles for the latter, a quasi-poststructuralist, McLullamte view of 
successive 'modes of aesthetic production', where tl1e 'medium is tl1e message'. McLullan refigures 
language as an initial technology: 
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The spoken word was the first teclmology by which man was able to let go of his 
environment in order to grasp it in a new way. Words are a kind of information retrieval 
that can range over the total environment and experience at high speed. Words are 
complex systems of metaphors and symbols that translate experience into our uttered or 
outered senses. They are a technology of explicitness. (Understanding Media 64). 
The same revelation marks the writing of Lewis Mumford in The Myth of the Machine: Technics and 
Human Development, where language is implicated as some kind of proto-technology, one which 
prepares the way for the construction of the 'mega-machine' in power societies: "Though language was 
man's potent symbolic expression it flowed, I shall attempt to show, from the common source that 
finally produced the machine" (9). One doesn't need to point to Wittgenstein's lesson in the 
Philosophical Investigations about the plurality and irreducability of 'language games' (or Lyotard's 
or Habermas' work for that matter) to recognise the limits of a view of language as tool, technology or 
machine. As tool it serves an instrumental function for the autonomous subject, or on the other extreme, 
the inverse of this perspective, but ultimately just as illusory, it is the instrument or tool of 'power', the 
'elite' or language itself. The poststructuralist (or what Jameson elsewhere rewrites as more totally or 
structurally postmodem) views on language qua material signifying system also manufacture or 
produce a sense of the 'verbal' medium as just one technology among others. Language, as an eternal 
or transhistorical constant as system, becomes a writing machine (Derrida), a normalising or power 
machine (Foucault), a subject-machine (Lacan). 
In the same way Marx's language projected or abstracted a transhistorical constant, the 'mode 
of production', in which the 'economic' or production is the central and recurring category. What his 
framework didn't seem to recognise was its own historicity- the primacy and differentiation of the 
economic that only fully emerges in the ultra-rationalised society of capitalism gets projected back 
retrospectively across all ages. McLul1an points to this distinctly modem 'theme' of the economy and of 
work: "In the first great age of the substitution of machine for hun1an toil Carlyle and the Pre-
Raphaelites promulgated the doctrine of Work as a mystical social communion, and millionaires like 
Ruskin and Morris toiled like navvies for aesthetic reasons. Marx was an impressionable recipient of 
these doctrines." (Understanding Media 51). Addressing early representations of 'the Hottentot' (sic) 
at the Cape, J. M. Coetzee points out how for the emerging anthropological discourse on 'Man', the 
absence of a distinguishable category of the economic in the observed culture was seen as an absolute 
scandal24. The insult to this discourse, with its preconceived and hierachical structure of separated 
social activities and institutions, could only be resolved by its angry and accusatory projection of 
"idleness" onto its object, the Hottentot. 
24 See his 'Idleness in South Africa' in the collection of essays, White Writing: "The moment when the travel 
writer condemns the Hottentot for doing nothing is the moment when the Hottentot brings him face to face (if 
only he will recognize it) with his own preconceptions" (24). 
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Looking at the language-question we see how Jameson, in another essay, 'Postmodernism or 
the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism', does manage to arise out of the trap of making one's own 
contemporary problems the bane of all ages. He points to the historical embeddedness of 
poststructuralism in the cultural dominant of a superficial postmodem effect of depthlessness, how its 
dismissal of the inside and outside, of depth-models (psychoanalytic, Marxist etc.), conform to this 
aesthetic- he shows how "the poststructuralist critique of the hermeneutic, of what I shall shortly call 
the depth-model, is useful for us as a very significant symptom of the very postmodernist culture which 
is our subject here" ('Postmodernism' 12). Presumably he would also concede that apart from the fact 
that these contemporary theories refract the whole in ways which expose themselves as symptom of the 
postmodem malaise itself (a point he wants to foreground), they also contribute as constitutive or 
affirmative 'causes' to this hegemonic cultural space. If one accepts the creative or destructive power of 
a cultural zeitgeist to determine and provide the dominant metaphors and models by which culture is 
thought then the whole materialist vocabulary, with its concepts and metaphors of 'media', 'function', 
'mechanism', 'production' and 'technology', would seem to be historically contingent, part and parcel 
of our contemporary cultural perspective, and not the only or final means by which pre-capitalist or 
non-western societies and languages can be w1derstood. With regard to societies where, for instance, 
there is no clear line between religious activity and economic production there would appear to be no 
logic in trying to abstract what Jameson refers to as an 'aesthetic mode of production', "organised 
around a central apparatus or machine". Here we must also credit Lewis Mumford for acknowledging 
that in many periods of human history, what we now call technology was "inseparable"
25 from other 
hwnan activities: "At its point of origin technics was related to the whole nature of man ... thus technics, 
at the beginning, was broadly life-centred, not work-centred or power-centred" (The Myth of the 
Machine 9). 
From this foothold one could begin to reflect back on our contemporary culture, often too 
hastily reduced to the obvious mechanism ofthe 'mass media' or the 'Culture Industry', as an opaque 
mediwn, or at least as activity not always already transparent, and think beyond the immediacy 
rendered by empiricist assumptions of mediwn as machine. But having pointed out the dangers of 
making generalizations and metaphysical statements about the essence of culture, what is important to 
acknowledge is the degree to which the mass media have accentuated and rendered hegemonic a certain 
aspect and way of looking at culture- postmodernism has 'materiality' as one of its favourite flavours. 
The conspiracy theory of historical materialism has a certain popular equivalent in the paranoia and 
conspiracies that abounds in popular culture - control and manipulation are revealed at every tum, and 
the common cultural practice (whether in pulp sociology or fictional device) of the unmasking of 
25 "The classic Greek term 'tekne' characteristically makes no distinction between industrial production and 
'fine' or symbolic art; and for the greater part of human history these aspets were inseparable, one side 
respecting the the objective conditions and functions, the other responding to subjective needs" (The lvfyth of 
the Machine 9). 
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'ideology' and 'propaganda' at work indicate a wariness and awareness of the power and 
instrumentality of ideas, of the mechanism of language. What Jameson discerns, and what is here 
affirmed, is the development of a general· 'sensibility', a democratisation of materialism, an explosion of 
codes and styles, which makes it far easier for cultural or linguistic practices to be seen, not for what 
they are, but as 'material', and no longer as 'spiritual'. 
RECONSTITUTING BLADE RUNNER 
... but if there were machines bearing the image of our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions 
as far as it is morally possible ... 
Rene Descartes 
Body-parts in the philosophical rubbish dump 
ln the preceding chapter I attempted to show how a certain strand of thinking the human in 
modernity could be seen as a continuous process of semiotic accumulation, a transgenerational thinking 
and imagining, a remembering and a mutation, in which the figure of technology or the machine pops 
up in some guise or other. The dominant fantasy-terrain in which this thought takes place is a battle-
field which sees forces of freedom pitted against those of necessity, determinism, and enslavement. 
These conflicts manifest themselves in synchronic systems as well as in the form of narrative, whether 
it be the allegorical journey to maturity suggesting the dialectical logic of freedom and the moral will, 
or the proletariat, or even Nietzsche's 'overman' oftomorrow. Not having dealt with Nietzsche's 
philosophy in much depth I do not want to suggest that he merely counters Kant -- it is often assumed 
his thinking marks a complete reversal of Kant's Utopian teleology ofhumanity. Although he replaces 
Kant's subject of history, the whole of humanity, with the privileged minority of thinkers able to 
overcome morality, the basic structure of the realm of necessity opposed to a realm of freedom stays 
the same, and the figure of the machine is retained to express the crushing 'diminution' of necessity. 
Nietzsche maintains that "that total machinery, the solidity of all the wheels, represents total 
exploitation of man: but it presupposes those on whose account this exploitation has a meaning. 
Otherwise, it would be a mere total diminution, a value diminution, of the type Man ... a regressive 
phenomenon in the grandest style" (quoted in Cooper 114).The increasing degradation and stunting of 
human life under economic growth and modernisation needs to be redeemed, or justified, by the 
emergence of a superior or 'higher' man who is enabled to transcend this realm of necessity; Nietzsche 
explains, "my metaphor for the [justifying] type is, as one knows , the word "overman" "(quoted in 
Cooper 115). 
Having explored or at least surveyed these various (yet similar) takes on the struggles of the 
modem era we can interpret them along the lines of a hermeneutic outlined by Jameson in The Political 
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Unconscious, where he discusses the concept of the 'ideologeme' at work in the second allegorical 
level of meaning of a text. The 'ideologeme' is the minimal functional unit of a class discourse, the 
parole or 'utterance' of a class, located in a determinate historical situation and a dialogical cultural 
field of competing ideologemes -like our philosophies above, it can take either diachronic or synchronic 
form. 
The ideologeme is an amphibious formation, whose essential structural characteristic may 
be described as its possibility to manifest itself either as a pseudoidea- a conceptual or 
belief system, an abstract value, an opinion or prejudice - or as a protonarrative, a kind of 
ultimate class fantasy about the collective characters which are the classes in opposition. 
This duality means that the basic requirement for the full description of the ideologeme is 
already given in advance: as a construct it must be susceptible to both a conceptual 
description and a narrative manifestation at once. The ideologeme can of course be 
elaborated in either of these descriptions, taking on the finished appearance of a 
philosophical system on the one hand, or that of a cultural text on the other (Political 
Unconscious 87) 
From this description one gathers that a text, manifested in one form or the other, partakes or exists as 
only one ideologeme. It is thus not usually a site dominated by more than one class discourse, and it 
presumably also manifests an ideologeme distinct from others possible within the parameters of a class 
langue (meaning not all bourgeois cultural texts contain the same ideologeme). However in his later 
essay 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' Jameson points to the exceptional 
example ofDoctorow's Ragtime, which appears to cut across any particular view of reality, by 
deploying different kinds of character-objects: " ... the objects of representation, ostensibly narrative 
characters, are incommensurable and, as it were, of incomparable substances, like oil and water -
Houdini being a historical figure, Tateh, a .fictional one, and Coalhouse an intertextual one- ... What 
such a description would want to register is the paradox that a seemingly realistic novel like Ragtime is 
in reality a non-representational work that combines fantasy signifiers from a variety of ideologemes in 
a kind of hologram" (23). It appears that what Jameson wants to demonstrate here is how this newer 
text 'resists interpretation', and conveys a sense of the loss of an older, easier access to the real or 
History; but for our purposes it would be beneficial to highlight his identification of the combination of 
"fantasy signifiers from a variety ofideologemes" in this more complicated ofpostmodern texts. 
I would like to argue that one could see Blade Runner in a similar light as a text in which the 
various signifiers of the specifically philosophical ideologemes of modernity (those which, according to 
Jameson, might have "the finished appearance of philosophical systems") come to die, a semiotic 
cemetery as such, in which no particular ideologeme out of the various we have discussed in the 
previous chapter comes to haunt more strongly than the other. Here I depart from the emphasis that 




what it is 'about', namely a political fantasy about class. It is tautological to talk about classical and 
modem philosophical systems as essentially 'class' languages, philosophy being a priori a 'ruling 
class' and esoteric commodity, and it tends to limit their effects to the predominantly and general 
'ideological' function of maintaining tl1e status quo. Where the analysis ofthe ideologeme as a unit is 
useful is in its emphasis on the historical contexts (and here we would want to assert the specificity and 
plurality of each of these), the social and discursive conditions offorn1ation in which the text 
(protonarrative or philosophical system) is situated. An ideologeme's 'historicity' would thus be its 
response to and resolution of a given social and technological situation, which always involves conflict, 
contradiction or at least difference between groups, social strata or classes. Hence Kant's 
Enlightenment scenario involves or fantasises the weakening of the minority clergy's hold over the 
larger whole of the population, and the resolution of an enlightened mass consciousness. 
In Blade Runner the historicity and redundancy of these various philosophical ideologemes is 
foregrow1ded. TI1ese grand narratives and fantasies, having been popularised, canned and circulated in 
the twentieth-century media age, get reduced to a whiff of Nazi-Nietzsche, the faintest ofKantian 
flavours, a hint of that w1fashionable product·(and its even worse marketing campaign) sold as 
'revolution'. Ratl1er than playing any kind of properly ideological role or animating role in the film 
tl1ese 'ideas' serve a kind of decorative, surface fw1ction, as pure, and fairly lifeless signifiers, if 
anything ironically canting together to connote a sense of 'philosoplticalness', and here wm1askingjust 
so many personal style-codes and strategic techttiques of control, while also expressing a nostalgia for a 
kind of thinking no longer possible. TI1is film can thus be read on one level (tl1e level of the ideologeme) 
as a mass of used and rusting spare-parts, decaying pseudo-ideas and fading parables; in Jameson's 
idiom, just so much recycled postmodem 'junk', irreversibly intermingled and reassembled to create 
another "henceforth themeless film" (Geopolitical Aesthetic 25). 
Jameson, tltis time in an analysis of the masterful David Cronenberg's 'cyberpunk' classic 
Videodrome (1983), discusses the decay oftl1e value of the pltilosophical concept, and of the 
philosopltical project or impulse more generally, in a nostalgic tone rentiniscent of Adorno. He seems to 
be arguing that With the erosion oftl1e distinction between ltigh and low art in postmodernism, the great 
rhetorical 'ideas' of a philosopltical modentism get retrospectively and generally seen as so many 
'sound bytes'. 
Yet the outer shell of the fonn is here and preserved; and Videodrome carefully explains 
its 'themes' to us- the social perniciousness of television and mass culture generally, 
McLuhanite reflections on the physical changes and perceptual mutations involved in 
prolonged exposure to the new medium, even tl1e old pltilosophical questions about the 
Good and whether the masses' cultural appetites automatically lead to them. These are all 
serious issues, with long and distinguished traditions of philosophical speculation and 
debate behind them; but who would wish to argue that Videodrome represents a serious 
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contribution to their development? ... My sense is that in the new dimensionality of 
postmodem cultural space, ideas of the older conceptual type have lost their autonomy and 
become something like by-products and after-images flung up on the screen of the mind 
and of social production by the culturalization of daily life. The dissolution of philosophy 
today then reflects this modification in the status of ideas (and ideology), which itself 
retroactively unmasks any number of traditional philosophical concepts as having been 
just such consciousness-symptoms all the while, that could not be identified as such in the 
culturally impoverished, pre-media and residually 'natural' human societies or (modes of 
production) of the past (The Geopolitical Aesthetic 25) 
One ofpostmodemism's ritual reflexes then is this tacit or not so tacit repudiation of the older 
ideologemes, a public flogging of the master-narrative, of the philosophical idea or value system. This 
is consistent with the crisis in legitimacy of the metanarratives that Lyotard addresses in The 
Postmodern Condition. Jameson goes on to show how Videodrome 's "remarkable political 
polysemousness [is due] to the space freed by the end oftraditional ideas, concepts and themes" (29), 
how it acts as a multiply-productive signifier or semiotic configuration. 
A similar kind of post-philosophical polysemousness, a layering of the incommensurable 
ideologemes of modernity, can be observed in Blade Runner, where it is not so much a hotchpotch of 
first-level or basic signifiers (where we rather have a fairly stable opposition between the obvious signs 
of 'Replicant' and 'human') so much as their signifieds, themselves reduced to a series of second-level 
signifiers, that seem to provide the inconsistency and heterogeneity that Jameson identifies. This 
second-level of meaning allows the signifier 'Replicant' to resignify the ideologemes or signifiers of 
'artificial intelligence', 'slave', 'hunter' consecutively, in different scenarios or scenes, yet also 
simultaneously, accumulating these meanings as the whole story mutates. What the Replicants actually 
'mean' seems to metamorphosize or hallucinate as the ghost of one philosophical ideologeme takes over 
from another, the fantasy of reconciliation receding and emerging against that of revolution, and that of 
sadism. In what could be seen as a ritualistic and mocking parade of the pompous past of ideas, the 
unmasking of the materiality of these now obviously ideological constructions, the Replicant figure 
constantly exudes mutating connotation-signs, so tl1at the ressentiment of Nietzsche, or, to revert to our 
previous example, his philosophy of cruelty is thus morphed cartoon-style (a hallucinogenic special 
effects of the ideologeme) into an older Christian or Kantian moral scenario. 
Revisiting tl1e chase scene provides a concrete example of this process of combining the 
incommensurable, where in the climax of the movie, we see the last lean Replicant, Roy Batty, chasing 
an inferior Deckard around and on top of Sebastian's apartment block. We have already commented on 
the "overman" signification, but here we can also see Nietzsche's virtue of 'cruelty' coming to the fore 
in the very dynamics of the hunt: 
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One should open one's eyes and take a new look at cruelty; one should at last grow 
impatient, so that the kind of immodest fat errors which have, for example, been fostered 
by tragedy by ancient and modem philosophers should no longer go stalking virtuously 
and confidently about. Almost everything we call 'higher culture' is based on the 
spiritualisation and intensification of cntelty- this is my proposition; the 'wild beast' has 
not yet been laid to rest at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has merely become- deified. That 
which constitutes the painful voluptuousness of tragedy is cruelty; that which produces a 
pleasing effect in so-called tragic pity, indeed fundamentally in everything sublime up to 
the highest and most refmed thrills of metaphysics, derives its sweetness solely from the 
ingredients of cruelty mixed in with it. What the Roman in the arena, the Christian in the 
ecstasies of the Cross, the Spaniard watching burnings or bullfights, the Japanese of today 
crowding in to the tragedy, the Parisian suburban workman who has a nostalgia for 
bloody revolutions ... - what all of these enjoy and look with secret ardour to imbibe is 
the spicy potion of the great Circe 'cruelty"' (Beyond Good and Evi/159). 
What this passage asserts is not only that the cruelty of the predatory 'wild beast' is something to be 
admired, but that it already surreptitiously provides the basis of many voyeuristic pleasures; in fact it 
appears to be the essential mechanism of drama, spectacle, religious excitement, and, we might add, 
cinema. According to this Nietzschian reading, when Batty breaks Deckard's fingers during the hunt he 
exemplifies the virtue of cruelty; one approves of this 'sporting chance' he gives both himself and 
Deckard, and at the same time enjoys the pain inflicted on the latter, the 'wild beast' toying with its 
prey (with Deckard's shooting-hand gone the struggle turns into fight between a naturally stronger 
predator and weaker, damaged prey). Batty's blood-sport is the surge of the bullfighter, the 
executioner, the revolutionary, and ours of the Roman spectator. This celebration of the beast's power 
and cruelty can include self-inflicted pain, as Nietzsche maintains that "there is also an abundant, over-
abundant enjoyment of one's own suffering, of making oneself suffer- and wherever man allows 
himself to be persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense, or to self-mutilation, ... he is secretly 
lured and urged onward by his cruelty, by the dangerous thrills of cruelty directed against himself 
(Beyond Good and Evi/159-60). In Blade Runner, this modulation in the cruelty theme occurs when 
Batty indulges in "self-mutilation", piercing his own hand, and the spectator registers (possibly with 
pleasurable respect, or at least fascination) the undecidable agony-ecstasy one associates with the 
masochist- additionally tl1e Christian resonance recalls the primitive collective sacrificial ecstasy at the 
individual agony of the crucifixion, which Nietzsche discerns as the same pleasure mechanism. 
If this section has and constitutes a dominant Nietzschian ideologeme, the hunt as 
protonarrative, the value or virtue of 'cruelty', then a rapid change takes place when Deckard is finally 
rescued by Batty instead of being trashed (like the piece of junk he deserves to be treated as). Hanging 
off the side of a building, with the "overman" about to finish him off, Deckard is a gonner. Suddenly 
54 
the aesthetic of cruelty and its teleology of death modulates into the Kantian Weltaunshaung, respect 
for human life and freedom as an 'end in itself' etc., and the beast turns into the proverbial lamb. The 
ambivalence and ambiguity of affective charge attached to the figure of the Replicants discerned earlier 
can therefore be reinterpreted from the space of postmodemism as both the 'waning of affect', and the 
waning of the value-effect of the concept; the text becomes a coalescence of ideologemes, a veritable 
philosophical scrapyard, in which a whole history of thoughts on- and fantasies of- freedom and 
oppression is contained and alluded to, but vaguely, ironically, without rigour or commitment or 
preference. Indeed from this vantage point the comical wind-up 'clock-work Prussian-ness' suggested 
by the goose-stepping and diminutive toy-soldier that Sebastian (the designer's name alluding to the 
classical ideologeme of 'genius') has bio-engineered to keep him company, along with its literal 
'constructedness', seem now more generally to ridicule the Age of Reason, and to figuratively mock the 
"ideas of the older type [which have] lost their autonomy", as Jameson puts it. 
It then remains to resurrect one last ghostly philosophical signifier from the hologramatic text 
of Blade Runner, one which doesn't manifest itself as narrative, which precedes the great dramas of the 
dialectic- the original pure fantasy signifier of the individual automaton. In this early anticipation of 
the human-machine in Descartes' 'Discourse on Method' we can see the prototype of the later yet 
related figure of the android or cyborg which will get deployed in the philosophies and fantasies (or 
) 
ideologemes as we know see tl1em) of freedom. Here in Descartes we see the very beginnings of the 
generic science-fiction fascination with the problematic of 'Artificial Intelligence', or on a deeper level 
the dilemmas and problems attending recognition of the Other consciousness, the dialogical voices of 
class and ethnicity etc. 
Nor will this appear at all strange to those who are aquainted with the variety of 
movements performed by the different automata, or moving machines fabricated by 
human industry, and that with help of but few pieces compared with the great multitude of 
bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and other parts that are found in the body of each 
animal. Such persons will look upon tlus body as a maclune made by the hands of God, 
which is incomparably better arranged, and adequate to movements more admirable than 
is any .machine of human intervention. And here I specially stayed to show tl1at, were tl1ere 
such machines exactly resembling in organs and outward form an ape or any other 
irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a 
different nature from these animals; but if there were machines bearing the image of our 
bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as jar as it is morally possible, there would 
still remain two tests whereby to know that they were not therefore really men. [my 
italics] Of these the first is that they could never use words or other signs arranged in such 
a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others: for we may 
easily conceive a machine to be so constructed that it enuts vocables, and even that it 
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emits some correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which cause a change in 
its organs; for example, if touched in a particular place it may demand what we wish to 
say to it; if in another it may cry out that it is hurt, and such like; but not that it should 
arrange them variously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of 
the lowest grade of intellect can do. The second test is that although such machines might 
execute many things with equal or perhaps greater perfection than any of us, they would 
without doubt fail in certain others from which it could be discovered that they did not act 
from knowledge, but solely from the disposition of their organs: for while reason is a 
universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, these organs on the 
contrary, need a particular arrangement for each particular action; whence it must be 
morally impossible that there should exist in any machine a diversity of organs sufficient 
to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life, in the way in which our reason enables us 
to act. (Discourse on Method 45) 
At this fascinating juncture in his Discourse Descartes seems to anticipate or prefigure, not just the 
central thematic dymanic of cyberpunk and cybernetic fiction (and possibly even more generally 
extrapolative science-fiction) but quite specifically the Replicants' quest for recognition in Blade 
Runner. Apart from its dialogue with this fictional space it also seems to herald the various 'real' 
reason-tests of modernity, the confession-based 'talking cures' and medico-juridical examinations and 
interrogations that Foucault unmasks as the strategically unified normalising discourse on Otherness 
and deviance. Descartes seems, in the 'first test' of syntactical construction, to put faith in the inability 
of an imaginary cyborg or machine to reach the state of discursive competence, and the ability of a 
power-knowledge apparatus (the test of reason itself) to measure and disqualify this bogus 
consciousness should it so emerge to contest its legitimacy. In Blade Runner this test resurfaces in the 
Voigt-Kampfftest, which no longer tests reason but emotion or empathl
6
; but crucially the actual 
stakes remain the same, the exclusion of the non-human. In both the Voigt-Kampfftest and the larger 
thematic antimony of the body-types the film seems to allude to Descartes' antiquated problematic of 
the definition of 'the human' and its differentiation from the Otherness of the merely machinic. Here the 
vaguely Nazi-ish connotations of the teutonic "Kampff'', reinforcing the more obvious 'eugenics' 
allusion, are presumably supposed to show up the genocidal tendencies of an instrumental reason 
lacking all empathy itself. This rewrite or reversal of the Cartesian text is overtly evident- in the 
opening shots of the film, where the test is being applied to the panicky Leon, the archaic, cumbersome 
and conspicuous test-apparatus (which works to register pupil contraction and dilation) unmistakably 
26 The 'psychological' test is used to sift Replicants out from authentic humans, copies from the original, so 
that they can be "retired". David Desser explains the mechanism of the test in 'Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep': "basically, the test measures involuntary responses to questions about the killing of animal or human 
life. Although androids "surpassed several classes of human specials in terms of intelligence", they do not 
respond empathetically" (194). 
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signifies "mechanism", a l.iteral.isat.ion ofDescartes' metaphor, ".instrument" of reason; and .its passive 
object, the quivering biological eye, is rendered "organism"
27 And of course the 'object' Leon's 
behaviour would appear to be a lot more emotional, and therefore more human (even though Leon is a 
Replicant) than the clinical, bureaucratic 'subject' (but presumably authentic human) administering the 
test. Ridley Scott's postmodem pastiche then seems somehow additionally to quote (even if it is 
disapprovingly), tius 'original' raw material ofideologemes to follow, a prulosoprucal 'primal scene', 
and yet another fantasy sigtufier is added to our multi-layered yet deptilless hologram of prulosoplucal 
ideologemes. 
One n1ight question how a fantasy ofti1e individual body-machine meets Jameson's criterion of 
a class fantasy, wluch is "not a mere reflex or reduplication of its situational context, but as the 
imaginary resolution of the objective contradictions to wluch it thus constitutes an active response" 
(118). Here the ideologeme is not so much an imaginary or fantasy resolution of specific class or social 
contradictions as a containment ofti1e radical, polyvalent questions of difference and simulation 
ti1emselves as they begin to manifest themselves (how in tius modernising and differing world to treat 
the Other who appears human and wuque: ti1e madman, the worker, the crinunal, woman, the savage 
etc.): 'we will be able to identify and contain Otherness'. In addition it would appear that Descartes' 
machine-human opposition is the allegorical key for ti1e more specific Etllightemnent narrative of 
emancipation we have discussed, one of the central tropes by which ti1e deeper narrative of collective 
and nunority freedoms are thought in modernity, and tims fi.mctions as ideologeme in tlUs ordinary way 
as well. 
JAMESON'S THEORY OF POSTMODERNISM 
Real life is becoming indistinguishable from the movies. 
Adorno & Horkheimer , 'The Culture Industry' 
The following section attempts to focus on certain aspects of Jameson's theory of 
postmodem.ism wluch are relevant to my broader discussion of the representation of technology and the 
maclune in the new interpretative frame ofti1e postmodern age. Jameson's overall metl1od is 
particularly useful in that it enables comparison and dialogue with the past; he is thus able to look at 
how an omnipotent Nature in ti1e older experience ofti1e sublime modulates into Technology, how 
Modernist representations of external, visible energy of the power-technology ofti1e day are thwarted in 
ti1e internal secretiveness of the computer. Additionally, in looking through the closer frame of 
27 In a strange postmodern modulation of 'the test' we find that "eye movement dysfunction" becomes the sign 
by which a schizophrenic can be detected: ''Eye movement dysfunction may be a trait marker for 
schizophrenia, since it is independent of drug treatment and clinical state" {Kaplan and Sadock 's Synopsis of 
Psychiatry 468). 
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Jameson's postmodemism, we don't altogether lose the issues or ideas of modernity; as the preceding 
section has attempted to show, they rather become democratised, internalised, commodified, and 
ultimatelytrivialised. The kind of temporal and sociological framework my analysis is predicated on 
borrows heavily from Jameson's periodisation of modernisation or capitalism, which emphasises 
continuity at the expense of rupture, choosing to see difference within sameness rather than the other 
way round. Postmodemism (as opposed to postmodemity) is seen as a transformation within the larger 
processes of (cultural) modernity, (social) modernisation, and (economic) capitalism. In fact one could 
read Jameson's essay 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' as a rhetorical bid to 
appropriate the treasured 'postmodemism' sign, an attempt to wrest a use-value out of its layers of 
packaging, a useful meaning for a Marxist language threatened by the increasing exchange-value of 
theories of postindustrialism. 
The intention behind the title of his essay would therefore seem to be: even if this conc.ept is 
itself suspect, let us make it work for us. But it would also be unfair to say that Jameson just uses a 
popular 'media' concept to recount a vulgar economic determinism, and his elaborate treatment of 
history as the 'absent cause' (always already, to a degree, narrativised) in The Political Unconscious is 
ample evidence that this is not another simplistic base-superstructure model. One of the fascinating 
things about his theory is its assimilation of a whole range of cultural and media theories on the present, 
from McLuhan to Baudrillard, and its integration with a more historically-rooted explanatory model. 
We should see it as a singular and important intervention in a intellectual debate dominated by post-
Marxist and neoconservative excitement at the end of history and emergence of a new post-industrial or 
information age. In this millenarian excitement the older debates and the stakes are thrown aside as 
anachronistic: classes don't exist any more, industrial production has ended, the masses have chosen the 
market system, etc. Jameson offers a way of thinking the present as a purer form of capitalism, a 
different mode of explanation from the immediately 'visual' apocalypses and new ages of the ecstatic 
sociologies, which tend to represent their object rather than think it. Although the major focus is on the 
historically new position of the figure of technology in what is discerned as the postmodern sublime, I 
want to precede this with an examination of Jameson's assimilation and diagnosis of a range of 
'consumer culture' theories and their preoccupations with liberating or alienating effects of a new 
technological culture on humanity, and secondly , with a discussion of the problematic interpretation of 
a new "schizophrenic" subjectivity. 
The Culture of the Simulacrum, or, Technology as 'The Evil Demon oflmages': 
Jameson's logic involves the initial establishment of a cultural dominant of surface image and 
depthlessness, in which both the real or referent and history are banished or rendered inaccessible -this 
hegemony of spatiality leads to a weakening and erosion of both private and public temporalities, and 
the breakdown of individual and collective history is what constitutes the schizophrenic present of 
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postmodemism. In this new regime of the sign one of the strongest formal characteristics is "a new kind 
of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense" ('Postmodemism' 9), 
and the example deployed to illustrate this is Andy Warhol's disconnected, self-sufficient and 
autoreferential art 'texts' which can't be made to reveal anything like a larger context or referential 
world, to which one might expect them to stand in metonymic relation. Jameson sees this art's 
resistance to interpretation as more than just a change at the level of artistic style; the refusal or 
inability to speak of what is presented is rather the reflection of a more fundamental change in the 
'object world' of late capitalism itself and in the perceiving postmodem subject- if anything Warhol's 
art seems to speak quite cryptically about this essentially unrepresentable social mutation, "explicitly 
foreground[ing] tl1e commodity fetishism of a transition to late capital" (9). This all serves to 
substantiate his earlier point "that aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity 
production generally" (4). In a kind ofinfmite internal regress this brand ofpostmodem pop art merely 
blandly reflects its own superficiality and complicity with the economic order, but without 
differentiating itself from tlus commodification. 
Related to this are other formal features that Jameson identifies, the 'waning of affect' (which 
will be discussed further when treating the concept of scluzophrenia) and 'pastiche', the random raiding 
and "cannibalisation" of past styles and aesthetic codes without any sense of centredness or the norm, 
or an authentically personal style. Eventually, via pastiche, Jameson comes to describe this transformed 
culture and society as one predicated on consumption of self-images; pastiche, as the insatiable desire 
for dead codes, is related to an "addiction- with a whole historically original consumers' appetite for a 
world transformed into sheer images of itself and for pseudo events and "spectacles" (the term of the 
Situationists)" ('Postn1odenusm' 18). It is here that he strangely enough doesn't mention the thought of 
Jean Baudrillard, whose work seems centred on the following concept - instead Jameson seems 
paradoxically to attribute its 'originality' to Plato: "It is for such objects that we may reserve Plato's 
conception of the "simulacrum", the identical copy for which no original copy has ever existed. 
Appropriately enough, the culture of the simulacrum comes to life in a society where exchange value 
has generalised to the point at which the very memory of use value is effaced, a society of which Guy 
Debord has observed, in an extraordinary phrase, tl1at in it " 'the image has become the final form of 
commodity reification' (The Society of the Spectacle)" (18). The various real voices ofhistory, of past 
generations and societies (a narrative-temporal tradition) have been reduced to (visual-spatial) "a vast 
collection of images, a multitudinous photographic simulacrum" (18). 
Jameson's conceptualisation of 'tl1e culture ofthe simulacrum' as a gluttonous consumption of 
images bears more than a family resemblance to Baudrillard' s more manic and dramatic revelations on 
the same subject. In The Evil Demon of Images Baudrillard articulates a similar view of the 
contemporary cultural system of industrialised societies, where the vice takes on a slightly different 
taint: 
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A propos the cinema and images in general (media images, technological images), I would 
like to conjure up the perversity of the relation between the image and the referent, the 
supposed real; the virtual and irreversible confusion ofthe sphere of images and the 
sphere of a reality whose nature we are less and less able to grasp. There are many 
modalities ofthis absorption, this confusion, this diabolical seduction of images. Above all 
it is the reference principle of images which must be doubted, this strategy by means of 
which they always appear to refer to a real world, to real objects, and to reproduce 
something which is logically and chronologically anterior to themselves. None of this is 
true. As simulacra, images precede the real to the extent that they invert the causal and 
logical order of the real and its reproduction .. Benjamin, in his essay "The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", already pointed out strongly this modem revolution 
in the order of production (of reality, of meaning) by the precession, the anticipation of 
meaning (13) 
In this mood we find Baudrillard caught in something of a diabolical bind himself, on the one hand 
raging with full biblical fervour against the perversion, distortion and disappearance of a genuine real, 
"a reality whose nature we are less and less able to grasp", and on the other hand proposing the radical 
negation of the possibility of a representable reality, when "reproduction" always precedes the real (the 
realm of production). This becomes more obvious a bit further on, when he corrects himself: "they 
[images] only seem to resemble things, to resemble reality, events, faces. Or rather they do conform, 
but their conformity is diabolical" (Evil Demon of Images 14). Here an earlier Marxist voice denounces 
the way our new visual systems of representation in their intensity seem to drown out the real as 
narrative, history, as economic structure or organisation, while another more solipsistic voice 
impotently registers the superficial yet lived reality and inescapability of projected and manufactured 
meanings28. In his title Baudrillard seems to be alluding to Descartes' evil demon, who could, 
hypothetically speaking, mislead the perceiving subject into erroneously believing in a seemingly 
empirical reality by providing him with a kind of 'false consciousness' of a hallucinatory order. But in 
this reference, which connects postmodem technologies of image production with this obviously illusory 
demon of 'manipulation', there is tl1e ironic sense that this demonising isn't that serious, that there isn't 
really a conspiratorial centre to the network, a controlling elite using the media for disguising the real. 
The title and tone of the essay (an overly prescriptive and condemnatory language) camply suggests 
that almost ludicrously ineffectual position of the biblical prophet, who in his conservatism denounces 
the cultural dominant to deaf ears. 
28 In some ways this partial acceptance of the validity of 'ideology', as a lived reality or conformity, parallels 
Raymond Williams' insistence on the necessity of a more affirmative or inclusive concept of 'hegemony': 
"Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of control only those seen 
as 'manipulation or 'indoctrination' .. .It is a lived system of meaning and values- constitutive and 
constituting- which as they are experienced as practices appear reciprocally confirming" (Marxism & 
Literature llO). 
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Baudrillard's assault on postmodern representation and reality-effect comes out more 
decisively in 'Simulacra and Simulations', where he posits the concept of simulation as a way of 
conceiving the sign diametrically opposed to that of representation. Where in representation the sign is 
guaranteed some kind of exchangeability for the real, simulation is founded on the foreclosure of its 
referential value, it becomes the real: "Representation starts from the principle that the sign and the real 
are equivalent ... simulation starts ... from the radical negation of the sign as value" ('Simulacra 
and Simulations' 152). Simulation gradually takes over representation in a journey of the image 
through four modes of reproduction, from where it simply reflects a reality, to where it disguises a 
reality, to where it hides the absence of a reality, and finally to the culture of the simulacrum in which 
"it bears no relation to any reality whatsoever" (153). What Baudrillard doesn't explicitly explain here 
is what causes this gradual transforn1ation of the semiotic regime or cultural space
29
; it would appear to 
be historically contingent on t11e quality and quantity oftlle image-production teclmology of a given 
mode of production. Presumably we are still stuck in the third stage of trying desperately to avoid what 
we have somehow already internalised on some level : that reality, as something preceding 
representation, is no longer there. This seems evidenced by Baudrillard's reading of the preswnably 
contemporary nostalgia phenomenon- and this specific feature oftl1e culture of the simulacrum is 
something which Jameson's postmodernism also elaborates, cementing the connection with Jameson. 
"When reality is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a 
proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality, of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity" 
('Simulacra and Simulations' 153). While Baudrillard seems to see tlus as the symptom oftl1e general 
evacuatioi1 ofthe real, Jameson reads this more specifically as a 'crisis ofhistoricity': "the remarkable 
current intensification of the addiction to tl1e photographic image is itself a tangible symptom of an 
omnipresent, onuuvorous and well-tugh libidinallustoricism" ('Postmodernism' 12). In a viciously 
hungry circle, the vacuum left by a dead past requires substitution or simulation, a process which only 
serves to furtl1er exacerbate the desire for authenticity. 
Here we nught recall Theodore Adorno, a major influence on Jameson, who anticipates 
Baudrillard's full-blown diagnosis of "panic-stricken production of the real" ('Simulacra and 
Simulations' 153). In lamenting the inautl1enticity oftl1e deployment oft11e concept of authenticity 
Adorno returns to the classic analysis of commodity fetislusm that manifests itself in Marx's Capital, 
and tl1e illusory foundation of gold on which capitalism bases its logic is re-revealed. 
The fraud of genuineness goes back to bourgeois blindness to the exchange process. 
Genuine things are those to wluch conunodities and means of exchange can be reduced, 
particularly gold. But like gold, genuineness, abstracted as the proportion of fine metal, 
29 Although he does seem to point to it in the previous instance we looked at - " ... technical images, 
whether they be from photography, cinema or television, are in the overwhelming majority more 
'figurative', 'realist', than all tl1e images from past. It is in its resemblance, not only analogical but 
technological, that the image is most immoral and most perverse" ('Simulacra and Simulations' 14). 
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becomes a fetish. Both are treated as if they were the fow1dation, which in reality is a 
social relation, while gold and genuineness precisely express only the fungibility, the 
comparability of things; it is they that are not in-themselves, but for-others. The 
ungenuineness of the genuine stems from its need to claim, in a society dominated by 
exchange, to be what it stands for yet is never able to be. The apostles of genuineness, in 
the service of the power that now masters circulation, dignify the demise of the latter with 
the dance ofthe money veils (MinimaMoralia [paragraph 99] 155) 
Just before this passage he has suggested that generalised commodity production has itself 
manufactured and marketed the concept of authenticity for humans as tl1e antithetical and distracting 
other of reifications and the standardisation of things. "The more tightly the world is enclosed by the net 
of man-made things, tl1e more stridently those who are responsible for this condition proclaim their 
natural primitiveness" (155). Mass-production has fostered the importance or significance of 
'uniqueness'. "Only when the countless standardized commodities project, for the sake of profit, the 
illusion of being unique does the idea take shape, as their antithesis yet in keeping with the same 
criteria, that tl1e non-reproducible is the truly genuine" (155). Of course tlus echoes tl1e central thematic 
problematic in Blade Runner (not to mention more generally science-fiction's obsessional leitmotiv of 
artificial intelligence and its attendant problems): the genuineness or authenticity of the Replicants' 
experience is unshakeably existent, even more intense and real than the drab space the humans find 
themselves in, even though it tums out tl1at their memories are false, that their bodies are synthetic~lly 
produced. 
What Adomo does is historicise the concepts of ethical authenticity, genuineness and 
originality and show how they don't make tl1e same kind of sense in a pre-industrial culture. 
"Previously, the question of authenticity was undoubtedly as little asked of intellectual products as tl1at 
of originality, a concept unknown in Bach's era" (MinimaMoralia 155). Adomo's thoughts ring true 
when we tl1ink of the postmodem advertising campaign and its extension of the 'authenticity' concept to 
the object world of products, around the brand name and logo: it hypes its product's originality and 
authenticity by waming against imitations and inferior replications. The pirate product, that which 
simulates a 'branded' product, serves to bolster or reinforce the illusory quality of genuineness Adomo 
illustrates- a differential or negative value appears as a positive tlung-in-itself (a noumenon), an 
essence. 
Of course Baudrillard, who emerged out of the Situationist work on conswner society, owes -
with regard to his work on the technologies of simulation - a fair amount of credit to arch-Situationist 
Guy Debord, whom Jameson does mention as an influence on Ius own thoughe
0
. Debord's analysis of 
consumer society is derived from a Hegelian-Marxist viewpoint, one which responds negatively to a 
30 Jameson quotes Debord's "extraordinary phrase", 'the image has become the final form of commodity 
reification' from Society of the Spectacle. 
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spectacular society effecting the complete paralysis of any possibility of collective praxis. His strange 
little book offers a number of extremely evasive if not opaque definitions of the modem 'spectacle', 
which seem, in their shifting plurality, to work against what is held to be capital's present strategy of 
visualising society- to give too clear a representation of the thoroughly evil spectacle would be doing 
its work for it, or at least promoting its logic of making things apparent (that is reifying social 
relations i 1. As in Baudrillard, the new technologies of representation, the mass media, play a 
constitutive role in derealising society, turning lived process into spectacle. 
The spectacle is the existing order's uninterrupted discourse about itself, its laudatory 
monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its totalitarian management of 
the conditions of existence. The fetishistic, purely objective appearance of spectacular 
relations conceals the fact that they are relations among men and classes: a second nature 
with its fatal flaws seems to dominate our environment. But the spectacle is not the 
necessary product of technical development seen as a natural development. The society of 
the spectacle is on the contrary the form which chooses its own technical content. If the 
spectacle, taken in the limited sense of "mass media" which are its most glaring superficial 
manifestation, seems to invade society as mere equipment, this equipment is in no way 
neutral but is the very means suited to its total self-movement. (Society of the Spectacle) 
Apart from the fairly conventional elaboration of a theory of ideology as the fixed 'naturalisation' of a 
fluid arbitrary or socially-constructed language and world, Debord im1ovatively sees the very form and 
structure of these technologies of one-way communication as isolating and alienating in their effects on 
the already passive consumer-subject. Communication technology is intentionally designed around the 
principles of mass stimulation and manipulation, and as he reveals below, is controlled by and for 
capital. As we shall see shortly this view of 'the content of form' is similar to McLuhan's credo, 'the 
medium is the message'. Debord continues: 
If the social needs of the epoch in which such techniques are developed can only be 
satisfied through their mediation, if the administration ofthis society and all contact 
among men can no longer take place except through the intennediary of this instantaneous 
communication, it is because this "communication" is unilateral. The concentration of 
"communication" is thus an accumulation, in the hands of the existing system's 
administration, of the means which allow it to carry on this particular administration. The 
generalized cleavage of the spectacle is inseparable from the modem State, namely from 
31 This would appear to be evidenced by a remark at the end of the book: ''The critical concept of spectacle can 
undoubtedly also be vulgarized into a commonplace hollow formula of sociologico-political rhetoric to explain 
and abstractedly denounce everything, and thus serves as a defense of the spectacular system. It is obvious that 
no idea can lead beyond the existing spectacle, but only beyond the existing ideas about the spectacle. To 
effectively destroy the society of the spectacle, what is needed is men putting a practical force into action." 
(paragraph 203) 
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the general form of cleavage within society, the product of the division of social labour 
and the organ of class domination (Society of the Spectacle, paragraph 24). 
Communication in the society of the spectacle is thus the unabashed appropriation and confiscation of 
the means of mediation and praxis, ofintersubjective language, by the deployment ofthe mass media, 
the machine-language of the administrators. With this inhuman, malignant growth of the society of the 
spectacle "all community and critical sense are dissolved" in a process which gathers its own 
momentum, when humans become automata and machines seem to do the talking. The spectacle openly 
displays its autonomy as "separate power developing in itself, in the growth of productivity by means 
of the incessant refinement of the division of labour into a parcellization of gestures which are then 
dominated by the independent movement of machines" (paragraph 25). 
IfBaudrillard and Debord exist as the fine French pedigree Jameson is willing to concede as 
influences on his theory of technology-centred postmodemism, there also exists another class of 
American and mainstream media theorists (or perhaps we should say writers) who aren't as openly 
manifested in his essay. I am referring to the popular media theories that Jameson refers disparagingly 
to in the beginning of his essay as those 'ideological' sociologies which "bring us the news of ... a 
whole new type of society, most famously baptized "postindustrial society" [Daniel Bell] but often also 
designated consumer society, media society, information society, electronic society or high tech and the 
like" ('Postmodernism' 3). Alongside the more polished, academic and ideologically threatening 
research of Bell one finds the popular futurists like Marshall McLuhan and Alvin Toffler. These 
'common' or popular cultural theories are implicated as similarly and simply ideological in their 
unwitting and 'religious' contribution to a larger intentional strategy of challenging the adequacy of 
Marxist discourse to explain the new socio-economic order. The suggestion here is that Jameson's 
theorisation of the culture ofthe simulac~m is critical of yet also informed or shaped at some level by 
this larger body of writing on the new 'world', whether it be the "swirling phantasmagoria" of 
Toffler's 'Third Wave infosphere' (The Third Wave 169) or McLuhan's musings on the thrills and 
dangers of technologies as the 'extensions of man'
32
. If we look closer at the theories themselves we 
fmd similarities, for example, between Jameson and McLuhan in the theme of a human body compelled 
to mutate to meet the new technological environment. Jameson suggests that the human subject is not 
yet ready for postmodem space: "The newer architecture therefore - like many of the other cultural 
products I have evoked in the preceding remarks - stands as something like an imperative to grow new 
organs, to expand our sensorium and our body to some new, yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately 
impossible, dimensions ('Postmodernism' 39). This seems to be reminiscent ofMcLuhan's metaphor, 
that "today, after more than a century of electric technology we have extended our central nervous 
system itself in a global embrace abolishing space and time as far as our planet is concemed" 
32 "Our mechanical technologies for extending and separating the functions of our physical beings have 
brought us near to a state of disintegration by putting us out of touch with ourselves" (Understanding Media 
105) 
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(Understanding Media 19). Even more closely McLuhan prefigures Jameson's analogy down to the 
mutation of "new organs", declaring that "electromagnetic technology requires utter human docility and 
quiescence of meditation such as befits an organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its 
nerves outside its hide" (Understanding Media 64). Additionally Jameson's call for a 'cognitive 
mapping' of our real relations to the global system, seem to echo, apart from the explicit Althusserian 
model of ideology, a suggestion one finds in McLuhan, where he discerns the need for a global 
consciousness and 'conscience'- "An external consensus or conscience is now as necessary as private 
consciousness" (64-5). Elsewhere McLuhan suggests that "today, when we have extended all parts of 
our bodies and senses by technology, we are haunted by the need for an outer consensus of technology 
and experience that would raise our communal lives to the level of a world-wide consensus" 
(Understanding Media 105-6). To a lesser degree even the hyperbolic style ofToffler's 
pronouncements on the new order, the "Third Wave infosphere", seem to affect Jameson's occasional 
rhetorical excesses about the 'Third machine age'. Tlus is entirely consistent with Jameson's own 
theory ofpostmodernism as a barrage of infectious styles and codes which erode earlier Modem 
assumptions of personal style, originality and access to a 'pure' referent, whether it be a past History or 
the very 'presence' of the present, postmodernism. 
The schizophrenic subject 
In Jameson we see a contradiction or at least an ambiguity or ambivalence concerning the 
emergence of schizophrenia as a cultural donlinant: schizophrenia is used as both a formal explanation 
ofhigl1-cultural authorial experimentation, and as a structural understanding of mass consumption- in 
his theorisation this possibly latent ambivalence isn't explicitly or consciously elaborated, and 
manifests itself in at least two contradictory 'stereotypes' or poles of psychiatric schizophrenia: 
paranoia and catatonia. With regard to the former both the anxiety and the active paranoid 
constructions, projections and conspiracies of the cyberpunk sub-genre are heralded and celebrated, and 
offered as an example of the still forthconling 'political' form ofpostmodernism, while the more 
passive variety of schizophret.ua, which one nlig11t correlate with the catatonic species, is seen in a 
negative ligl1t. The hedonistic state of the postmodem subject, consunling as opposed to working, 
watching instead of acting is castigated, and is captured in the witl1ering denunciation of an imbecilic 
indiscrimination towards sensory input: "the ideal schizophrenic, indeed, is easy enoug11 to please 
provided only an eternal present is thrust before tl1e eyes, which gaze witl1 equal fascination on an old 
shoe or the tenaciously growing organic mystery of the human toenail" ('Postmodernism' 10). In 
Jameson's tone above one finds a paradoxical syntl1esis ofDatliel Bell's conservative outrage at the 
fantasy-orientated and anti-work Modernist sentimet.1t saturating and threatening the social domain, and 
at the other extreme, Guy Debord's indignant and radical analysis oftl1e society oftl1e spectacle and its 
induction of a state of generalised political paralysis. This catatonia is the subject's lack oftemporal 
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direction, caught in the eternal 'present' of the simulacrum, a semiotic flux of distractions which 
disorientate and produce amnesia. The sense of the loss of the real and of continuity (History) is only 
half-remembered, and ironically commodified, in the nostalgia product. 
But how does one deal with the treatment of these two species of schizophrenia, which Jameson 
never delineates as such? Should one accept the contradiction as coextensive with Jameson's explicit 
aim mentioned elsewhere of thinking capitalism 'dialectically', "to think this development positively and 
negatively all at one [ ... ] as catastrophe and progress altogether" ('Postmodernism' 47)? Nowhere in his 
essay does Jameson treat the differences and contradictions of the medical taxonomy of schizophrenia, 
although there are a number of effects he describes which correlate to different 'subtypes'. The 
Paranoid Type, according to the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic bible, The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV), corresponds to Jameson's affirmative analysis 
of the postmodern sublime, to the "high-tech paranoia" thematic of cyberpunk. "The essential feature of 
the Paranoid Type of Schizophrenia is the presence of prominent delusions or auditory hallucinations in 
the context of a relative preservation of cognitive functioning and affect" (DSM-IV 287). On the other 
hand Jameson's 'waning of affect' and 'fragmentation' seem to bear witness to some of the criteria of 
the Disorganized Type, "disorganized speech, disorganized behaviour, and flat or inappropriate affect" 
(287). The last trait is explained: "the disorganized speech may be accompanied by silliness and 
laughter that are not closely related to the content of the speech" (287 -8). 'Pastiche', the 
"cannibalisation" of past styles, echoes the "echolalia" of the Catatonic type, which is "the pathological 
and parrot-like, and apparently senseless repetition of a word just spoken by another person", and to a 
degree the related "echopraxia", "tl1e repetitive imitation oftl1e movements of another 
person ... stereotypies, mannerisms, and automatic obedience or mimicry" (288). The Catatonic "motoric 
inunobility" or "stupor" (289) additionally exemplifies tl1e Debord-shaded inactivity of the postmodern 
spectator, frozen by the spatiality oftl1e culture of the image. Blithely incorporating these 
incommensurables or extremes, schizophrenia appears in Jameson's essay as the unproblematic 
problem ofpostmodernism, the unified state and dominant illness or etiology of commodity culture, or a 
zeitgeist, tolerating no internal contradictions. 
The actual connection with or relation to what schizophrenia nonnally means in a clinical sense 
ts never actually explored, except vaguely and analogically in the reference to a Lacanian theory of 
breakdown and psychosis. The Paranoid Schizophrenia of the cyberpunk sub-culture would then have 
to be considered as a kind of counter-schizophrenic force in Jameson's schema, actively working from 
within, constructing patterns and tracing conspiracies, all towards regaining a cognitive hold on the 
world and our positions within it. The following section attempts to thresh out some of the problems 
and confusion surrounding Jameson's often vague and contradictory conceptualisations of 
schizophrenia as a model for postmodern aesthetics. 
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The theorisation of a schizophrenic 'present' is quite a serious and important feature of 
Jameson's theory of postmodemism, and although I hope to demonstrate its limitations, inaccuracy and 
inconsistency as a label attempting to bring together various very different uses of the term, I also want 
to argue for its usefulness and continued relevance, after articulating the poles and gradations it 
contains, as a concept for evaluation. Jameson's paradigm of schizophrenia seems to be a synthesis of 
various theories, and exists in his essay as the total 'effect' of various aspects or characteristics of 
postmodernism. Initially he discusses the move from an emotional or psychological experiential tone of 
'anxiety' to that of 'schizophrenia' with the emergence ofpostmodernism- whereas 'expression', 
requiring the differentiation between inside and outside of an ego or subjectivity, was still possible in 
the earlier cultural moment, the newer space seems to erode the difference, and both 'expression' and 
'the subject' are casualties. Here Jameson's style seem to be speculative and impressionistic; he doesn't 
bother to go into the mechanics of the metamorphosis, drawing most of his evidence from a few 
paintings and a vague generalisation about the sixties ("the notorious cases of burnout and self-
destruction of the ending 1960s, and the great dominant experiences of drugs and 
schizophrenia"['Postmodemism' 14] ). The main feature ofpostmodernism he addresses here is the 
death of the subject, which appears to be the consequence of the French pronouncement of the death of 
the author. At this juncture he would thus appear to be influenced by influential yet academic essays, 
like Foucault's 'What is an Author?', which had already declared the end of expression, the 
inside/outside opposition, and the author or 'writing subject' (somewhat optimistically): 
we can say that today's writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression. 
Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, 
writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority ... In writing, the point is not to 
manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin the subject within language; it is rather 
a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears ('What 
is an Author?' 198). 
The problem with this absorption of Foucault is that the latter is writing about innovations in Modernist 
'writing', as avante garde art, literature as a 'high' cultural space outside of- and out of touch with -the 
field of mass culture; Jameson rearticulates as and expands to a 'cultural dominant' what is a hopeful 
diagnosis of a minor tangent (in Foucault and Barthes). It doesn't take much to persuade one that the 
American film industry is still firmly founded (and trades) on auteur theory. 
Scott Durham, however, redeems Jameson somewhat by illustrating how the death of the 
subject exists not only as a 'literary' project, with its formal interest in authorial expression and 
autonomy, but as the dominant thematic of Philip K. Dick's oeuvre, and commits himself to "showing 
how he stages the death of the subject in terms of a radically contestatory politics of experience" ('P. K. 
Dick: From the Death of the Subject to a Theology of Late Capitalism' 173). He sees Dick as removed 
from the elite "high-cultural movements of the post World War Two period" and emblematic of an 
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everyday broadly based "counter-cultural" movement already on the wane from the 60s, and thus "it is 
perhaps by virtue of his very marginality with regard to high culture (as hegemonically defmed) that 
Dick emerges as particularly symptomatic of the transformations that American culture has undergone 
with the emergence of late capitalism" (173). This "politics of experience" revolves around the central 
question of what it is to be a subject in this strange new 'schizophrenic' world in which culture is 
indistinguishable from commerce, and the field of desire is intensified to the point where the subject is 
unable to separate itself from the object-world. He analyses two different instances or "antagonistic 
tendencies" of this confusion or dissolution in Dick's novels, where a subject's boundaries are 
'exploded' by desire to incorporate objects, and, the reverse, an experience of being invaded or 
colonised by a world of hostile subject-objects. 
We are presented with desire's unmediated investment ofthe everyday, a well-nigh 
schizoid experience .... In this first moment, the triumph of desire is total and its dissolving 
subject is paradoxically sovereign: it recreates its object as "benign entities" and traverses 
them "at will". In the second moment, which Dick characteristically stages as the yearning 
of drug dependency, this "death" appears as an invasion of the subject by its objects and 
at the same time as the deterioration of that very power for desire's "projection" that 
characterised that first moment: we are presented with a paranoid experience in which 
desire is immobilised, crushed and reduced to little more than a subordinate attribute of an 
"oppressive" object-world which seems to embody an unfamiliar and hostile subjectivity. 
Hence, the death of the subject is staged twice: first as an expansion of subjective powers 
in which desire is freed from its contempl,ative prison and immediately invests a complicit 
everyday, secondly, as the triumph over the subject of desire by a raw matter which seems 
paradoxically endowed with antagonistic subjectivity of its own ('P. K. Dick: From the 
Death of the Subject to a Theology of Late Capitalism' 176). 
The distinction made here seems useful, as it strikes at the root of Jameson's schizophrenic 
incorporation of assorted meanings of 'schizophrenia': even though a favourite refrain of his is that one 
must think culture or postmodernism dialectically, and not moralistically as good or bad, the essay, as 
has already been pointed put, seems to respond more positively to one 'subtype' of schizophrenia, while 
condemning another. In other words Jameson's essay seems to be aware of these "antagonistic 
tendencies", while not fully exploring or developing them. 
Durham's split, along with his initial analysis of 'counter-culture' can be traced back to Daniel 
Bell's analysis of the emergence of a broad-based 'counter-culture' and a more traditionally elite 
'adversary' culture, both of which emerge out of an anti-bourgeois Modernism and constitute 
unrealistic degrees of hedonism out of touch with the economic base. He sees a "a widening disjunction 
between the social structure ... and the culture, each of which is rooted by a different axial principle" 
(The Coming of Post-Industrial Society 4 77), where the culture is orientated around the self, while the 
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social structure is based on rationality or performativity. This split between the system's requirements 
and the culture is enhanced by capitalism itself: "in the organization of production and work itself, the 
system demands provident behaviour, industriousness and self-control, dedication to a career and 
success. In the realm of consumption, it fosters the attitude of carpe diem, prodigality and display, and 
the compulsive search for play" (478). This 'post-Modernist' culture is divided into two streams: one is 
more analytical and academic, the 'counter-culture' constitutes a challenge in terms oflifestyle, and 
extends 'freedom' and 'fantasy' to every facet of life. 
These anti-bourgeois values, on the levels of ideology and consciousness, go hand in hand 
with the expansion of a new intellectual class, huge enough to sustain itself economically 
as a class, and with a new youth movement which seeks expression and self-definition in 
altered states of consciousness, cultural rebellion, and enormous personal freedom. What 
has emerged, coincident in time, is both an "adversary culture" and a "counter-culture 
(479). 
The "adversary culture" academics, Jameson and Durham, seem to express distaste or misgivings for 
this brand of 'naive' consumptive schizophrenia, a "counter-culture" resembling Catatonic and 
Disorganized Schizophrenia, and instead promote the more 'intelligent', analytical or 'organized' 
variety of schizophrenia, what Durham identifies above as the second moment, the "paranoid 
experience" which acknowledges the commodity system as other to the subject. In fact we see the 
paranoid type of schizophrenia above deconstructing the alien and alienated object-world of capitalism 
in a remarkably similar light to Marx's analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital. 
33 Durham actually 
attempts to reposition Dick in his own "adversary culture", after initially situating him in the plebeian 
"counter-cultural" realm of "coffee-house metaphysics and dreams of conspiracy" ('P. K. Dick From 
the Death of the Subject to a Theology of Late Capitalism' 173). While acknowledging the 
undecidability of Dick's "oscillation" of the "desiring subject from absolute sovereignty to absolute 
abjection" (176) he nevertheless feels obliged to emphasise that in Dick "the unmediated equation of the 
field of desire with the field of social production appears as the product of late-capitalist tendency to 
violently reduce the former to a moment of the latter" (177). In other words Dick is a good boy because 
he sees that ultimately capitalism rules desire. 
As we see in the following chapter, Jameson also applauds the "hi-tech paranoia" of cybernetic 
and cyberpunk literature as exemplary forms of political postmodemism, while one gets a sense he 
looks down upon the amnesiac disorientation of the postmodem consumer/spectator in the midst of the 
culture of the simulacrum with disappointment and disapproval. In fact one finds in the taxonomy of 
psychiatry itself a division between the very different paranoid and catatonic schizophrenia's, two 
distinct forms which are respectively active and passive. I have been trying to argue tl1at these schizo-
33 Where Durham describes the object-world as "raw matter which seems paradoxically endowed with 
antagonistic subjectivity of its own". 
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types make their way into Jameson's theory at some level, as negative and positive aspects of the same 
general state of abnormality. It is difficult to find Jameson directly denouncing 'schizophrenia': it is 
more a matter of tone, and of comments which seem to suggest culture's radical deviancy or departure 
from a norm or expected trajectory (which is self-contradictory, considering the essay's exposure of the 
absence of a norm in postmodem styles and codes), observations like the "impossible imperative to 
achieve that new mutation in what can perhaps no longer be called consciousness" ('Postmodemism' 
31). The figure of a 'mutation in consciousness', along with the very diagnostic figure of 
'schizophrenia', seems to indicate this sense of abnormality or sickness, even if he expressly distances 
his schizophrenic analogy from its clinical application and resonances: "I have found Lacan's account 
of schizophrenia useful here not because I have any way here of telling whether it has any clinical 
accuracy, but chiefly because - as description rather than diagnosis -it seems to me to offer a suggestive 
aesthetic model" ('Postmodemism' 26). But even if no comparison is intended, the fact is Jameson uses 
a clinical model of 'schizophrenia' (actually paranoia) to elaborate his 'aesthetic' model when he moves 
into a Lacanian framework.. In this sense there is no difference between a 'neutral' description and a 
prescriptive diagnostic label - 'schizophrenia' is a term which describes a course of action to be taken. 
Additionally his 'purely' aesthetic model seems to describe both the spirit of the artistic text's 
production, and its effects in the act of consumption or reception; this seems to pale at the larger 
contradiction, that one can't talk about an aesthetic model (as opposed to a general model) when one is 
primarily arguing that 'aesthetics' is no longer an autonomous realm, having been subsumed by the 
culture industry, and roped into the everyday experiences of consumption. Following the logic of the 
Frankfurt School, which Jameson dutifully serves elsewhere, to "describe" aesthetics is to "diagnose" 
culture at large. 
Other problems with the concept of schizophrenia present themselves upon scrutiny of the 
Lacanian model offered. We encounter Jameson explaining "very briefly" what he remembers to be 
La can' s 'theory of schizophrenia': 
Lacan describes schizophrenia as the breakdown in the signifying chain, that is the 
interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance or meaning. I 
must admit the familial or more orthodox psychoanalytical background to the situation, 
which Lacan transcodes mto language by describing the Oedipal rivalry in terms not so 
much of the biological individual who is your rival for the mothers' attention but rather of 
what he calls the Name-of the-Father, paternal authority now considered as a linguistic 
function ('Postmodemism' 26). 
There is no other mention of Lacan's underlying causality and he goes on to describe the 'meaning 
effect' without explaining how this "background" brings about the breakdown of the chain. When the 
breakdown happens it has no cause: "when that relationship breaks down, when the links of that 
signifying chain snap, then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated 
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signifiers" (26). However the chain can't just "snap" of its own accord. The problem that Jameson is 
faced with- or rather the one that he doesn't face- is that Lacan's theory is actually a description of 
(essentially paranoid) 'psychosis' and not of the particular condition or species of psychosis 
'schizophrenia' is generally considered to be
34
- he remembers some of the content ofLacan's 
mechanistic account of the 'sliding' of the signified along the chain of signifiers, but he doesn't 
remember that context; the essay in which this takes place is "On the Possible Treatment of Psychosis" 
(in Ecrits ), which Lacan incidentally associates with homosexuality, and not schizophrenia per se. 
Jameson seems to have quite simply misremembered Lacan. Furthermore the "breakdown" of 
signification is a symptom and an expression of psychosis, which occurs because of a particular failure 
in the developmental history of the subject , at the Oedipal stage, namely the 'foreclosure' or rejection 
of the patemal metaphor, which should attain and inhabit the Other (the place of a continuous self-
questioning) and maintain the subject's sense of identity. "Freud revealed this imaginary function of the 
phallus, then, to be the pivot of the symbolic process that completes in both sexes the questioning of the 
sex by the castration complex" ('On the Possible Treatment of Psychosis' 198). Within the Imaginary 
the signifying phallus has to be "evoked" by the patemal metaphor. This failure can be determined by 
the real mother's respect for the law and authority of the father, as well as the father's own relation to 
the law, and by all the unappealing positions within it he could take up: "ideals that provide him with 
all too many opportunities of being in a posture of undeserving, inadequacy, even of fraud, and in short, 
of excluding the Name-of-the-Father from its position in the signifier" (219). When the patemal 
metaphor or the Name-of the- Father is foreclosed and constitutes a lack "a hole ... opens up in the 
signified from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds" (217). Lacan is adamant that 
psychosis proceeds from, in fact can only be triggered after, this failure. It is "the foreclosu~e of the 
Name-of -the-Father in the place of the Other that, and in the failure of the patemal metaphor, that I 
designate the defect that gives psychosis its essential condition" (215). This "essential condition" is not 
only 'inessential' to Jameson's theory, but is not present anywhere as any kind of cause. It becomes 
clear that Lacan's theory of psychosis is incompatible with Jameson's ideas on a number of points. 
Firstly Lacan's theory, as sununarised above, is geared toward a specific understanding of 
psychosis as opposed to neurosis. As Lacan points out: 'foreclosure' replaces 'repression' as the key 
term (200). Tlus means that psychosis is the result of the personal history of the individual subject-
thoroughly dependent on the 'cause' of an abnormal childhood development it has nothing to do with 
the 'historicity' of "late capitalism" and a cultural assault on temporality. Neither does 'neurosis' 
become 'psychosis', as Jameson's anxiety mutates into fragmentation or schizophrenia-- 'foreclosure' 
is entirely different from the mechanism of 'repression'. We might well ask whether the theory of a 
serious clinical disorder is appropriate for a general "aesthetic model". Surely Jameson would not want 
34 See Foucault, Mental Illness and Psychology, p5 
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to imply or concede that the paternal metaphor is consistently lacking in the postmodern subject, that 
we are all tautologically psychotic. 
If Jameson's theory of the connection between postmodemism and schizophrenia does not 
really or theoretically emerge from a Lacanian framework the link can be found elsewhere. Debord 
provides the basis for both the active and inactive types of 'schizophrenia' we discerned as Jameson's 
schema. As we have seen the consumption-void of history in a dominantly visual and spatialised culture 
is what enables him to make the connection with history. The eternal present ofthe schizophrenic 
experience is more broadly attributed to the breakdown of historicity or narrative temporality, and a 
sense of the failure of personal and collective history as process and continuity. This connection to a 
'lack of history' we can trace to one of Debord's key oppositions, the 'freezing of history' in the 
spectacular society: "the capitalist need which is satisfied by urbanism in the form of a visible freezing 
of life can be expressed in Hegelian terms as the absolute predominance of the 'peaceful coexistence of 
space' over the 'restless becoming in the passage of time' "(Society of the Spectacle, paragraph 170). 
The suppression of becoming is what he later identifies as schizophrenia at the level oflived history. 
The parallel between ideology and schizophrenia, established by Gabrel (La Fausse 
Conscience) must be placed in this economic process of materialization of ideology. 
Society has become what ideology already was. The removal of praxis and the anti-
dialectical false consciousness which accompanies it are imposed during every hour of 
daily life subjected to the spectacle; this must be understood as a systematic organization 
of the "failure of the faculty of encounter" and as its replacement by a hallucinatory 
social fact: the false consciousness of encounter, the "illusion of encounter". In a society 
where no one can any longer be recognized by others, every individual becomes unable to 
recognize his own reality. Ideology is at home; separation has built its world. 
"In clinical charts of schizophrenia," says Gabel, "the decay of the dialectic of totality 
(with disassociation as its extreme form) and the decay of the dialectic of becoming (with 
catatonia as its extreme form) seem solidly united". The spectator's consciousness, 
imprisoned in a flattened universe, bow1d by the screen ofthe spectacle behind which his 
life has been deported, knows only the fictional speakers who unilaterally surround him 
with their commodities and the politics of their commodities (Society of the Spectacle 
paragraphs 217-18) 
This would appear to be more like the space of failed praxis and 'becoming' that results in the 'eternal 
present' of Jameson's schizophrenia: "The ideal schizophrenic is easy enough to please provided only 
an eternal present is thrust before the eyes" ('Postmodemism' 10). The new culture of the image works 
against narrative continuity and erodes personal identity and empowerment, so that ultimately at the 
scale of personal experience "the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from 
all the activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis" (27). When 
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Jameson talks ofthe schizophrenic confusion and erosion of inside and outside, private and public, in 
the dominant cultural space produced as postmodernism, we can again recall Debord: "The spectacle 
obliterates the boundaries between self and world by crushing the self besieged by the presence-absence 
of the world and it obliterates the boundaries between true and false by driving all lived truth below the 
real presence of fraud ensured by the organization of appearances" (Society of the Spectacle paragraph 
219). 
Another influence also forces itself upon the 'schizophrenic' scene. In the slim-line Mental 
fllness and Psychology, the conventional view of schizophrenia is described and revised by Michel 
Foucault, utilising the same characteristics of "fragmentation" that Jameson sees replacing 'anxiety'. 
· Foucault proposes the following structural analysis based on Freud and Janet: 
Lastly, in confusional and schizophrenic states, the deterioration takes place as a deficit in 
capacity: in a horizon in which the spatial and temporal markers have become too 
imprecise to facilitate orientation, thinking has disintegrated and proceeds in isolated 
fragments, dividing up an empty, dark world with "psychic syncopes", or is enclosed in 
the silence of a body whose very motility is locked up in catatonia (Mental fllness and 
Psychology 27). 
The notion of 'disorientation' is an important schizophrenic effect that Jameson identifies in 
postmodernism, and is central to his project of counter-ideological "cognitive mapping". More 
importantly the thought process described above as taking place in "isolated fragments" is precisely 
what Jameson finds in schizophrenic experience of "signifier in isolation" ('Postmodernism' 27), and 
the 'schizophrenic art' in which the most apt model is "a sentence in free-standing isolation" (28). 
Foucault goes on to add that this description of schizophrenia is insufficient, as it 'doesn't acknowledge 
the fact that there is still some kind of coherent personality in the schizophrenic person. 
Inferior and simple as they may be, one must not omit the organisations by which a 
schizophrenic structures his world: the fragmented world that he describes accords with 
his dispersed consciousness, the time without future or past in which he lives reflects his 
inability to project himself into a future or to recognise himself in the past; but this chaos 
finds its point of coherence in the patient's personal structure, which guarantees the 
experienced unity of his consciousness and horizon. Thus, ill as a patient may be, this 
point of coherence cannot but exist (Mental Illness & Society 28). 
Again we encounter a "fragmented world", and in the representation of a "inability to project himself 
into a·future or to recognise the past" one finds almost an exact correlation with Jameson's idea of the 
schizophrenic "unable to unify the past, present, and future" of his "biographical experience or psychic 
life" ('Postmodernism' 27). Foucault implies the schizophrenic's place of habitation is in the 'present', 
describing it as a "time without future or past" which echoes Jameson's suggestion of "a series of pure 
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and unrelated presents in time" (27). It would thus appear that Jameson's understanding has more in 
common with Foucault's reading of schizophrenia than the confessed inspiration in Lacan's psychosis. 
Regarding these various sources Jameson's theory ofpostmodem schizophrenia appears to be 
an assemblage of different theories and responses, which encompasses both positive and negative views 
of different characteristics. On the hand he seems to be strongly opposed to the kind of celebration of 
the schizophrenic experience one finds in the influential Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
ofDeleuze and Guattari. They assert the schizophrenic's primal point of view as their own: "Producing 
machines, desiring machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the 
non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever" (Anti-Oedipus 2). The 
schizophrenic has some kind of privileged view of "nature as a process of production" (3), in which 
different 'machines', and different orders of machines intersect and combine with one another. Jameson 
is less keen on things being turned inside out, ofthe erosion ofthe barriers between "self' and the 
"non-self', or on the loss of the sense of the 'human' in its opposition to nature ("we make no 
distinction between man and nature" [Anti -Oedipus 4]). On the other hand 'cognitive mapping' wishes 
to restore a 'healthy', rational perspective through a kind of positive 'paranoid' schizophrenia, and in 
this sense he is an heir to the old Enlightenment protonarrative, Kant's story of emancipation about 
enlightenment, of the human emerging out of the animal or the phenomenal and machine-like realm of 
Nature. As we shall see in the next chapter he refigures technology, impregnating it with the old 
sublime power of Nature, so that 'it' once more threatens the autonomy, the very definition or meaning 
of the human. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : CYBERHYPE - CYBERPUNK, CYBERNETICS & THE 
POSTMODERN SUBLIME 
His paranoia grew. McVeigh [the Oklahoma bomber] claimed that the government had injected a 
computer chip into his backside. "It's all part of a programme to control Americans through 
computers", he said. 
'Mad Bomber's Harrowing Story of Terror', People magazine. 
The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into the unknown. Many people 
understand something of what technological progress is doing to us, yet take a passive attitude 
toward it because they think it is inevitable. But we don't think it is inevitable 
The Unabomber's manifesto, 'Industrial Society and its Future' 
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THE POSTMODERN SUBLIME -FROM KANT TO JAMESON 
We may thus describe the sublime thus: it is an object (of nature) the representation of which 
determines the mind to think the unthinkability of nature regarded as a presentation of Ideas. 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement 
The other of our society is in that sense no longer Nature at all, as it was in precapitalist societies, 
but something else which we must now identify. 
Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or ,The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' 
One of the most important aspects of Jameson's attempt to theorise postmodernism is the 
resuscitation of the aesthetic theory of the sublime, a theory which involves the formulation of a new 
significance for the figure of technology. The machine moves from being the Other of the bourgeois 
autonomous ego to constituting the metaphysical Other of the whole of humanity, in which technology 
takes on the role previously occupied by an untamed and ferocious force of nature. This change, which 
Jameson discerns at as simple a level as the transformation of the built space our of our daily 
environment, will be elaborated in detail below. The discussion of the postmodern variant of the 
sublime follows on, fairly logically, from his discussion of the new schizophrenic effect of being 
engulfed by an intensity of sensory experience in 'Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism'. After developing the present (postmodern) dominant of a 'schizophrenic' aesthetic, in 
which an older narrative temporality is broken down, and a disorientating spatiality 'forces' itself on the 
subject, and the subject fragments, ceasing to be able to determine its boundaries, Jameson proceeds to 
discuss how the concept of the sublime seems to articulate the dynamics of this schizophrenia. Initially 
Jameson goes about describing the Sartrean 'derealization' effect of some contemporary art, pointing to 
Duane Hanson's 'wax works', exact three-dimensional replications of human figures. Normal mental 
representation breaks down when the world becomes a momentary hallucination, real humans in the art 
gallery become fake, like Descartes' replicants, so many automata: 
Your moment of doubt and hesitation as to the breath of these polyester figures .. .tends to 
return upon the real humans moving about you in the museum and to transform them also 
for the briefest instant into so many dead and flesh-coloured simulacra in their own right. 
The world thereby momentarily loses its depth and threatens to become a glossy skin, a 
stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without density ('Postmodernism' 34) 
These works infect our ideologically constructed world-view, and momentarily provide us with a 
glimpse into another parallel reality, a limitless and normally inaccessible economic 'world' inhabited 
by commodities and controlled by machines, which our 'glimpse' cannot begin to map, the global and 
total domain of capitalism itself. The lived or ideological world is shown up as a massive fiction against 
the materiality of this machine-world peopled by pre-programmed cyborgs. This 'solipsistic' experience 
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he identifies as a kind of "hysterical" sublime, which corresponds to the schizophrenic aesthetic and to 
the earlier Romantic sublime. 
The history of the concept of the sublime provides Jameson with the materials for explaining 
the contemporary mutations of the experience of the extraordinary or the sublime. What attracts him to 
the theory of the sublime is its emphasis on the failure of representation to do justice to the totality, or 
that which is properly unpresentable, and the feeling of discomfort, even dread, associated with this 
incapacity or breakdown. For Edmund Burke the sublime is explained as "an experience bordering on 
terror, the fitful glimpse, in astonishment, stupor, awe, of what was so enormous as to crush human life 
altogether" while this "was refmed by Kant to include the question of representation itself- the object 
of the sublime becomes not only a matter of sheer power and of the incommensurability of the human 
organism with Nature but also of the limits of figuration and the incapacity of the human mind to give 
representation to such forces" ('Postmodernism' 34). Before we go further and discuss his 
transformation of this model, a retum to Kant will give a clearer picture of the mechanism and 
materials being reconstructed. 
Kant 
In the Critique of Judgement Kant goes about describing those special kinds of experience we 
call, or called, 'the beautiful' and 'the sublime', and attempts to ground them psychologically in 
specific relations between (or configurations of) the separate mental mechanisms or faculties. He posits 
a cognitive hierarchy, in which the senses and Imagination interact with the superior conceptual faculty 
of Understanding, which in tum is ruled by the ultimate faculty of Reason. The sublime is a similar 
type of experience to that of the beautiful (the main thrust of his book) - it is also an aesthetic 
judgement of 'subjective universality', and neither a judgement of sense nor of logic "but one of 
reflection" (Critique of Judgement 1.23). This means the delight is caused by neither sensation nor 
concept, which are both dependent on the extemal world. There are however fundamental differences 
between the two experiences. The 'beautiful' experience involves harmonious 'free play' between the 
Imagination and the Understanding- but in the sublime experience, which involves the failure of the 
elementary representational mechanism (the lowly Imagination) to provide a unit of measure to assess 
the magnitude of the perceived object, the mind is shocked into jumping a level and resorting to 
intercourse with the usually inaccessible realm of Reason, a short-circuiting of the Understanding 
altogether. What this means in short is that a person confronting a very large or powerful object fails to 
properly represent this object; it evades his cognitive faculties and requires special treatment from the 
'higher' realm which deals with the unconditioned or the infinite. 
Thus where the experience of beauty relates to 'quality' and form (and thus definite limits) the 
latter involves 'quantity' and a sense of "limitlessness, yet with a super-added thougl1t of its totality" 
(Critique of Judgement 1.23). This means that "Nature, therefore, is sublime in such of its phenomena 
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as in their intuition convey the idea of their infinity" (1.26). According to Kant the pure idea (one which 
cannot be presented visually) of a 'limitless totality' is one which has its home in the supersensible 
realm of Reason. In terms of measurement of magnitude the Imagination is relative, whereas Reason is 
absolute. The sublime consists of both pleasure and displeasure (different from the pure delight of the 
beautiful, and closer to the feeling of 'respect') at the inadequacy of the Imagination to grasp the 
sublime 'object' spatially . The secondary pleasure (a "negative pleasure") is derived from the 
realisation that the Imagination is inferior to Reason, and that this latter faculty is able to cope with the 
infinite, a reminder that part of us is able to transcend the empirical self. 
Now the greatest effort of the imagination in the presentation of the unit for the estimation 
of magnitude invokes in itself a reference to something absolutely great, consequently a 
reference also to the law of reason that this alone is to be adopted as the supreme measure 
of what is great. Therefore the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of 
sense to serve for rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with reason's 
laws and a displeasure that makes alive to the feeling of the supersensible of our being, 
according to which it is fmal, and consequently a pleasure, to fmd every standard of 
sensibility falling short of the ideas of reason. (Critique of Judgement [1984 ], 1.27) 
The "supersensible" is of course that higher faculty of 'practical' Reason that has no commerce with 
the "sensible" world perceived by the Senses (apart from instances such as these) and which holds such 
unpresentable Ideas as that of infinity or the 'absolutely whole'. Because the abstract Ideas of Reason 
have no corresponding representations or intuitions they are absolute or pure - they are not limited by a 
visual component. The pleasure that we feel is the internal recognition or awareness of a cognitive 
hierarchy - the superiority of Reason is only felt when the Imagination and Understanding are proved to 
be inadequate, and having failed in their task of grasping and measuring the phenomena, have referred 
the work to Reason 35 . 
Although Nature appears as 'might' in the violent eruptions of nature he discerns as the 
dynamic sublime, powerful enough to quite easily crush human existence, Kant believes the subject 
meets the danger (psychological or physical) with a 'fearfulness' or a "power of resistance, which gives 
us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature" (Critique of 
Judgement 1.28). Of course one has to be out of immediate physical danger to be able to reflect in this 
manner. But out of the experience of the sublime the subject achieves a transcendence of herself which 
minimises the significance of her own life and personal attachments. Kant would appear to be trying to 
offer a psychological explanation of what amow1ts to a spiritual experience - he goes as far as 
mentioning the 'soul': 
35 Although Kant might disapprove of this analogy, we could argue that, like the judgement of beauty, this 
pleasure is a 'psychological' pleasure, a pleasure produced by the mechanism of the mind in acknowledging 
itself as a multi-functional mechanism or system, but unlike beauty the sublime also involves the initial 
displeasure of the mind not being able to work, unable to function as a well-oiled machine. 
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For though the image, no doubt, finds nothing beyond the sensible world to which it can 
lay hold, still this pushing aside of the sensible barriers gives it a feeling of being 
unbounded; and the removal is thus a presentation of the infinite. As such it can be 
nothing more than a negative presentation - but still it expands the soul (Critique of 
Judgement 1.29) 
The sublime thus makes us aware of ourselves as being split between levels of awareness that are only 
commensurable through an 'unnatural' forcing of the one into the other. It is a tickling of the soul- or 
"soul-stirring delight" (1.28) - a reminder that there is this other dimension to ourselves. His 
theorisation of the sublime is thus a corroboration of the sensible-supersensible, or phenomena-
noumena opposition dealt with in the first chapter. Kant links the sublime feeling with the moral feeling 
attending Ideas of Practical Reason, and argues that without the capacity for experience of the latter-
that is, the development of a moral component in the individual -the sublime would be merely a 
negative experience of danger. 
Back to the Future (Jameson again) 
Although he doesn't really go into either Kant or Burke in much detail it seems as if Jameson 
had the dynamic sublime in mind, whose awesomeness lies in its magnitude and its threatening might. 
At first the two experiences appear to contradict each other- Kant's dynamic sublime is met with 
Reason, a sense of the infinite which "expands the soul", while Jameson's schizophrenic sublime is 
negative, either paranoid or fragmentary. But we see Kant noting how a development of the moral law 
in the subject is necessary for the threatening might of nature to be countered. If there is a breakdown in 
sensible representation but no 'spiritual' supersensible realm of freedom (which, as we saw earlier, is 
basically the recognition or acknowledgement of the Other as an end in himself) to redeem the 
experience, then all we have is a 'painful' breakdown of the cognitive mechanism. Thus Jameson's 
implied logic is that the complete lack of a moral dimension and the dissolution of moral depth, "the 
waning of affect" of the postmodem subject, has as its consequence the purely terrifying and 'negative 
experience of danger' when it comes to encounters with a powerful Other - an Other which in the late 
twentieth century is no longer Nature but Technology (as we will see shortly in more detail). 
Yet this is not to say the theories are entirely commensurable - for Jameson the postmodem 
schizophrenic experience can be either terrifying or euphoric: "But is this now a terrifying or 
exhilarating experience?" ('Postmodernism' 34). Perhaps they are no longer as distinct; the thrills of 
horror or exhilaration - "that euphoria or those intensities that seem to characterise the new cultural 
experience" (32)- are now just a quality-less 'intensification' of experience, the quantity of stimulation. 
If this is so then Jameson seems closer here to Burke's theory of the sublime. Lyotard maintains that 
"For Burke, the sublime was no longer a matter of elevation (the category by which Aristotle defmed 
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tragedy) but a matter ofintensification".
36 ('The Sublime and the Avante-Garde' 205). If pure 
intensification indicates Burke's contribution, at the level of the quality or non-quality of the 
experience, Jameson nevertheless needs Kant's elaborate representational model of the sublime, for 
much of his elaboration of the effects he wants to question requires a model dealing with the limits and 
incapacity of the representational faculty of the mind, its inability to do justice to the totality (of global 
capitalism). He will need Kant to bolster a theory of the sublime which will illustrate a representational 
(Althusserian) ideology straining to break through its limits to reach the domain of pure 
representationless (Althusserian) science; or to use the Kantian model, a transition from realm of sense 
to realm of freedom, seeing or perceiving striving to become thinking and feeling. He observes that "the 
Althusserian fonnula, in other words designates a gap, a rift, between existential experience and 
scientific knowledge. Ideology has the function of somehow inventing a way of articulating these two 
distinct dimensions with each other" ('Postmodernism' 53). The sublime in Kant, is a bridge between 
the two dimensions of the conditioned and unconditioned, and with Jameson this structure is retained: 
normal cultural representations (ideology, mythology) quite literally offer the subject a simple point of 
view, while the sublime, as the more powerful and political postmodern art, points beyond 
representation and its immediate world. Kathryne Lindberg notes that Jameson argues, with regard to 
the importance of cyberpunk as an art of the sublime, that "tlus is the most crucial terrain of ideological 
struggle today, which has migrated from concept to representation" ('Prostl1etic Mnemonics and 
Prophylactic Politics' 59). Jameson implies that cyberpunk will strive towards the higl1er calling of 
'concept', Reason or philosophy, and at the same time is acknowledging that the "terrain" of actual 
conflict is no longer conceptual; struggle now has to be representational, in a 'spatial' culture.
37 
As already mentioned, according to Jameson in this late stage of capitalism Nature has been 
literally conquered and erased, and has as culturally symbolic Other been replaced by the figure of 
Technology. Jameson warns us thoug11, that technology is just tl1e sign for a far larger complex of 
meaning we will address shortly, and we are told that "this other thing [should] not be overhastily 
grasped as technology per se, since I will want to show that teclmology is here itself a figure for 
something else" (3 5). If Burke and Kant had identified the symbolic and religious force of God and 
Nature as the Other of humanity, these metaphysical forces have lost their potency as confrontational 
and antagonistic powers in the advance of capitalism, colonialism, industrialism and the global spread 
of the commodity form. This seems to echo Adorno and Horkheimer's observation: 
36 Lyotard sums up Burke's more physiological theory as follows: ''Here then is an account of the sublime 
feeling: a very big, very poweful object threatens to deprive the soul of 'it happens', strikes it with 
'astonishment' (at lower intensities the soul is seized with admiration, veneration, respect). The soul is thus 
dumb, immobilized, as good as dead. Art, by distancing tllis menace, procures a pleasure of relief, of delight. 
Thanks to art, the soul is returned to the agitated zone between life and death, and this agitation is to its health 
and life." ('The Sublime and the Avante-Garde' 205) 
37 "I think it is at least empirically arguable that our daily life, our psychic experience, our cultural languages 
are today dominated by categories of space rather than categories of time, as in the preceeding period of high 
modernism" ('Postmodernism' 16). 
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The noontide panic fear in which men suddenly became aware of the nature as totality has 
found its like in the panic which nowadays is ready to break out at every moment: men 
expect that the world, which is without any issue, will be set on fire by a totality which 
they themselves are and over which they have no control (Dialectic of Enlightenment 29). 
One of the last dramatic instances of this change, the final step in the disenchantment ofNature, is 
witnessed in the Green Revolutions, and the yoking in of Third World agriculture into the global 
market system. The Green Revolutions in 'scientific' farming (producing high yields), first at home in 
the First World, and then the second phase in South East Asia, and Central and South America, see the 
conquest of Nature in both 'production' and the people or 'nations', the 'primitive' peasantries who are 
absorbed into a greater 'civilisation', the world of commodities. The other 'unrefom1able' or 
unindustrialisable regions (such as most of investment-resistant Africa), which don't see the benefit of 
the Green Revolution and industrialised agriculture, are nevertheless seen to conform to transformation 
via the continued push under colonial and postcolonial administration towards cash-cropping, a 
systematic forced transition from household subsistence to household commodity fam1ing. 
Jameson uses Ernest Mandel's three stages of capital and technological revolution to describe 
the modem transformation of the natural world. With the three successive stages of market, monopoly, 
and multinational capitalism one fmds the three corresponding machine ages, three revolutions in 
machinery: steam, electric and combustion, and- finally in the post-1945 era- nuclear and electronic 
('Postmodernism' 35). Along with these can be attached the trailing categories of realism, modernism, 
and postmodernism: more than anything we are in the Third Machine Age, or alternatively 
postmodernism. The culture of these ages celebrates the awesomeness of its dominant mode of 
machinery, but unfortunately for postmodem culture the apotheosis of the electronic machine, the 
computer, isn't really representable- or at least poses a problem to representation- its power being 
hidden, inside, invisibly active as opposed to kinetic (36). Additionally production is to a degree 
superseded, or displaced by, reproduction; television, musical equipment, databases - the information 
age. Reproductive appliances or networks displace moving productive machinery. 
Postmodem texts sometimes offer a "glimpse into a postmodern or technological sublime" by 
going beyond just the representation of the reproductive processes and discerning some kind of larger 
network or connectedness beneath the various reproductive networks. Thus the massive 
communicational or computer network in popular fiction functions as a "representational shorthand" 
for the more dimly and distantly conceived mega-system or "global network of the third stage of 
capital" ('Postmodernism' 38). In tlus light the proliferation of conspiracy tl1eory should be tl1ought of 
as the attempt "to think the impossible totality of the contemporary world system" (38). The excitement 
and fascination with the Other of a complex Technology is therefore the figure for, and the buffer 
against, an even more complex, unpresentable, and frightening, Other. As stated above the degree of 
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metonymic figurality indicates and constitutes the degree of the erosion of ideological resistance to the 
'real conditions of existence' or the global system. 
With Jameson's emphasis on the new symbolic role ofteclmology, we can see how his 
schizophrenic experiences of engulfment by the menacing other of particularly reproductive (media, 
electronic and computer) teclmology could well intersect with Kant's extrapolation of the purely 
subjective sublime. 38 We have already seen the breakdown in the moral or intersubjective domain, via 
the microcosm of the entropic alienation of the contemporary cinema pseudo-community, which moves 
from social-ideological to individual-hormonal pleasures. With regard to this transition, Debord, a 
strong theoretical vector in Jameson, seems to address the political consequences of this mutation of the 
film and other representational media, identifying 'the spectacle' as a mechanism of psychic 
disintegration and social alienation: 
Philosophy, the power of separate thought and the thought of separate power, could never 
by itself supersede theology. The spectacle is the material reconstruction of the religious 
illusion. Spectacular technology has not dispelled the religious clouds where men had 
placed their powers detached from themselves; it has only tied them to an earthly base. 
The most earthly life has thus become opaque and unbreathable. It no longer projects to 
the sky but shelters within itself its absolute denial, its fallacious paradise. The spectacle 
is the technical realization of the exile of human powers into a beyond; it is separation 
perfected within the interior of man. (Society of the Spectacle paragraph 20) 
The power (and powers) of myth and of religion is no longer invisible; it now plays itself out on the 
television screen. Removed from the subject, the (only occasionally) "Promethean" ('Postmodernism' 
36) power to build, reconstruct and change the social world was via theology once invested in a deity, 
extemalised in a transcendent world, the Kingdom of heaven. That same authority, a legitimating 
power, has been returned to the human world, but, now built into the mechanism of the media, it still 
separates most of humanity from the world of power and empowerment, both in terms of its medium, a 
one-way relation of enthralment, entanglement and mass separation, and its message of power 
happening 'there' (the Olympian machinations of the soap-opera, the majestic gestures of the 
'superpower', etc.)- the meta-message that only a few can act and interact, while the rest must watch, 
consume and live vicariously. Debord identifies a hidden function of the media beyond that of the older 
ideological unificatory myth; one of fragmenting, separating or even desocialising classes or groups, a 
vector undermining the very fabric of social interaction and collective action. This strategy and effect 
38 Connecting this experience with what will later be called schizophrenia, is Kant's description of withdrawal 
from social interaction as a sublime experience - perhaps preceding the more modern concepts of alienation. 
"We must however remark that separation from society is regarded as sublime, if it rests upon ideas that 
overcome all sensible interest. To be sufficient for oneself, and consequently to have no need for society, 
without at the same time being unsociable, i.e without flying from it, is something bordering on the sublime" 
(Critique of Judgement 1.29 ). How was he to know that separation from or transcedence of social being would 
be achieved through the external sense mechanisms of the representational technologies, and not through 
ascetism or the moral domain of freedom? 
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of isolating the individual subject, leading to its heightened sense of its vulnerability or 'smallness', 
seems to be the root of both sublime and schizophrenic 'intensities'. 
Deleuze and Guattari are additional influences on Jameson's thought with regard to the relation 
of technological change to subjectivity. In a distinction that distinctly resembles Jameson's cultural 
extrapolation ofEmest Mandel's Second and Third Machine Ages the two authors (Deleuze and 
Guattari) maintain that a recent change in subjectivity has taken place, resulting in a 'machinic 
enslavement' ofpostmodem subjectivity: "If motorized machines constituted the second ages ofthe 
technical machine, cybernetic and informational machines form a third age that reconstructs a 
generalized regime of subjection: recurrent and reversible "human-machine systems" replace the old 
nonrecurrent and nonreversible relations of subjection between the two elements" (A Thousand 
Plateaus 458). Exactly the same kind of epochal determinism is at work here, with pretty much the 
same terms; the advent of a new age of the informational machine brings about a change in human 
subjectivity in both theories. Their example of 'machinic enslavement' is the human-TV relation - "one 
is enslaved by TV as a human machine insofar as the television viewers are no longer consumers or 
users, nor even subjects who "make" it, but intrinsic components, "input" and "output", feedback or 
recurrences that are no longer connected to the machine in such a way'as to produce it or use it" (458). 
This disapproval is echoed by Jameson's insistence on a new subjectivity dependent or addicted to 
hallucinogenic stimuli (an experience which generates 'intensities' as opposed to affect), as is 
demonstrated by the remark "the ideal schizophrenic, indeed, is easy enough to please provided only an 
eternal present is thrust before the eyes" ('Postmodemism' 10). 
As noted above Jameson's use of the term technology is just "shorthand" for what we 
commonly and crudely call 'modem society', the new world of postmodem space. It is the new interior 
cybernetic environments of home and office, the landscaped exteriors of our built technological and 
economic environment, the barely conceivable informational networks, financial flights and flows and 
trade routes of global commerce and capital. At the literal level of machinery, the word 'technology' is 
also a buffer against the negative force of resentment that could and should be associated with a power 
removed from producers: "technology may well stand as adequate shorthand to designate that properly 
human and anti-natural power of dead human labour stored up in our machinery- an alienated power" 
('Postmodernism' 35). But in tenns of its figurality, teclmology also stands in for the whole process-
system of multinational capitalism itself. "The technology of contemporary society is therefore 
mesmerizing and fascinating not so much in its own right but because it seems to offer some privileged 
representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our 
minds to grasp: the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of capital itself' (38). 
Jameson's argument seems to be that 'weaker' postmodem texts don't manage to extend the figural 
dimensions of technology beyond the immediate and normalised object-world of the present, and thus 
merely and superficially produce meaning about reproduction or information society, containing 
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technology as merely so many interchangeable props, technological gadgets and equipment, while 
stronger or more "energetic" texts "beyond all thematics or content seem to tap the networks of the 
reproductive process and thereby to afford us some glimpse into a postmodem or teclmological sublime, 
whose power and authenticity is documented by the success of such works in evoking a whole new 
postmodem space in emergence around us" (37). While weaker texts contain the present as the product 
of literally smooth and harmless historical and technological innovations and transitions, along a 
Utopian trajectory of benign progress, the more powerful artefacts begin to bear witness to that which 
is not present (neither geographically nor historically\consciously) or even presentable, the repressed 
historical reality of alienation, subjugation and control upon which the technology and 'superiority' of 
the first world is founded. Although there is obviously no clear line between political and non-political 
texts, it would be apparent nevertheless that the political aspect of any work is a matter of its 'richness' 
of evocation, its degree offigurality. Rather than choosing the 'politics-of-everything' route, a rather 
hackneyed critical move which claims that all texts are equally 'political' regardless of intelligence or 
superficiality, Jameson mobilises older literary values of depth, of quality, to evaluate the degree of a 
text's awareness and scope, and in order to selectively confer the status of being 'political'. 
Hyping Technology 
In the next section we will see how, according to Jameson, cybernetic or "higl1-tech paranoia" 
fiction such as cyberpunk is the supreme and chosen example of the politically-engaged artistic text 
which attempts to give technology its true or proper figural dimensions, and which tries to think the 
totality of global capitalism. For the moment however I would like to comment on what appears to be a 
lacuna in Jameson's argument. In analysing the three-part movement of stages of capital we saw how 
Jameson unproblematically transplanted Mandel's economic dete011inism into his own essay. Jameson 
doesn't see a contradiction between the culture of the simulacrum, which in Debord's eyes poses the 
problem of distinguishing between the real and the fictional for both spectator and the cultural theorist, 
and Mandel 's base-superstructure dete011ini sm of culture reflecting techno! ogi cal I eap s. For James on, 
following Mandel (and Adomo), the culture of the simulacrum is just mirage or effect, an effect of the 
intensification ofthe culture industry's commodification drive. On the other hand, later on in the essay 
he admits a "prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which 
everything in our social life -from economic value and state power ... - can be said to have become 
cultural in some original and yet untheorized sense." ('Postmodemism' 49). Here he returns to 
Baudrillard and Debord, who point to the fiction or staging of the 'real', including the economic, where 
the 'truth of postmodemism' is its utter saturation of and occupation of lived space by signs to the point 
where it is no longer possible to maintain the essentially fictional line between economic and cultural 
spheres, or between truth and fiction. How does this then impact on Mandel's earlier suggestion of an 
'essence' to the economic formation? 
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The fundamental revolutions in power technology- the technology of the production of 
motive machines by machines- thus appears as the detenninant moment in revolutions of 
technology as a whole. Machine production of steam-driven motors since 1848; machine 
production of electric and combustion motors since the 90s of the 19th century; machine 
production of electronic and nuclear-powered apparatuses since the 40s of the 20th 
century- these are the three general revolutions in technology engendered by the capitalist 
mode of production since the "original" industrial revolution of the late 18th century 
(Mandel quoted in 'Postmodernism' 35) 
Although one wouldn't want to quibble over the value and connotations of 'revolutionary' or 
'fundamental', or 'innovations', one should surely question the "revolutionary" and central status ofthe 
so-called 'power technologies', which Mandel seems to establish as some kind of autonomous economic 
essence or transcendental principle of a particular economic situation, internally meaningful and 
independent of external (or cultural ) influences in terms of its importance. Although maintaining that in 
postmodernism "everything in our social life- including economic value ... can be said to have become 
cultural" Jameson seems to want to maintain a contradictory, traditional position, alongside Mandel, 
that certain economic values, most notably that of the 'core' "power technology" which makes other 
technology (and here we have a metaphysical origin or first cause), follow their own pure logic, and are 
exempt from this new cultural determinism
39
. In my book the importance - or what is really the 
perceived dominance- of a particular form of technology has to be returned, in part, to the sphere of 
cultural production. 
The logic here is the obvious principle, quite familiar to Marxism, that value is created by 
humans and language. If some values (exchange value being the obvious example) are more routinely 
or mechanically 'produced' than 'created', then the general cultural value of a 'dominant' technology is 
more created than produced, the result of a hegemonic cultural celebration of its power over weaker 
others. Dominance is seen, culturally constructed, a created difference rather than an inherent 
superiority of value. With regard to postmodern society this amow1ts to the view that the electronic or 
nuclear 'power technology' is not necessarily 'central' to economic production, but mythically 
privileged and maintained- tlus is consistent witl1 one of the subtexts of Jameson's essay, wluch is that 
the West or the First World erroneously believes it is a postindustrial organism, which has no need of 
'older', or what are seen as peripherally industrial, modes of production. What needs to be examined 
and demonstrated is how a certain technological 'mode' within a given economic system is (initially and 
then hegemonically) given the status of the dominant technology over others in existence- how in our 
39 Derrida has demonstrated how important an imagined center is to the 'structurality' of a structure: ''By 
orientating and organising the structure, the centre of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the 
total form ... [but] it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that 
very thing within a structure which, while governing the structure, escapes structurality" ('Structure, Sign and 
Play' 1 09). He goes on to show how this kind of metaphysical thinking assuming pure 'presence' is finally 
being challenged. 
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age, in national and global systems of circulation, the reproductive digital machinery (computer and 
media technology) is celebrated over the older yet equally 'fundamental' machinery of heavy industry, 
of Third World agriculture. Jameson goes some way to recognising the constitutive role of culture in 
celebrating, mythologising and bringing about the dominance of an illusionary 'core', epochal 
technology in his observation of the Futurist's euphoria, "the excitement of machinery in the moment of 
Capital preceding our own, the exhilaration of futurism, most notably, and ofMarinetti's celebration of 
the machine gun and the motor car" ('Postmodernism'36). This overzealous creativity is however 
pruned by a gardener who wants to keep the plant close to the ground, "These are still visual emblems, 
sculptural nodes of energy which give tangibility and figuration to the motive energies of the earlier 
moment of modernization" (36). Art is returned to reflecting a prior economic movement, the base-
superstructure paradigm surfacing again to keep cultural production in its place as reflection. 
What needs to be asserted is the complicity ofthe cultural sphere in the affirmation and 
perpetuation of technological dominance or 'centrality', the creative role played by cultural vectors in 
what emerges as the resultant or the dominant. Culture doesn't just legitimate economic value: it helps 
create it. Cultural production involves itself in the positing of an essence of presence of a technological 
zeitgeist - in the Second Machine Age, by the combined forces usually brought together under the label 
'Modernism'. The machine aesthetic certainly appears more than an Italian eccentricity, as the 
following extract from Wyndham Lewis illustrates. In Blasting and Bombadiering, his raucously 
irreverent account of earlier passions and exploits, Lewis describes an encounter with the arch-Futurist, 
Marinetti, which reveals a shared perspective underneath superficial differences (indeed they agree to 
differ, as the saying goes): 
"You are a futurist, Lewis!" he shouted at me one day, as we were passing into a lavabo 
together, where he wanted to wash after a lecture where he had drenched himself in sweat. 
"No," I said. 
"Why don't you announce you are a Futurist?" he asked me squarely. 
"Because I am not one" I answered, just as point-blank and to the point. 
"Yes, but what's it matter!" said he with great impatience. 
"It's most important," I replied rather coldly. 
"Not at all!" said he . "Futurism is good. It is all right." 
"Not too bad," said I. "It has its points. But you Wops insist too much on the Machine. 
You're always on about the these driving-belts, you are always exploding about internal 
combustion. We've had machines here in England for a donkey's years. They're no · 
novelty to us." 
"You have never understood your machines! You have never known the ivresse of 
travelling at a kilometre a minute. Have you ever travelled at a kilometre a minute?" 
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"Never." I shook my head energetically. "Never. I loathe anything that moves too quickly. 
If it goes too quickly it is not there." 
"It is not there!" he thundered for this had touched him in the raw. "It is only when it goes 
quickly that it is there!" 
"That is nonsense," I said. "I cannot see a thing that is going too quickly." 
"See it - see it! Why should you want to see?" he exclaimed. "But you do see it. You see it 
multiplied a thousand times. You see a thousand things instead of one thing" (38) 
Lewis' ambivalence towards Marinetti 's aesthetic is revealed when he grudgingly admits it's "not too 
bad". Although the whole story recounts his own resistance, and that of the "great London Vortex", to 
the ideological 'advances' ofMarinetti's Futurism, one gets a sense that there is a grudging admiration 
for the personal charisma, anarchic energy and ideology of the "Wop". What stops him from joining the 
ranks of the Futurist machine cult is not so much any aesthetic or ideological difference, but rather 
personal rivalry, ego politics, what he elsewhere confesses to be a touch of megalomania: "The 
"leadership" principle, you understand, was in my bones" (Blasting and Bombadiering 36). There are 
however minor ideological differences: Lewis finds the 'Italian' celebration of the machine a bit 
excesstve. 
The point I am trying to make here is not so much the 'underlying' sameness of Modernist 
viewpoints, but the collective activity of not just 'reflecting', but critiquing, thinking, rejecting and 
'hyping' technological change as progress. As well as looking at 'real' technological innovations or 
revolutions, the perceptions of a revolution or new order need to be addressed. Thus Le Corbusier's 
observation regarding the opening of a new 'open' space of praxis becomes a contribution to the sense 
of the crystallisation of a Second modem world: "To take hold of the modem world and lift it into the 
fantastic possibilities of a machine civilisation endowed with unbelievable powers, that is the adventure 
possible and open to those who are prepared to risk their ease" (New World of Space 11). While 
Jameson is theoretically willing to give Modernism some kind of setni-autonomy in relation to 
postmodernism's conflation of 'economy' and 'culture', when he actually looks at some ofthe 
Modernist representations of Second Machine Age technology (to illustrate the relative ease of their 
depictions of external, kinetic machines in relation to our 'internal', secretive workings of the computer) 
they are once again presented as so many passive reflections of the 'power technology' of the day. 
What is omitted in this mode of analysis is the intentional and competing strategies of 
conferring the status and values of 'newness', 'centrality', 'progress' or 'otherness' on this object-
world. When fleetingly referring to Charles " ... Sheeler's grain elevators and smokestacks" 
('Postmodernism' 36) as representative of a relatively easy Modernist reflection of the dominant 
Second Machine Age power technology (when compared with the secretive, invisible workings of 
contemporary computer technology), Jameson removes the semi-autonomy he is theoretically willing to 
give Modernism in relation to postmodernism's erosion of the space between econotnic and cultural 
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spheres ( 48). In looking at comparative epochal treatments of respective power technologies, Sheeler 
and contemporary Modernists are all reduced to simple corroboration of a pre-existing and 
economically defmed and 'fundamentally' dominant power technology. What this mode of analysis 
omits is the intentional and competing aesthetic strategies of creating status and value, of the 
'progressiveness', 'strangeness', 'centrality' of the new industrial landscapes and kinds of machines, 
factories, and technology. While one might posit a Modernist zeitgeist of emancipation through 
industrialisation cutting across political ideologies, it is important to recognise differences and alliances 
within the larger synthetic whole. As Tashjian points out, Sheeler chooses a certain (conservative) 
ideological perspective, and thus plays a constitutive role in the emergence of a machine aesthetic which 
affirms a certain techno-economic (and cultural) tangent: 
... Sheeler was deeply conunitted to a celebration of American life. Despite the Depression 
he never felt alienated from the large-scale technological forces at work in America 
society ... Sheeler's Precisionist aesthetic was finally predicated on an ideological 
acceptance of modem technology at the heart of industry an urban life. Such a position 
was controversial at a time during the 1920s when intellectuals and artists were debating 
the social value of technology (William Carlos Williams and the American Cultural 
Scene: 1920-1940 86). 
On the other hand we fmd a more sceptical William Carlos Williams in the first two stanza's of 
'Classic Scene' treating the same subject matter, but questioning the status of what is for Jameson an 
unproblematic "smokestack": 
A power-house 
in the shape of 
red brick chair 
90 feet high 
on the seat of which 
sit the figures 
oftwo metal 
stacks - aluminium 
[commanding an area ... ] (William Carlos Williams 84) 
As Tashjian suggests the power technology of the "powerhouse" is represented as a perverse 
manifestation of an older symbolic act of deification, in which natural objects or forces are given 
supernatural powers and anthropomorphic form, as in the sublime. "Williams uses words that can be 
taken to describe the powerhouse literally but that also extend a submerged conceit likening the 
smokestacks to monolithic figures, ancient sculpture of the gods on their thrones perhaps" (William 
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Carlos Williams 85). In turning the smokestack into a god, one could argue Williams subtly mocks the 
hollow 'religion' of technological progress and the constructed centrality of the new 'idolatrous' 
machinery. 
Thus culture dominates through its dominants: at the same time cultural production can't all be 
reduced to the cultural dominant or aesthetic 'sensibility'- texts can be judged with regard to the degree 
of complicity with a dominant, with their acceptance or rejection of a given value-formation. As I have 
mentioned, this perspective- one which sees the construction (or fiction) of dominance- contributes to 
an understanding of the present hegemonic mythology of a postindustrial Utopia around the comer, as 
welcomed by Daniel Bell, and will also help explain some of the ideological mechanisms which 
participate in the construction of class, international and inter-regional power-relationships (relations 
which can't simply be reduced to economic). Jameson's concern is that tl1e very notion of 'post-
industrialism' serves to banish from consciousness the difficult and unpleasant ethico-economic 
relations of dependency on other classes and populations. But while on the one hand it is tempting to 
attribute the skewed relation of reproductive machinery over productive machinery simply to the pre-
existing (and according to Marxism, eternal) division of labour between 'mental' and 'physical' work, 
this latter opposition doesn't seem to hold as much water as it used to. Although the euphoria around 
the information-age serves in part a conventional ideological function, it also deploys and affirms a new 
legitimating principle, a new meta-rule of logic or reasoning which asserts the primacy and 
transcendence of cybernetic efficiency. Once it has been accepted that culture, particularly the culture 
of the simulacrum, is the kingmaker and not just the handmaiden of the market, then it can be shown 
how witl1 cyberhype the neo-Futurist celebration and embracement ofteclmology becomes tl1e metaphor 
of a philosophical or ethical mutation at the heart of material culture, and the establishment and 
enshrinement of the cybernetic legitimating principle of 'performativity'. 
CYBER[N]ET[H]ICS 
Answering the question: What is cyberpunk?- Cyberpunk or Cyberhype 
We have decided to call the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the 
animal, by the name of cybernetics 
Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics 
What is interesting about many of the critical works dealing witl1 specific cyberpunk texts is 
that they inevitably end up returning to a nagging question - one perceives an obligation to answer the 
more general question of what the neologism 'cyberpunk' actually means or refers to. The question 
seems to haunt these studies, as if there is an awareness at some level of the blatant materiality and 
malleability of its signifying function, as something deployed in discourse seen as a chain of signifiers; 
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a conspicuous cog in an inconspicuous machine. Its newness and constructedness as a 'forged' sign 
seems to echo cyberpunk's alleged central thematic obsession with the materiality and superficiality of 
the human body exemplified in the cyborg; all of these signals can be read as symptomatic of the new 
'popular materialism' that we saw Jameson identified in postmodernism: "the deep underlying 
materiality of all things has fmally risen dripping and convulsive into the light of day; and it is [now] 
clear that culture itself is one of those things whose fundamental materiality is now for us not merely 
evident but inescapable" ('Surrealism without the Unconscious' 67). The actual word 'cyberpunk', and 
the cyborg, seems to signal or stand in for a deeper awareness of a cultural context, a language-
machine, in which subjectivities are just cogs or parts like the social 'mechanisms' Kant saw as a 
necessary evil in 'private reason'. As Jameson points out the blatant and flagrant materialism and 
materiality of the Culture lndustry or the media retrospectively refigures culture as always having been 
'mechanical' or functionalist in some way. 
Before one even gets to the debate around the legitimacy of the 'progressive' aspects of 
cyberpunk, the very process of defining 'cyberpunk' seems plagued with ambiguity and contradiction. 
There seems to be no consensus amongst critics on how to define cyberpw1k either as a genre/style or 
as a movement - often a generic or formalist analysis would appear too vexed to even attempt, and 
critics resort to the easier task of pointing to a group of writers in the eighties who regard themselves as 
a movement of sorts. ln this mode of defmition the name 'cyberpunk' refers less to the kind of 
characters in the stories than to the style or ideology of this literary group and possibly even the writers 
themselves, a view promoted by the novelist and publicist Bruce Sterling; Stirling maintains 
"[s]uddenly a new alliance is becoming evident, an integration of technology and eighties subculture. 
An unholy alliance of the technical world of pop culture, visionary fluidity, and street level anarchy" 
(quoted in Olsen 278). Apart from the question ofthe validity ofthis description of goal-orientated 
strategy (to what end did cyberpunk mobilise itself?) the generality and nebulousness of this description 
(which amounts to merely a fashion sense of 'where its happening') problematises this as a definition. 
ln terms of a thematic definition, the cyberpunk writer and editor of Mondo 2000 Rudy Rucker 
maintains rather blandly that "cyberpunk fiction is really ABOUT the fusion of humans and 
machines ... There is a massive human\computer symbiosis developing faster than we can think about it 
realistically" (The User's Guide to the New Edge 9). The preceding chapters have hopefully 
demonstrated that what Rucker claims as the essential preoccupation of cyberpunk has been around for 
a while. Brian McHale, one of the major cyberpunk critics, offers a formalist's definition in 'Towards a 
Poetics of Cyberpunk', with lots of empirical evidence to substantiate his claims, that "there are three 
main bundles or complexes of motifs which cyberpunk SF shares with mainstream postmodernist 
fiction: motifs of what might be called "worldness"; motifs of the centrifugal self; and motifs of death, 
both individual and collective" (247). "Worldness" tums out to be a repetition of his rather reductive 
assertion in Postmodernist Fiction that postmodem fiction is about 'ontological' issues, while 
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Modernist fiction asks, less radically, more 'epistemological' questions. Equally banal is the incredibly 
tedious question that McHale reckons cyberpunk throws out for postmodern subjectivity with its cyborg 
figure: "At what point does a human being cease to be a human being and begin to count as a machine 
?"(256)- a reversal of the conventional SF AI question, 'when does a machine become human?'. In a 
'postmodernism-as-cultural-logic of-late-apitalism' formulation Terence Whalen suggests that "the 
cyberpunks, the mirror-shaded writers from a hi-tech counterculture who put a hard dystopian spin on 
the post-industrial age without ever disputing its ascendancy" ('The Future of a Commodity' 76) bear 
witness to the emergence of an information economy where commodified information serves business 
and there is no "correlation between information and enlightenment" (78) as popular myth would have 
it. And this analysis sees the 'cyberpunk' as a street-wise writer. 
From a totally different (Jungian) angle Ronald Schmitt sees cyberptmk, as exemplified by 
Gibson, as being the symbolic articulation of resistance to an authority who abuses power in society. 
Technology's cybernetic function is subverted by a young class of rebels, and his essay commits itself 
to looking at "the ways in which primitive mythology is used in ritualising and symbolising this 
rebellion against authority" ('The Novels of William Gibson' 65), ways which cyberpw1k shares with 
punk music, such as their common identification with the primal warrior archetype. With regard to the 
semantics of the name 'cyberpunk', it would appear in this interpretation to refer to the characters; he 
points to some of Gibson's characterological creations, the body-painting and mutilation, the voodoo-
derived loa in cyberspace, shades of shamanism, concluding that "Gibson's heroes are truly 
cyberpunks that use technology and mythology to wreak havoc on a technologically based, corp orated 
world" (67). But if Sclunitt sees cyberpw1k and cyberspace as another manifestation of the eternal 
recurrence of inner human symbolism, a projection of the primitive, internal past, Lance Olsen 
maintains that these creations are a reflection of the external, inhuman future: "The most striking 
emblem of cyberpunk integration are the mirrorshades ... Mirrorshades depersonalize and dehumanize, 
giving world rather than self back to the viewer" ('The Shadow of Spirit in William Gibson's Matrix 
Trilogy' 279). 
On the other hand, the very notion of a cyberpunk 'school', genre or movement has been 
questioned. Olsen grudgingly allows the cyberpunk 'collective' a kind of validity within illusion after 
emphasising difference and a "vaguely defined" sensibility: "Although what may fmally matter most in 
speculative fiction are the differences rather than the similarities among the loose group whose names 
have been connected with cyberpunk .. .it is nonetheless significant that during the middle of the last 
decade a number of writers in the amalgam viewed themselves as belonging to a movement that shared 
a vaguely defined but deeply felt sensibility" ('The Shadow of Spirit in William Gibson's Matrix 
Trilogy' 278) .. In Rob Latham's 'CyberPunk=Gibson= Neuromancer' cyberpunk is described as "a 
historically useful, if now perhaps dated, term describing the work of a group of consciously affiliated 
writers striving to bring SF into the information age at the beginning of the 80s" (267)- a similar 
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emphasis here more on the sense of affiliation than anything inhering in the texts themselves. Nicola 
Nixon casts a harsher light on the movement, suggesting that the coherence of a cyberpunk 
'programme' is more due to the slick marketing campaign run by the self-proclaimed publicist and 
marketer of cyberpunk, Bruce Sterling, than any genuinely shared and revolutionary aesthetic or ethic 
('Cyberpunk: Preparing the Ground for the Revolution or Keeping the Boys Happy' 220). She shows 
how Stirling mobilises a 'male' SF lineage, whose "classic Hard" conservatism is first embraced as 
tradition and then flamboyantly rejected: "once he has unearthed adventurous fathers and constituted a 
satisfying filiation for cyberpwlk writers, he can figure oedipal rebellion, reinterring the fatl1ers as 
"mainstream" and celebrating the sons as young turks" (220). Nixon asks "But is cyberpunk realizing 
a coherent political agenda? Is it indeed "preparing tl1e grow1d for a revolution"?" (221), suggests that 
it might be nothing more "professional, self-interested hype or a clever marketing strategy on the part of 
the SF publishing industry itself' (221) and states that '"cyberpunk' is, to a certain extent, a catch-all, 
convenient label for the work of a number of heterogeneous writers" (221). This assault on the validity 
of the term then moves into a deft evaluation oftl1e legitimacy of cyberpwlk's claims to being "sexy 
social critique" (222) through an analysis of various strands in Gibson's work. 
Cyberpunk Sociology 
In studies of the emergence of the sub-generic style of cyberpwlk, the influence of the popular 
futurist sociologies, particularly of Toffler, has been observed (Olsen 279). Lance Olsen maintains that 
"many cyberpunk ideas about these issues were influenced by Alvin Toffler's The Third Wave (1980) a 
generally optimistic futurist sociological study that Sterling calls a "bible to many cyberpunks"(xii)" 
('The Shadow of Spirit in William Gibson's Matrix Trilogy' 279). In many senses the ambivalence 
which characterises the cyberpunk response to technology is discernible in Toffler's future of a 
'practopia', which is neither utopian or dystopian (one might simply accuse it offence-sitting): 
But Third Wave civilisation is also no 'anti-utopia'. It is not 1984 writ large or Brave 
New World brought to life. Both these brilliant books, and hw1dreds of derivative science-
fiction stories paint a future based on highly centralized, bureaucratized and standardized 
societies in which individual differences are eradicated. We are now heading in the 
opposite direction (The Third Wave 367). 
Elsewhere Toffler dismisses the myths that abow1d about multinational control of the global economy, 
and in its place points to a new kind ofpostnationalism, geographically and politically decentred and 
restructured around common goals through networks and matrices (337). Tius is consistent with the 
underlying narrative of emancipation, that the Third Wave "frees us from the machine" (256). To what 
degree this view of the West's trajectory in fact insinuates itself into cyberpwlk and Gibson's fictions 
needs to investigated by working through the fictional material in some detail, a process undertaken 
below. 
92 
Meanwhile Toffler offers a new role for the activist as "techno-rebel" in the Third Wave, a 
position which has some links with a Romantic and Luddite past, but is more accommodating with 
regards to technology, and faces the future head on .. This could also be seen to be related to the 
romance of oppositionality and the a:ffim1ation of sub-cultural languages and organisations one detects 
in cyberpunk. 
"However, most oftoday's techno-rebels are neither bomb-throwers nor Luddites. They 
include thousands of people who are themselves scientifically trained ... as well as millions of 
ordinary citizens." (Third Wave 162) 
"They begin not with technology but with hard questions about what kind of future society we 
want. They recognize we now have so many technological opportmlities we can no longer fund, 
develop and apply them all. They argue therefore the need to select more carefully among them 
and choose those technologies that serve long-range social and ecological goals" (163) 
"The techno-rebels contend that technology need not be big , costly or complex in order to be 
'sophisticated'. "(164) 
"The techno-rebels are also disturbed by the radical imbalance of science and technology ... 
[and]. .. favour devoting more technological attention to the world's poor" (164-5). 
"Taken as a whole the techno-rebel programme provides the basis for humanizing the 
technological thrust" (165) 
Pop sociology seems to offer the cyberpunk artist-creator quite an attractive identity, with plenty of 
street-cred in addition to an older social 'revolutionary' status. The notion of an enlightened vanguard 
of non-violent technology-wise individuals (falling a bit short of the requirements for a revolutionary 
class, but providing an attractive model for those who don't want to rock the foundations) finds some 
resonance in McLuhan's description of the role of the artist who is able to transcend the mundane 
experience and acceptance of the everyday electric age: "The serious artist is tl1e only person able to 
encounter technology with impunity, just because he is an expert aware of the changes in sense 
perception" (Understanding Media 33). 
Do cyberpunk writers perhaps model themselves on or identify with this class of people that 
Toffler identifies, the "techno-rebels"? One needs to take one step back and ask: does 'cyberpunk' and 
the associated teclmo-rebel ideology in fact refer to the writers themselves or to the characters and 
thematics oftl1e texts? Certainly some of the characters and groups in the film Johnny Mnemonic 
(Longo, 1995) appear to be modelled on this imaginary vanguard role. The Loteks are a rebel group of 
media terrorists who join forces with Jolumy and Molly against multinational capital. We are left in no 
doubt as to their narrative and characterological function: they are defined as rebels from the word go. 
The opening title sequence of the film rolls up some introductory text which explains the Loteks as "a 
resistance movement risen from the streets: hackers, data-pirates, guerrilla fighters in the info- wars. 
The corps defend themselves, they hire the Yakuza, still the most powerful of all the crime syndicates". 
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Against the dominating, conformist and hyper-organized high-tech 'syndicates', whether commercial 
(the corps) or political (the Yakuza) (which are all part of the same system of multinational capital 
anyway), the 'low-tech' motley crew of individual misfits, the Loteks, have spontaneously "risen" and 
crystallised.40 
The underground Lotek collective, seems to be living according to Toffler's "techno-rebel 
programme", avoiding big technology, using clean technology, and redistributing wealth and 
resources, playing Robin Hood for the poverty-stricken masses (who can't afford the cure for the awful 
Nerve Attenuation Syndrome [NAS]). The Lotek headquarters, a suspended industrial environment 
called Heaven, provides a whole interior urban space wrought out of recycled mechanical and electronic 
parts and junk, a fact which if missed visually, is explicitly spelt out to Johnny - and the 
henneneutically challenged suburban viewer - when he is first introduced to the place by Lotek leader, 
Jaybone. This eco-friendly use of domestic technology is echoed in Lotek defensive technology, their 
'primitive' yet effective weaponry. While their use of the "low technology" of crossbows and arrows-
standing out in stark contrast to the guns and high-tech weapons of the dominant Y akuza and corporate 
culture (one Yakuza strongman has a kind of laser whip which slices through limbs and bodies with 
great effectiveness)- is supposed to conjure up the merry band of brigands inhabiting Sherwood Forest, 
this also alludes to that other rather hackneyed signifier of tribal eco-friendly consciousness, the 'Red 
Indian'41 . 
Ronald Schmidt draws a comparison between punk (and cyberpw1k) stylistic signification and 
the aggressive visual symbolism of the primitive warrior, suggesting that punks identify and emulate the 
aggressive posturings of the latter. "Where the hippies endorsed a natural, earthy look with long 
flowing hair, the punks 'elaborate hairdos [e.g. the Mohawk] and thick applications of brightly-
coloured make-up resemble the Native American braves' feathered head-dresses and warpaint" 
('Mythology and Technology' 66). The Loteks as cyberpunks share the identification with primitive 
garb and hairstyling with the 70s and 80s pw1ks, but the warrior signification is even more conspicuous 
as they literally copy the facial warpaint of the Native Americans. Ice-T, who plays Jaybone, the leader 
of the Loteks, has tended to play macho, aggressive roles in his previous films, consistent with his 'real 
life' aggressive persona as a rap-artist, an identity which reinforces the ghetto rebel-warrior 
connotation. He is obviously (and, in his other life, outspokenly) a 'man of colour', which again gives 
the seal of authenticity to the group, 'blackness' standing in for 'redness', but also lending its own 
particular shade of Negroid rebellion and resentment to the semiotic complex. Ice-T/Jaybone, whose 
position as rebel leader makes him the concentrated symbol and focal centre of the Lotek structure, 
40 Somewhere between this Manichean dualism lies the free-wheeling contracting class of 'console cowboys' 
and 'couriers', "elite agents who smuggle data in wet-wired brain implants"- of whom Johnny is a member. 
41 The ecological strand, a variant of the older 'freedom' ideologeme, reaches its climax and resolution with a 
super-dolphin (Nature, eco-awareness) conquering encryption (Technology, capitalism ), and saving Johnny 
from brain damage and the world population from NAS. Nature also has a mini-triumph over technology when 
the dolphin manages to fry the inhuman Street Preacher 
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exudes armchair anthropological connotations of 'ethnicity', 'culture' (as opposed to 'society'), a 
contemporary sense of minority, oppressed 'culture' (and an opposition which could be reinterpreted as 
speech against writing, nature rising against culture, man against the machine, and so on).This helps · 
mobilise our old friend, the protonarrative or ideologeme of freedom, as a narrative skeleton for the 
film's narrative -- but inverts it. Instead of moving into modernity, from barbarism to civilisation, we 
have a Rousseauian nostalgia which wills a return to primitivism and the noble savage. Although the 
film's denouement of deprivatising and publicisng the cure for NAS resolves a global struggle of haves 
against have-nots, it also enacts a fantasy return from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschajt, where the tribe, 
the village, the clan or tribe (American Indians, Mrican-American slave culture) triumph against a 
more complex and alienating bureaucractic organisation of social life (the corps [Pharmakon], the 
Yakuza). 
To (rhetorically) rephrase an earlier question, are the Loteks the embodiment, the fantasy 
image, of not just To:ffier's "techno-rebels", or Jameson's or McLuhan's political artist, but the 
imaginary identity of the 'cyberpunk' himself? The enigmatic neologism of 'cyberpunk' as pure 
signifier, was certainly awaiting some kind of visual representation, some manifestation, having being 
drawn into the public domain after the meteoric rise of the 'cyberspace' concept, which did come to 
have a referential coefficient in the Internet. People, outside literary circles and a sci-fi readership, 
didn't have much to put to the word - the 'punk' suffix did cut quite a mean, lean figure of opposition 
to authority, but what was this new 'cyberpunk' identity, what did they look like, what kind of 
attitudes, commitments, praxis emanated from the cyberpunk position? Unfortw1ately William Gibson 
looks like quite an ordinary guy, pretty straight and downright nerdish at the end of the day. The 
Loteks, in their visual iconography and 'style' and their ridiculously successful caper against the 
Pharmakon corporation, seem to be some kind of compensation, a commodified excuse, for the 
hollowness, the manufacturing of the cyberpunk concept as a 'real' literary phenomenon, both in tern1 
of lifestyle and coherent political ideology and praxis. Their creation (that of the Loteks) and 
deployment in the film Johnny Mnemonic seems simultaneously to fantasise and lie about the existence 
and possibility of radical cultural politics in the postmodern world, and reveals Hollywood (and Gibson 
as author and script-writer) cashing in through the commodification of a concept, that of 'cyberpunk', 
already beginning to lose currency. 
Pwlk music is another sociological parallel, prequel or analogy to cyberpunk often pointed to 
by the critics, and a comparison that needs to be investigated and challenged. Lance Olsen, pronouncing 
on the punk half of cyberpunk, describes the "cotmotations of the cow1tercultural sociosphere, 
especially late 1970s punk-rock, itself an embodiment of visionary intensity, anarchic violence, and an 
attempt to return to the pure roots of rock and roll in the same way cyberptmk attempts to return to the 
experimentalism of New Wave writers" (278). The "connotations" might well be suggested but are they 
substantiated by the 'cyberpunks' themselves? In a book on 'cybernetic fiction' which precedes and 
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unwittingly anticipates the critical hype around the cyberpunk phenomenon (The Soft Machine, 1985), 
David Porush examines how punk and New Wave music movements "wamed against these cybemetic 
developments": 
Punks affected a toneless speech, black and white clothes, hair coloured in the impossible 
colours of plastic; they abhorred tans, preferring the paleness that announces perpetual life 
indoors, nearer the machines. Their dress incorporated small flashing lights and LED 
numbers, and they danced with the expressionless and stiff movements of robots, evolving 
a new machine aesthetic out of their bodies. The technological fears and dreams of an 
earlier generation, expressed in metaphor, prophecy and fiction, were here incamated in 
the style of a later one. This style partly relied on its silence. One doesn't talk about high-
tech (it's too obvious to mention), one lives inside it. (The Soft Machine 2) 
Schmitt also discusses the original punk movement as one which rebels against a technological, 
rationalised and unjust society, and agrees with Porush that this is primarily articulated via fashion 
('Mythology and Technology' 65). With regard to the music itself, technology is symbolically tumed in 
on itself via feedback and distortion, and noisy incomprehensible yelling- in cybemetic terms the 
entropic passage from information to noise is encouraged, not thwarted. His main thrust or assertion is 
that 
the punk rocker seeks to subvert all the values that he or she associates with the 
established conventions of a corrupt society and looks to re-energise a musical genre once 
potent but now castrated througl1 commercialisation and hypocrisy. Similarly, Gibson's 
cyberpunks obscure meaning, attack authoritarian values, and celebrate vandalistic and 
anarchistic values using computer and other technologies rather than music ('Mythology 
and Technology' 65). 
In this light punk and cyberpunk share a rebellious edge, and offer a critique of consumerism or 
'commercialism'. While acknowledging the sentiment we need to recall Jameson's comment about 
radical articulations in postmodernity, coincidentally also referring to a punk group; how "even overtly 
political interventions like those of The Clash are all somehow secretly disarmed and reabsorbed by a 
system of which they themselves might well be considered a part, since they can achieve no distance 
from it" ('Postmodernism' 49). This is in fact some ofthe built in frustration of punk music- it knows it 
is "corrupt" already, that it can't escape from the conm1odity fonn (and, if one looks at the petty 
indulgences and lifestyles of the archetypal Sex Pistols, comes to revel in its contamination). Punk 
music doesn't want to "re-energize", doesn't have the righteousness that Schmitt pins on it and that 
cyberpunk has. 
We see that it is not only the critics who wish to draw on the imbecilic and epileptic rage of 
punk music to strengthen the name of the cyberpunks. In Gibson and Longo's Johnny Mnemonic 
(1995) we seethe creators casting two 'hard-core' music artists- who both bring a post-punk 
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authenticity with them- as fairly central characters. Ice-Tis cast as Jaybone, leader of the Loteks, and 
Henry Rollins is cast as the Sandinista-type doctor, Spider, who is at the forefront of the battle against 
the media-disease, NAS, and does voluntary work at the peoples' hospital . We know Ice-T as a much 
respected (and super-successful) gangsta-rap artist, the voice of angry, streetwise black masculinity, an 
allegedly genuine gangster and ex-drug dealer from the ghetto, that unquestionable signifier of reality 
and authenticity. As a countercultural genre, rap, and particularly gangsta-rap, is a black equivalent of 
the punk music and movement a decade before it, drawing on experiences of unemployment, drugs, 
street violence, and taking a generalised confrontational and aggressive stance against everything and 
anyone, including their own. Ice-Tis probably best remembered for his notorious mega-hit, 
'Copkiller'. Henry Rollins, a white guy who in real life pumps iron (and looks like he suffers from 
steroid psychosis), also provides a fine 'punk' pedigree, now playing in his own successful 'grunge'
42 
group (The Henry Rollins Band) but also playing in less successful, but 'harder', American neo-punk 
bands in the eighties. White grunge and black gangsta-rap, the two contemporary 'countercultural' 
heirs of the original punk scene, are thus both metonymically present in the film, their vast generic and 
semiotic powers deployed, or rather employed, to engorge the sense of authenticity and anarchic 
rebellion in the film and to sell these as the 'cyberpwlk' concept. 
Cybernoia\Paranetics 
And even today the notion of a structure lacking any centre represents the unthinkable itself. 
Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play' 
As we saw earlier on in this chapter Jameson sees cyberpwlk in a favourable light, as some 
new attempt within the parameters of a science-fiction genre to think the world system via the 
technology network figure. In Katherine Lindbergh's 'Prosthetic Mnemonics and Prophylactic Politics' 
she reminds the reader that near "the end of Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
he [Jameson] regrets that he did not include a chapter on cyberpwlk .... the vanguard of a new politics of 
daring and definition" (59) and that he sees it as at the forefront of a new ideological struggle and 
critique of capitalism, that moves the battle from the academy onto the street, from the concept to 
representation. Her tone is sceptical, and with Nicola Nixon's feminist critique of cyberpunk, seems to 
present a questioning of the revolutionary ethos that Jameson and other critics ascribe to it. The 
questions we need to ask are, firstly, does the sub-genre actually meet his requirements for a politically 
engaged art, and secondly, is this genre sufficiently new in its orientation, thematics and style to 
warrant serious critical attention as a movement, school and genre in its own right? 
42 A contemporary rock style or sub-genre best described as a nineties blend of eighties American rock-
heavymetal with seventies British punk 
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Jameson's reason for celebrating cyberpunk can be pulled apart by dialectical poles of form 
and content: cyberpunk both evokes and presents the world system. Paranoia - which is dealt with a bit 
further on - is the figural device with which the sublime beyond of machinations and control is 
'suggested', while the Far East is also quite literally present in the commodities, characters, cultures 
and corporations that populate Gibson's world. There is a Japanese crime syndicate, the Yakuza, who 
constitutes a significant actant, there are Ono Sendai cyberspace decks. While according to Jameson 
this making manifest what is normally repressed in the ideological point of view of an immediate world 
oflabour-less products (the Other of production), and this literal 'deterritorialisation' of the Orient as 
geographical Other, could be a positive sign, it could also be read as yet another symptom of the 
(schizophrenic) collapse of exteriority into interiority, or vice versa, a free-floating anxiety which 
recognises that the Other is already 'inside'. 
Nixon argues that Gibson's representation of 'Japaneseness' is both a continuation of a project 
of establishing a feminine or feminised Other (cyberspace, family-run corporations, collective 
organisations) against a fairly conservative Reaganite trope of the individualistic and male 'cowboy' 
entrepreneur. The whole cowboy genre, with its Wild West scenario, is a fantasy landscape which 
Marshall McLuhan has already interpreted as the necessary correlate of, and embedded in, a 
postmodem, hyper-organised socio-economic order. 
The celluloid West still plays something of that role in our imagination. It offers 
equestrian dash and characters of ruthless and exuberant individualism ... The old enemy 
was a slick feudal enemy. The new enemy is the slick and anonymous machine. To people 
overwhelmed by industrial scale, the West restores the image of the human dimension. To 
a commercial society far advanced along the road of monopolistic bureaucracy, the West 
holds up the primordial image of the lonely entrepreneur. Tlus is why the celluloid image 
becomes more and more vivid as the historical actuality gets dimmer (The Mechanical 
Bride 156). 43 
Nixon points out how in Neuromancer Case as a 'console cowboy' individually takes on the collective 
Others of the multi-nationals and the Japanese Corporations, and sexually "jacks in" into a feminised 
cyberspace, and "penetrates" viral ICE, and finally the coveted data banks ("the matrix itself is figured 
as feminine" ['Cyberpunk: Preparing the Ground for the Revolution or Keeping the Boys Happy?' 
226]). Her reading of the macho cyberpunk cowboy hero defining himself against a feminized and 
collective (whether it be corporate or domestic-nuclear) Other, is also affirmed by McLuhan. He sees 
the typical male identity, entangled in a net of social and economic commitments, as feeling threatened 
43 His reading of the Western and of the nostalgia ofpostmoden culture seems to corroborate the point made 
earlier, that Jameson's theory ofpostmodernism is also indebted to McLuhan. The above passage continues: 
"Closely associated with these cultural dynamics is the deep nostalgia of an industrial society, a nostalgia bred 
by rapid change. Obsolescence is a major reality in tltis kind of world ofbusiness turnover. .. Hair, clothes, 
educational, and hit-parade patterns are switched faster than the young can grow into them" (156). 
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in the (post)modem world: "For millions of men horse opera [the cowboy world] presents a 
reassuringly simple and nondomestic world in which there are no economic problems. In that territory 
mating, likewise, is a simple affair without elaborate courtship and dating preliminaries" (Mechanical 
Bride 156). 
Nixon additionally locates Gibson's Orientalism within a xenophobic isolationism and 
nationalistic fervour that gripped American media culture in the eighties, expressing fears of Japanese 
economic expansionism. This force was countered by a sense of the necessity of Japanese investment, a 
view that lead to an "open-door policy to Pacific Rim countries" in British Columbia, Gibson's home. 
This field of ambivalence, needing yet fearing foreign penetration, not to mention commodities, is what 
Gibson's brand of cyberpunk emerges out of, in which no simple 'racist' impulse can be construed. 
If we examine Gibson's texts within the context of such conflicting interests, we seethe 
degree to which he deliberately avoids any form of simplistic anti-Japanese paranoia or its 
attendant etlmocentrism. And yet Gibson's Japanese conglomerates, in their collective 
and familial practice nevertheless form the implicit antagonistic counterpoint to the 
individualist heroes. The bad guys in Gibson are, after all, the megacorporations- Ono 
Sendai, Hosaka, Sanyo, Hitachi, Fuji Electric. The good guys are the anarchic, 
individualistic, and entrepreneurial An1erican heroes: independent mercenaries and 
"corporation extraction experts" like Turner, console cowboys like Case, Bobby 
Newmark, Gentry, Tick and the crew at the Gentleman Loser who jack in and out oftl1e 
matrix with unparalleled mastery. ('Cyberpunk: Preparing the Ground for the Revolution 
or Keeping the Boys Happy?' 224) 
The same can be said for the wave of Japanese and Asian technological products flooding the North 
American markets in the eighties, particularly cheap computer equipment. The genius of Silicon Valley 
is now seen to be threatened by the cloning factories of the East, which manage to replicate hardware 
the moment it hits the market: tl1e myth rests on and presents an opposition something like "Japanese 
pragmatism and mass production versus American innovation and ingenuity" (225). The American 
cowboy in Gibson's cyberpunk survives through sheer 'mastery' of the networks. They've got the 
hardware but we make the software. If this is paranoia, and a schizophrenic confusion and horror at the 
con:flation of exteriority into interiority, then it is not a variety tl1at agrees with the Leftist politics and 
criteria of Jameson's project of repoliticisation or cognitive mapping. 
If, as Nixon and McLuhan have shown, the figure of tl1e console cowboy is an element within a 
conservative, nostalgic and nationalistic mythology, and also affirms yuppie entrepreneurial success, it 
additionally celebrates tl1e emergence of a new brand or class of computer-skilled, or at least computer-
literate, contractors: programmers, database administrators, systems analysts, computer graphic and 
multimedia artists and editors, software developers, hardware and networking technicians. The cowboy 
is a hired hand (sometimes even a mercenary), as is the computer or media worker. The trend in the 
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above-mentioned sectors is towards contract as opposed to permanent positions: although relatively 
highly valued and employable as contractors they no longer have the security, both fmancial and 
ideological, of life-long commitments to and from single corporations. They are either self-employed, 
temporary employees (contractors), or else transient employees, temporary in so far as they move 
around a lot more, migrating from one company to the next in search of the optimum package-
contracting is only a possibility because of the interchangeability of these skills. Gibson's 'matrix' or 
cyberspace is their terrain - the new economic environment and work space which must be 
mythologically dressed for this new class. The popularity and literalisation of Gibson's fictional 
neologism to refer to the Internet (or the World Wide Web) is evidence of this affirmative role that 
cyberpunk plays - or is made to play - in the evocation of 'the paperless office' and the 'new' 
information society on its way.
44 As suggested above Gibson's 'cyberspace' creation also symbolises in 
a more allegorical mode the flux and instability of this new labour market, figuring it as afield of 
power, the spatialisation of the economic dangers that confront the free-floating subject cut loose from 
corporate ties at the cutting edge of a cut-throat late capitalism. 
In the previous chapter the identification of the 'paranoid type' as Jameson's preferred variety 
of schizophrenia (he identifies "high-tech paranoia" of an exemplary 'cyberpunk' art) can now be 
linked to its specific mode of response to the new reproductive machinery and media networks that 
characterise the present moment. In Kaplan and Sadock 's Synopsis of Psychiatry we find an interesting 
case study of a paranoid schizophrenic whose 'inappropriate' or deviant behaviour stems from his 
belief that he is the centre of a media-teclmological surveillance system: 
The patient maintained that his apartment was the centre of a large communication system 
that involved all three major television networks, his neighbours, and apparently hundreds 
of "actors" in his neighbourhood: There were secret cameras in his apartment that 
carefully monitored all his activities. When he was watching television, many of his minor 
actions (for example, getting up to go the bathroom) were soon directly commented on by 
the announcer. Whenever he was outside, the "actors" had all been warned to keep him 
under surveillance; everybody on the street watched him. His neighbours operated two 
"machines"; one was responsible for all his voices, except tl1e "joker". He was not certain 
who controlled that voice, who visited him only occasionally. The other voices, which he 
heard many times each day, were generated by that machine, which he sometimes thought 
was directly run by the neighbour whom he attacked. For example, when he was going 
44 The argument here is that Gibson's oeuvre is both critical and affirmative, wary and celebratory. Gibson's 
textuality certainly extends futher than Jameson and the Science Fiction Studies critics- his brand of cyberpunk 
has a wide 'popular' following or readership, a popularity which can largely be put down to its brilliantly 
detailed rendering of a whole new futuristic object world, as well as 'colourful' cultural and sub-cultural 
intricacies. For many readers and viewers this 'form' or detail is really the content, and the politically correct 
eco-Marxist emancipation 'content' mere form. 
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over his investments, those "harassing" voices constantly told him which stocks to buy. 
The other machine he called "the dream machine". That machine put erotic dreams into 
his head, usually of black women. (Kaplan & Sadock 472) 
In psychiatric discourse persecution, voice hallucinations, thought insertion and thought broadcasting 
are all recognised symptoms of schizophrenia. But in the above patient's fantasy we see a distorted 
reflection or figuration of the actual, unrepresentable world of control that Jameson identifies as both 
the media network and global capitalism. Porush states that "the most primitive literary response to the 
threat of cybernetics is paranoia. Cybernetics and paranoia are naturally linked at the most general level 
because the first threatens to, and the second is threatened by, control tl1rough forces beyond the power 
of the individual" (The Soft Machine 85). If we extend this essentially literary model to a greater 
cybernetic system, then this still holds, and paranoia becomes a response to the multiple networks and 
systems of postmodern society. The patient's 'paranoia' above is thus the 'faulty' representation of a 
subjectivity striving to "cognitively map" its situatedness or position in the sublime and 
incomprehensible circuits of power, communication and capital: unfortunately the centreless networks 
are centred around the illusory centre of the patient. While tl1e machine broadcasting voices directly into 
his mind is obviously an extension of the new 'magical' media, which bombard the subject with a 
variety of conflicting discourses (and the "other" "dream machine" the more pleasant 'fantasy' effects 
of the same mechanism, television), the voices commenting on his investments seem to compensate for 
the absent, repressed human and class relationships (and constitute tl1e return of the repressed global 
tentacles of capital) behind the illusory face of money and commodities, not to mention the even more 
abstract level of stocks, shares and financial schemes, which constitute "our" (Western) dialogue with 
foreign populations- earlier we are told that his illness first manifested itself properly after seven 
months as an investment consultant. In its inability to properly represent what catmot be represented 
the paranoid patient meets Jameson's requirement of the more 'energetic' postmodernism, that it is able 
"somehow to tap the networks of the reproductive process at1d thereby to afford some glimpse into a 
postmodern or technological sublime" ('Postmodernism' 37). 
Cyberpunk, which seeks and sees similar interfaces with teclmology, and similarly creates 
hyperbolic metaphorical worlds and scenarios based on the existing one, and also sees a malignant 
conspiring other in language and informational machines, whether they be cyberspace or multinationals, 
manages to "tap the networks" in a similar, paranoid-figural way. Gibson's fictional world of 
cyberspace is the perfect example of this technological sublime, where the self looses itself, is finally 
obliterated ("flatlined") or temporally transcended (distracted) in the all-consuming matrix. In his 
'Cyberspace at1d the Sublime' Jack Voller discusses the way Gibson accesses an older quasi-religious 
model of the sublime: 
In this new romanticism, "sublimity" is accessed not on mountain tops, but tl1rough technology, 
the source and locus of cyberspace, Gibson's analogue of the infinite and the eternal- the 
101 
playground, in other words of the gods. In cyberspace one slips the shackles of body and time 
... and cyberspace is defined at one point as "that space that wasn't space, mankind's unthinkably 
complex consensual hallucination .... where the corporate hotcores burned like neon novas, data so 
dense you suffer overload if you tried to apprehend more than the dimmest outline" (Count Zero 
38-39). This collation of images makes evident the fact that data has acquired the attributes of 
Yahweh and Jesus- attributes normally associated with mountain-tops, the traditional place of 
epiphany, and especially for the romantics, of sublime experience" (22). 
Voller's main emphasis is on the religious modulation in this new sublime, and to this end he traces the 
Voodoo elements that inhabit Gibson's matrix .. What he doesn't develop or touch on is the focus on the 
negative experience of terror or awe, and on the mind's limited capacity for representation, in the pre-
Romantic theorisation of the sublime (as we saw in Kant and Burke). In the Count Zero quotation 
above- "mankind's unthinkably complex consensual hallucination ... ", we seem to have a direct allusion 
to the unthinkability, or the failure of representation, of Kant's totality of Nature - and possibly 
Jameson's revised totality of Capitalism. Indeed the reference to "corporate hotcores [which] burned 
like neon novas, data so dense you suffer overload if you tried to apprehend more than the dimmest 
outline" would appear to speak more specifically about a concealed and inaccessible commercial or 
economic content (in Jameson's eyes, the 'secret' of the economic world system itself) than any 
nebulous religious or spiritual beyond. 
Complimenting cyberspace the multinational is another threatening Other for cyberpunk. In 
Gibson's Mona Lisa Overdrive we find the omnipresent multinational Tessier-Ashpoollogo appearing 
on a print-out: "TESSJER-ASHPOOL SA, the typeface regal and spidery" (63). The ominous 
metaphor of the spider, at the centre of a web, is hinted at to present a picture oftl1e structure of 
capital, to place the multinational corporation at the centre of a sublime and unpresentably or 
"unthinkably" complex and centreless money-system and commodity network. One can see why 
Jameson is attracted to paranoia as a protocritical response; it presents an active attempt to extricate 
itself from what its sees as the predatory web ofteclmology, ideology and discourse that manipulate and 
regulate subjectivity in postmodernism. 
But is this adoption of the paranoid view something new to Gibson and cyberpunk? Lindberg 
quotes Gibson on the origin of his fictional world from an interview where he describes watching the 
intensity of kids playing video-games in what she describes as a "cybernetic bio-informationloop". 
Gibson is reported as saying "It was like one of those closed systems out of a Pynchon novel: a 
feedback loop with photons coming off the screens into the kid's eyes, and neurons moving through 
their bodies, and electrons moving through the game" ('Prosthetic Mnemonics and Prophylactic 
Politics' 61). If we look back to Pynchon, who Gibson appears to acknowledge here quite explicitly as 
some kind of forerunner of the cyberpunk genre, we find the example of a fully developed paranoiac 
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thematic in which "cybernetic bio-information loops" involve the bizarre combination of different kinds 
of 'machines'. 
She awoke at last to find herself getting laid; she'd come in on a sexual crescendo in 
progress .... outside a fugue of guitars had begun, and she counted each electronic voice as 
it came in, till she reached six or so and recalled only three of the Paranoids played 
guitars; so others must have plugged in. Which indeed they were. Her climax and 
Metzger's, when it came, coincided with every light in the place, including the TV tube, 
suddenly going out, dead, black. It was a curious experience. The Paranoids had blown a 
fuse (The Crying of Lot 49 27). 
There is a strange 'paranoid' connectedness here in which biological reproduction intersects (in the 
coincidental 'blow out') with electric and electronic reproduction machinery. The television also 
interfaces with them (their seduction had taken place in front of and involving the plot of a television 
programme), creating a semiotic network of broadcasting, desire, seduction, plot and the electrical 
network that joins the television, the rock group 'The Paranoids', and the couple. The orchestration of 
biological and electronic 'reproductive' process, sex, broadcasting, amplified music seems to pun on the 
theory of a culture of simulacra, or the reproduction (as opposed to production) process that typifies 
postmodernism, and which also alludes to a cybernetic view. The cybernetic view of the human 
machine is shown to share a reductive materialism with schizophrenic desire. Deleuze and Guattari 
propagate a 'schizophrenic' view of the world which sees "not man as the king of creation, but rather 
as the being which is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who 
is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an 
energy machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal 
custodian of the machines of the universe" (Anti-Oedipus 4). TI1ey see the schizophrenic tapping the 
logic of desire, a kind of prelinguistic grasp of the world as the combination and interaction of different 
kinds of machines all involved in some kind of production. In 'POSTcyberMODERNpunkiSM' Brian 
McHale maintains that Pynchon is a crucial "feedback loop" between SF and postmodernist fiction, and 
extremely influential on all cyberpunk: "The presence ofPynchon's texts, Gravity's Rainbow (1973) in 
particular, is pervasive in cyberpunk fiction at all levels, from the minutest verbal details up to the 
paranoid world view and conspiracy theory ofhistory characteristic of most cyberpunk fictional 
worlds" (231). The 'central' "paranoid" thematic of cyberpunk, which is also obvious in William 
Burroughs ('POSTcyberMODERNpunkiSM' 229), is then much older than cyberpunk- what remains 
'new' is the dressing, the "high-tech" detail, a sumptuous baroque series of technological 'digi-tech' 
gadget-fantasies, multi-ethnic backdrops, and endless repetition of a tired theme. McHale seems to be 
suggesting that cyberpunk is like some kind of extended, endless commentary on Pynchon and his 
cybernetic paranoia. 
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Cybernetics and the Performativity Principle 
Organism is opposed to chaos, to disintegration, to death, as message is to noise 
-Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics 
Along with the hegemony of computers comes a certain logic , and therefore a certain set of 
prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as "knowledge" statements. 
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 
The very ethos of cybernetics, its hidden 'spirit' (or perhaps the more two-dimensional 
metaphor of 'force' is more appropriate), could well be the emerging cultural sub-dominant of the 
teclmological sublime that Jameson attempts to identify within the global dominant of postmodemism, 
and cyberpunk and cybernetic science-fiction of the Pynchon mould the generic forerunners of a now 
significant aesthetic and mythology criss-crossing and linking genres, as well as different cultural forms 
(not just literature, but music, film, television and so on). The question that needs to be answered in the 
following section is: how, specifically, would what we have provisionally called 'cyberhype', in 
reference to the above-mentioned (and as yet undefined) general cultural style, then relate to the 
scientific principles or axioms of cybernetics, a specifically scientific or technological discourse? The 
answer would have to try to map the seepage of cybernetic principles from technological and 
engineering discourse into other cultural realms. 
Cybernetics mobilises and enshrines what has been identified by Lyotard as the 
'performativity' principle of legitimisation: cybernetics is thus a technological logic or power which 
reads social and natural realities as informational machines needing to be regulated and managed 
according to the 'performativity' principle of optimum perforn1ance. It ignores the older concerns of 
truth, justice and taste, reducing all forms of linguistic practices to communication of information, the 
various heterogeneous language games and activities to the 'total system'. Lyotard traces a genealogy 
in which cybernetics is affiliated to a functionalist school of sociology of which Talcott Parsons is the 
most emblematic theorist; the earlier positivist organic model of society of the nineteenth century 
French school (Comte et al) was superseded by a mechanical one: "The theoretical and even material 
model is no longer the living organism; it is provided by cybernetics, which during and after the second 
World War, expanded the model's application" (Postmodern Condition 11). 
Discussing the relative merits of the brain and the new computing machines, Norbert Wiener, 
the father of cybernetics, remarks that "It is thus advantageous to remove, as far as possible to, the 
human element from any elaborate chain of computation and to introduce it only where it is absolutely 
unavoidable, at the very beginning and the very end." (Cybernetics 118). The obviousness of this 
prescription hits us, instantly presenting itself as anachronism. We no longer have to argue the validity 
of replacing human processes or activities with computerised ones; to insist on human labour where a 
machine is much more efficient no longer has any logical weigllt, and its inverse, the assertion of the 
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superiority of computer technology, is just as obsolete. The legitimating principle of performativity or 
efficiency has quietly triumphed everywhere to the point of becoming transparently obvious (to the 
point of invisibility)- it doesn't need articulation anymore. 
If Wiener's observation-prescription ("it is thus advantageous") appears out of date its appeal 
to a logic or authority of economic utilitarianism or control according to performativity also seems 
prophetic: this is of course due to its now all-pervading power in the seemingly separate cultural 
spheres of art, science and politics, what in early modernity were envisaged as relatively autonomous 
departments of reason. Both Habermas and Lyotard confront in their separate ways the problem of the 
legitimation of knowledge or cultural production when these distinct spheres with their own rules lose 
their autonomy and get replaced by what Habermas sees as all-consuming 'cognitive-instrumental 
reason', and what Lyotard discerns as the metaprescriptive ofperformativity or efficiency.
45 Jurgen 
Habermas recalls Weber's analysis of the emergence of cultural modernity as 
the separation of the substantive reason expressed in religion and metaphysics into three 
autonomous spheres. They are: science, morality, art. These came to be differentiated 
because the unified world-views of religion and metaphysics fell apart. Since the 
eighteenth century, the problems inherited from these older world-view could be arranged 
as to fall under specific aspects of validity: truth, normative rigl1tness, authenticity and 
beauty. These could then be handled as questions of knowledge, or of justice and morality, 
or of taste. Scientific discourse, theories of morality and jurisprudence, and the production 
and criticism of art could in tum be institutionalised ('Modernity- An Incomplete Project' 
103). 
The domains of these autonomous realms of reason are ruled or controlled by professional specialists. 
"This professionalized treatment of the cultural tradition brings to the fore the intrinsic structure of 
each of the three dimensions of culture. There appear the structures of cognitive-instrumental, of moral-
practical and of expressive-aesthetic rationality ... " (103). If this echoes the Kantian project of the three 
Critiques, Habermas seems to acknowledge the role played by the Enlightenment thinkers in this regard 
a bit further on in his essay: "The project of modernity formulated in the eighteenth century by the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal 
morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic" (103). The project of modernity is, 
at this point, also founded on the myth of enlightenment of the general public through this specialisation 
-all of this cultural production will somehow be returned to the masses. Both these characteristics, the 
45 In the The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge Lyotard examines the contemporary tension 
between the dominant 'performativity' or 'efficiency' criterion and a new paralologicalmethod, two different 
forms of legitimating knowledge production. He traces the emergence of the older performativity legitimation 
through the decline of the older 'myths' oflegitimation, the grand Enlightenment narratives of emancipation 
and totality with its criteria of truth and justice. 
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drive to systemic totality and to emancipation, constitute Lyotard's prime targets of meta-narrative 
legitimation in The Postmodern Condition. 
In Habermas' The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity this theory of heterogeneous 
rationalities resurfaces in an analysis of the multi-faceted speech act, which appears to respect a 
Kantian plurality of language games, as well as corresponding 'worlds'. "With any speech act, the 
speaker takes up a relation to something in the objective world, something in a common social world, 
and something in his subjective world" (Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 313). Unfortunately the 
status or power of these respective worlds have not developed equally as envisaged by the architects of 
modernity. The history of Reason has seen the lop-sided growth of the 'objective world' and its 
instrumental logic of reification; cognitive-instrumental reason, which involves the mastery of a subject 
over objects, has been overcultivated and overextended beyond its domain through the manipulations of 
capitalism and rationalisation. Habermas points out how (perversely) 
communicative potential of reason first had to be released into the patterns of modem 
lifeworlds before the unfettered imperatives of the economic and administrative sub-
systems could react back on the vulnerable practice of everyday life and could thereby 
promote the cognitive-instrumental dimension to domination over the suppressed moments 
of practical reason (Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 315). 
Rules relating to specifically intersubjective relations, what Kant saw as "practical reason" and its 
foundational principle of moral freedom, are overwhelmed by the totalising logic of subject-object 
relations. People are treated as objects, or as merely part of the "objective world" Habem1as identifies 
as the ontological correlate of cognitive-instrumental reason. The identification or delineation of the 
form of instrumental reason is partly based on the theorisation of reason and rationality of the Frankfurt 
School, particularly Adorno and Horkheimer's influential Dialectic of Enlightenment. What they 
identify is an instrumental reason which is really the will to power of mathematical language, and which 
translates the realities of both social and natural worlds into pseudo-concepts or abstractions which are 
to be administered and calculated according to economic productivity. As Thomas Docherty puts it, "a 
mathematical consciousness thus produces the world, not surprisingly, as mathematics ... Knowledge, 
conceived as abstract and utilitarian, as a mastery over recalcitrant nature, becomes characterised by 
power" ('Postmodernism: An Introduction' 6). Adorno and Horkheimer explain that the underlying 
drive ofteclmological innovation and scientific knowledge is a mastery of Nature, for specific ends: 
"What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men ... 
power and knowledge are synonymous" (Dialectic of Enlightenment 4). Enlightenment Reason 
dominates both Nature and thinking or consciousness through objectification and abstraction -
"Nature .. is that which is to be comprehended mathematically ... mathematical procedure became, so to 
speak, the ritual of thinking .. .it turns thought into a thing, an instrument- which is its own term for it" 
(Dialectic of Enlightenment 24-5). 
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With the "conununicative reason" that Habermas proposes, the validity claims of 'normative 
rightness' and 'subjective truthfulness' are allotted equal value to the dominant legitimation of 
'propositional truth'; thus according to Habermas "correlative to the three fundamental functions of 
language, each elementary speech act as a whole can be contested under three different aspects of 
validity" (Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 313). Of course this is in an ideal and idealistic 
speech situation in which these three validity claims are equally recognised. What Habermas doesn't 
really confront here is the historical mutation of the 'truth' claim of a cognitive-instrumental reason 
dealing with objects into the more technological and production-orientated logic ofperformativity; a 
transition which Lyotard accomplishes. 
In his book The Postmodern Condition Lyotard discards the architectonic thinking of 
Habermas, and looks at the historically verifiable failure of the Enlightenment myths and the crisis of 
legitimation: the loss of faith in its grow1ding or legitimating myths of progress or emancipation, and 
universality or totality. For Haberma~ these myths still offer some hope; his proposal is to resurrect 
them for a co-ordinated cultural programme. But for Lyotard the resort to philosophies of history are 
no longer adequate. These forms of narrative legitimation of knowledge no longer seem to generate the 
power or authority they used to: if modern is "any science that legitimates itself with some reference to 
a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative" (xxiii) then 
postmodern is "incredulity towards metanarratives" (xxiv). Tlus incredulity arises from both inl1erent 
inadequacy and external pressure from new forms of legitimation and validity. 
Lyotard traces the crisis of legitimation in the sciences, and observes the widespread 
acceptance of a new validity criterion (a kind of metanarrative) of 'performativity' - "the best possible 
input-output equation" (The Postmodern Condition 46)- or 'efficiency' which definitely emerges out 
of the crisis, although as the handmaiden of technological innovation and capitalist growth since the 
late eighteenth century it has been arom1d longer ( 45). Tlus is the legitimation to which systems theory, 
logical positivism and other positivisms turned: no longer is the question asked "is it true?", but instead 
"how efficient is it?". In his Introduction he describes the newer form of legitimation- one which is 
premised on control or social 'management' according to this principle of efficiency or "maximum 
performance", and in its hegemonic status finds a 'terroristic' force. 
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to 
input/output matrices, following logic which implies their elements are interchangeable. 
They allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and scientific 
truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on optimising the system's performance 
-efficiency. The application of this criterion to all of our games necessarily entails a 
certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) or 
disappear. (Postmodern Condition xxiv) 
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Lyotard doesn't seem to be too keen on this return (almost a full circle) to what Habermas identifies as 
"unified world views of religion and metaphysics", where the new religion is that of cybernetics or 
systems theory, in which all language games obey the same principle: "The operativity criterion is 
technological; it has no relevance for judging what is true or just" (xxv)
46
. This view echoes Adorno 
and Horkheimer' s observation of the amorality of teclmology: "kings, no less directly than 
businessmen, control technology; it is as democratic as the economic system with which it is bound 
up ... " (Dialectic of Enlightenment 4). Technological improvement doesn't necessarily mean a more just 
society, in fact (one gets the sense they are implying this) it can mean the opposite. 
Against the development of positivism and the efficiency principle, which would appear to still 
be the dominant (or at least a still powetful) philosophical-scientific vector, Lyotard poses the new 
trend of postmodern knowledges which unfold without a separate and legitimating authority. Where the 
determinism of cybernetics, positivism or systems theory presumes stability, predictability the 
alternative trend acknowledges, even seeks, instability, uncertainty and contradiction. 
Science does not expand by means of the positivism of efficiency. The opposite is true: 
working on a proof means searching for and "inventing" counterexamples, in other words, 
the unintelligible; supporting an argument means looking for a "paradox" and legitimating 
it with new rules in the games of reasoning. In neither case is efficiency sought for its 
own sake; it comes somewhat tardily as an extra, when the grant givers finally decide to 
take an interest in the case. But what never fails to come and come again, is, with every 
new theory, new hypothesis, new statement or new observation, is the question of 
legitimacy. For it is not philosophy that asks this question of science but science that asks 
it of itself. (Postmodern Condition 54) 
The new discourse includes its discourse of legitimation, the rules that enable the game, in itself, and is 
continuously in the process of modifying them, as in the accommodation of paradoxes. In fact it not 
only includes them but is primarily concerned with the re-examination and revision of these 
'metaprescriptives'
47
. External legitimation, the form of legitimation in both the older grand narratives 
of modernity, and in the perfonnativity rule of positivism, is no longer utilised. 
Thus Lyotard ends his discourse on postmodernity with the choice between the technocratic 
solution in ascendancy, which sees society as a homogenous organism or mechanism, or total system, 
and the alternative properly postmodern 'project' of endless fission, paralogy and innovation based on 
46 "A cybernetic machine does indeed run on information, but the goals programmed into it, for example, 
originate in prescriptive and evaluative statements it has no way to correct in the course of its functioning- for 
example, maximising its performance. How can one guarantee that performance maximisation is the best goal 
for the social system in every case?" (Postmodern Condition 16) 
47 ''The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is 
to point out these metaprescriptives (sciences "presuppositions") and to petition the players to accept different 
ones." (Postmodern Condition 65) 
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local and temporary validity claims, which views society as a myriad of heterogeneous language games 
(following Wittgenstein). 
We are finally in a position to understand how the computerization of society affects this 
problematic. It could become the "dream" instrument for controlling and regulating the 
market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the 
performativity principle. In that case, it would inevitably involve the use of terror. But it 
could also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives by supplying them with the 
information they usually lack for making knowledgeable decisions (fostmodern Condition 
67). 48 
How do these theories connected to cybernetics? If we stereotype the cybernetic view as one which 
demands the replacement of the human with the machine, or of different language games with the 
essential characteristic of informational communication, and which assumes the superiority ofthe 
technological criterion of efficiency over all others, then these theories all respond negatively to this 
view. We saw how Norbert Wiener insists that "it is thus advantageous to remove, as far as possible, 
the human element from any elaborate chain of computation ... ". The cybernetic logic is geared towards 
optimising the system, its central premise or principle is that what is important or valid or 
"advantageous" above all else is performance. Adorno and Horkheimer claim this - the reduction of 
knowledge to technology, culminating in Lyotard's time as the "computerization of society"- amounts 
to the reduction of thinking as well as the world that emerges from this consciousness: with the 
scientific Enlightemnent (which they see, like Foucault, as the beginning of the teclmology of human 
domination) "thinking objectifies itself to become an automatic, self-activating process; an 
impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately the machine can replace it" 
(Dialectic of Enlightenment 25). Against Habermas' Utopian hopefulness (being able to return to an 
integrated cultural programme which returns knowledge to the people) one detects the perception of a 
dominantly cybernetic and technocratic world in Lyotard's diagnosis of the present leading into the 
future. 
For brevity's sake suffice it to say that functions of regulation, and therefore of 
reproduction, are being, and will be further withdrawn, from administrators and entrusted 
to machines. Increasingly the central question is becoming who will have access to the 
information these machines have in storage to guarantee the right decisions are made. 
Access to data is, and will continue to be, the prerogative of experts of all stripes. The 
ruling class is and will continue to be tl1e class of decision makers. Even now it is no 
longer composed of the traditional political class, but of a composite layer of corporate 
48 The solution, to "give the public free access to the memory and data banks", is coincidentally the same as the 
symbolic resolution deployed in Johnny Mnemonic, where the LoTeks emancipate the data-cure for Nerve 
Attenuation Syndrome from Pharmakon's privatised memory banks (via Johnny), and then broadcast it to the 
masses. 
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leaders, high-level administrators, and the heads of the major professional, labour, 
political, and religious organizations (Postmodern Condition 14) 
Here again machines replace humans or human processes, but following the Frankfurt School, the new 
technology doesn't impact on everyone in the same way; it still maintains a socio-political divide 
between those who have power and those who doh't. The system appears to be progressing according to 
an immanent principle of self-improvement but this enhancement of its powers and performance suits 
the interests of "the class of decision makers". 
110 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A POETICS OF CYBERNETIC FICTION 
Yet the city housing projects designed to perpetuate the individual as a supposedly individual 
unit in a small hygienic dwelling make him all the more subservient to his adversary -the 
absolute power of capitalism 
Adorno & Horkheimer, 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment and Mass Deception' 
And that no man might buy or sell, save that he had the mark, or the name of the beast, or 
the number of his name 
-Revelations 13: 17 
From the discussion of the definitions of the cyberpunk concept above one would be justified in 
discerning a thread of scepticism towards the category in my analysis. Apart from all the problems and 
contradictions mentioned, cyberpunk often gets reduced to its most prominent and skilful practitioner, 
William Gibson, a phenomenon objectionable to some but in my opinion symptomatic of the 
foundational limits (and limited lifespan) of the label
49
. In his article 'Cybepunk=Gibson 
=Neuromancer' Rob Latham points out that in the collection of essays (from a cyberpunk symposium) 
called Fiction 2000: Cyberpunk and the Future of Narrative most of the 17 papers treated not just 
Gibson, but even more specifically his most famous work, Neuromancer, the first of the Sprawl trilogy, 
as the locus of their enquiry. He seems a bit disappointed at the fact that "the movement, as a literary 
practice and a cultural ideology, gets forced into a straightjacket" (266). He doesn't consider the idea 
that the term itself might be overly rhetorical to start with, and that it might not be able to be stretched 
much beyond a personal style developed by Gibson and Sterling, plus a few others who have cashed ·in 
on the publicity, and the attendant and overzealous critics. 
In an age of increasing artistic commodification one has to maintain a certain critical relation 
towards self or critic-proclaimed declarations of literary or cultural movements. Although one might be 
tempted to see (postmodern) cyberpunk as a school, style, ideology or movement along the lines of a 
(Modernist) Futurism or Vorticism, there seems to be none of the earlier group interaction, 
cohesiveness and process of self-definition; whereas Futurism had a coherent and articulated "cultural 
ideology" (to use Latham's term) it is difficult to find a similar system of ideas, values and goals in 
cyberpunk.- there are no manifestos, publications etc. If we are pushed to abstract an aesthetic and 
ethical framework, something like a critical reaction to the hegemo:riic cybernetic culture emerges, an 
ironic cybernetic aesthetic. As has been pointed out this is not peculiar to cyberpunk, but stretches back 
to include writers such as Pynchon, Burroughs, Philip K. Dick ,etc. This does not amount to a 
wholesale rejection of the usefulness of the cyberpunk category; what I am suggesting is that a more 
49 It has been noted how in postmodernism, the present is becoming exponentially smaller, more intense and 
concentrated, as fashion cycles grow shorter, and more cut off from the past. Culture and consciousness are 
tending towrads a series of pure presents, in which continuity is lost, and narrativeor memory breaks down. 
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fruitful context-orientated critical approach would be to emphasise a larger literary (possibly even more 
generally cultural) formation or corpus, one which doesn't even have to know itself as such, 
corresponding to more general social and cultural changes. Changes in the technological infrastructure 
of culture, television, modem film, video, the pop music industry (what Jameson calls the postmodem 
culture of the simulacrum) broadly define or set the horizons of a new cultural space. Jameson's 
identification of a postmodemism, corresponding to the third machine age of nuclear and electronic 
technology seems quite a fundamental and useful historical break in which to locate what has been 
partially revealed as a cyberpunk aesthetic. TI1is larger formation, of which cyberpunk can now be seen 
as just the latest matlifestation or wave, we might call cybernetic literature or fiction, and draws from 
renegade postmodem lligh literature, as well as science-fiction 5°. 
Retunling to Jameson, we see him occasionally substituting the word 'cybernetic' for his term 
'postmodem' used for referring to the cultural space produced around and through electronic 
technology. In his preface to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition, Jameson discusses the three stages 
of technological production, and mentions the " ... tlurd, cybernetic or nuclear variety" (Foreword to 
Postmodern Condition xiii). Here 'cybernetic' seems to be a useful shorthand for the nexus of 
education, control, and entertainment effected by the media and electronic machines in tllis new 
machine age. Altl1ough tllis view of a cybernetic culture only comes to the fore in postmodemism, it is 
possible to look back into a modernity of control systems predating fully-fledged cybernetic systems. 
Foucault exanlines tl1e mode of commwlication in the space of the school classroom of the classical era 
and discovers a mode of 'signalization' tl1at operates witl1 a "mechatlical brevity" (Discipline &Punish 
166). It is "a question of understanding tl1e injunction but of perceiving the signal and reacting to it 
immediately, according to a more or less artificial, prearranged code ... a little world of signals to eacl1 of 
which is attached a single, obligatory response ... few words, no explanation, a total silence interrupted 
only by signals" (166). Tllis diagrammatic description of the actual flows of what is essentially and 
reductively information, a representation of an almost electrical or digital infom1ation flow, bears a 
marked resemblance to a scene in Pynchon's classic proto-cyberpunk novella, The Crying of Lot 49: 
the protagonist Oedipa's experience upon arriving in the recently developed Californian town, San 
Narciso. 
She looked down a slope, needed to squint for the sunlight, onto a vast sprawl of houses 
which had grown up all together, like a well-tended crop, from the dull brown earth; and 
she thought of tl1e time she'd opened a transistor radio to replace a battery and seen her 
first printed circuit. The ordered swirl of houses and streets, sprang at her now from tllis 
high angle with the same unexpected, astonishing clarity as the circuit card had. Though 
she knew even less about transistor radios than about Southern Californians, there were to 
50 See Jruneson: " ... the beginnings of postmodernism, where a new interpenetration of high art and mass 
culture enables conspiritorial plot-constructions such as those of Pynchon to attain 'artistic' or high-brow 
stat1ding. (Geopolitical Aesthetic 9). 
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both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of meaning, an intent to communicate (The 
Crying of Lot 49 14-15). 
One might be tempted to argue that these two perceptions are completely opposed to each other. Where 
Foucault reduces a three dimensional discursive situation to the flat functional space of the circuit 
board, Oedipa 'humanises' the circuit board, giving it the depth of an "intent to communicate". 
But what becomes obvious is that the "intent" is really her own projection, the overall effect of 
her becoming aware of a new cybernetic society in emergence around her. What is common to these 
two insights is the resemblance or correspondence that Oedipa sees in the circuit board and the planned, 
structured suburb that causes the flash-back Lived three dimensional space is collapsed like Foucault's 
effect. She detects a sameness that exists across completely different products of human enterprise; the 
difference here that is most conspicuous is the size difference. The micro-world of the electronic 
circuitry and the macro-dimension of industrialised housing developments. What is significant for 
Oedipa, almost revelatory - "a revelation trembled just past the threshold of her understanding" (The 
Crying of Lot 49 15), is an "unexpected" perception enabled by a perspective from above, a sight from 
a "high angle" on a slope. Her elevated perception takes her out of her normal ideological subject-
position or point of view within the world of familiarity, the houses, streets and shops of middle-class 
suburban subjectivity, and gives her a glimpse from outside and above, of the big picture, a sense of 
design, normally the privilege of the real-estate developer, the military or the 'military-industrial 
complex', or God. What she sees is the prototype of the machine, the design and manufacturing 
according to the rules of maximum efficiency and functionality, a recurring systemacity (or city-
system) that can be encountered in products of different magnitudes or dimensions including the 
product or construction of our physical environment. What she perceives is a new, thoroughly 
engineered space governed by a techno-scientific logic appropriate to the inhuman two-dimensionality 
of a circuit board. The power ofthis 'total' cybernetic space is only really evoked in the comparison -
the sameness and omnipresence of 'plannedness', of design. Neither technology precedes the other -
social engineering and electronic design are part of the same hyper-organised system in which the 
postmodern subjectivity finds itself- and are thus indistinguishable from one another, existing, to 
borrow a phrase from Adorno and Horkheimer, as an "entanglement of myth, domination and labour 
[my italics]" (Dialectic of Enlightenment 32). 
Jameson also refers to the above passage, that famous circuit board scene, a perennial favourite 
for Pynchon critics, describing his style as a "space in which new cybernetic figures are forged and 
elaborated: static op-art after images spw1 off the bewildering rotation of just such cyberplots" 
(Geopolitical Aesthetic, 16). But his project here is to reveal not so much a cybernetic literature as a 
more general and postmodern conspiracy allegorical form, a type of fiction which unconsciously tries to 
map the totality of the world system. As one mode among others the narrative representation of 
cybernetic environments speak about the atmihilation of nature at1d the investment of the object-world 
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with an "intent to commW1icate", as well as the new reproductive machinery itself. Porush's book, The 
Soft Machine - Cybernetic Fiction, ambitiously attempts to outline a fiction which both emerges out of 
and confronts the axioms and logic of cybernetics. Jf, for instance, cybernetics sees language as 
informational code (and the mind as an input-output device), cybernetic fiction might both start from 
this and also coW1ter with a view that consciousness cannot be wholly reduced to and adequately 
expressed as pure information or code (the recurring 'spirits in the machine', the voodoo spirits and 
other ghosts that inhabit Gibson's otherwise strictly infonnational zone of cyberspace, seem to speak 
of this incommensurability). Porush also touches on what I have tried to stress, namely the real, 
historical emergence of a new culture and hegemonic logic of performativity (Wiener's vision of an 
applied cybernetics come true), altl1ough he doesn't really go on to develop this "contextual" analysis: 
"The extremity of cybernetic fiction's response can only be explained by the extremity of the 
technology creating its context: cybernetic fiction is a means for the author to present himself or his 
literature as a soft machine, a cybernaut -like hybrid device, combining human vulnerability and 
imagination with machine-like detenninism" (Soft Machine 22). Although this description appears a bit 
like an elaboration of the central cybernetic figure itself, tl1e cyborg or cybernetic-organism, it does go 
some of the way to showing how cybernetic fiction including cyberpunk- the label now taking on new 
resonances once again - responds ambivalently to tl1e hegemonic cybernetic ideologeme. 
Jf cybernetic fiction and cyberptmk manage to critically engage the new techno-scientific world 
in emergence around us it is not always done directly. In fact indirect means almost begins to be an 
absolute necessary criterion for the kind of fiction we have been looking at. Cybernetic fiction could 
thus be seen as a loosely organised- although stylistically and thematically continuous- attempt to 
think beyond the familiarised and naturalised present (both geographical and historical) and to 
constitute a form of 'political' postmodernism which doesn't just reflect the new landscapes and spaces 
ofpostmodernity or late capitalism. As I have already mentioned, Jameson's discerning of stronger 
(essentially more critical) postmodern texts which manage "somehow to tap the networks of the 
reproductive process and thereby to afford some glimpse into a postmodern or technological sublime" 
suggests an allegorical mechanism, or the mechanism of the sublime in altered form. Conspiracy is 
common means for acllleving this "glimpse", because of the growing complexity of social networks and 
systems, This would seem to provide a fairly reliable criterion for evaluating a text and its right to 
claim the title of cybernetic fiction -it has to move beyond the bland representation of a normalised and 
neutral object-world for us to consider it as attempting to conjure up the power and awesomeness of the 
new tecl1nology which confronts us as absolute Other. 
Cybernetic fiction, as a conspiratorial form thinking the totality via teclmological figures, 
could even be extended to what appea.r to be the antithetical myths of contemporary Christianity. As 
many critics have pointed out Gibson's cyberpunk has as one of its favourite targets the reborn 
televangelism sweeping conservative America: witness the Street Preacher in Johnny Mnemonic, played 
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by a bearded Dolph LlUldgren, a cyborg assassin with a passion for crucifixion and other sadisms. 
Although the Street Preacher has all the trappings of a holy man his ideology hides an evil cash 
principle and wicked soul. Like wise his externally wholesome muscular body hides the many synthetic 
implants his earnings pay for. This seems allegorically to speak about Christianity (particularly the 
evangelical variety) in the Third Machine Age, an anachronistic ideology of anti-materialism apparently 
resisting technology, but paradoxically centred in and propping up the whole "cash nexus" (Pynchon's 
phrase) that is America, and again paradoxically making ample use of the new media and technologies 
of persuasion. 
Ironically, however, cybernetic and cyberpunk fiction seem to bear a family resemblance to the 
new eschatological discourse and narrative fantasy that is so popular on the American Christian cable 
channels, the promises and stories about the rapture and the Beast For example, on the (South African-
based) Trinity Broadcasting Network's menu of American chatshows a favourite topic is the Book of 
Revelations, and the mark of the Beast; colUltless experts on the Scriptures tell the reader the mark of 
the Beast, the number 666, is the only way in which the subject will be able to operate and interact in 
an emergent cashless society (Revelations 13: 17). One expert has offered a new reading of the mark, 
that the number will be in as opposed to on the hand; the mark is in fact a microchip implant the size of 
a grain of rice. Describing this on TBN he actually produced a chip, already being used in (and, more 
metaphorically, on) animals, whose exact location on the globe can be located by the powers that be. 
The experts talk of a new culture of numbers; numbers rule Christian lives, citizens are reduced to 
numbers by the Government. 
Once again Jameson indirectly provides an insight into this techno-paranoia and credit-phobia, 
suggesting the more complex tl1e world economic system becomes, the more confused tl1e allegories 
which try to map it become as well. 
Surely the newer spy novels, with their bewildering multiplication of secret or private 
espionage operations within public ones, their dizzying paper structures (more philosophically 
dematerialized and ideal than the stock market) turning on the facile but effective device of 
the double agent, so that whole teams of villains can be more transformed into heroes at the 
flip of a switch- surely these go a certain way towards declaring at least the intent to 
construct a narrative which is in some way the analogon of the unimaginable 
overdetermination of the computer itself (Geopolitical Aesthetic 16). 
What is frightening about the "dizzying paper structures" of virtual money in the apocalyptic vision of 
the credit system or televangelism's "cashless society", is the overwhelming power of the culture of the 
simulacrum or media to show up the 'groillldless' foillldations of late capitalism. Money is no longer 
tangible, ownable, real- and the necessary correlate of labour. Reproductive processes can no longer be 
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separated from productive processes- money is no longer material, concrete, a sign of individual toil 
and divine reward in the age of instant lottery millionaires, overnight media stars and the infomercial 
mail-order systems. For this particular televangelical conspiracy genre, which thematically draws on 
apocalyptic scenarios, but employs the formal elements of the cybernetic paranoid hermeneutic of 
conspiracy, technology is also the threatening other. Although it claims that technology is the sign of 
the Beast, we (the hierophants of late Marxism) can invert that so that the Beast is the mark of 
technology which is the sign of the now even more complicated and unthinkable national and world 
systems. In a bizarre twist one has to admit that evangelical techno-paranoia is itself a lunge at 
cognitive mapping in the same vein as cybernetic fiction; its principal tragic character, the shopping 
cyborg with its 666 implant, awaits damnation at Judgement Day. 
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